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Abstract
This Report culminates a year-long project undertaken by the Joseph R. Crowley Program in
International Human Rights to study the impact of the Mexico City Policy in Kenya and to analyze
the applicable international human rights standards. This Report sets out the findings and legal
analysis that resulted. Following this Introduction and a cataloguing of our recommendations,
Part I examines those international human rights obligations that the Mexico City Policy most
obviously implicates. In Part II, the Report turns to the impact of the Mexico City Policy upon
these rights in Kenya. Part III of this Report turns to the understudied question of whether and
to what extent donor nations, such as the United States, are or should be held responsible by the
international community for the violations of international law that their policies promote. Here
the Report concludes that there exists some basis for establishing such responsibility, but there are,
nonetheless, significant gaps in current international law that the international legal community
should consider and address.
SPECIAL REPORT
EXPORTING DESPAIR: THE HUMAN
RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF U.S.
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"After [the clinic] closed, I was stranded. When I went to an-
other clinic, the services were not as good. It was discourag-
ing because they always told me to come back another day."'
"We still see a lot of people, but we just don't have the same
supplies we used to. [They ask] 'why have you abandoned
us?' [Our clients] liked our services, but not now."2
"Clients were praying that we wouldn't close [the clinic] but
we had to. '
INTRODUCTION
These voices, together with many others, speak to the im-
pact in Kenya of a policy known as the "Mexico City Policy."
They tell a common story. In light of clinic closings and staff
cutbacks resulting from the Mexico City Policy, the level of
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sity.
1. Interview with Marren Acheing, former client, Family Planning Association of
Kenya [FPAK], in Kisii, Kenya (May 20, 2004) (on file with Crowley Program).
2. Interview with Hussein Maran, Kenya Community Health Workers Program, in
Embu, Kenya (May 20, 2004) (on file with Crowley Program).
3. Interview with Dr. Methuselah Ocharo, former FPAK Embu Clinic Manager, in
Embu, Kenya (May 20, 2004) (on file with Crowley Program) [hereinafter Former
FPAK Ocharo Interview].
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health care in some areas has deteriorated dramatically in terms
of availability, access, and quality.4 Nowhere has this decline
been more significant than in poverty stricken areas and among
poor women - where health care is needed the most.5
Often termed the "Global Gag Rule," the Mexico City Policy
is a regulation that issued not from Kenya, but rather the United
States.6 On January 22, 2001, President George W. Bush issued
an Executive Memorandum that formally reinstated a set of re-
strictions prohibiting foreign non-governmental recipients of
U.S. family planning funds from, among other things, promot-
ing or advocating abortion as either a means of family planning
or, in all but potentially fatal cases, as a procedure to safeguard a
woman's health.7 These restrictions, in the first instance, bind
the U.S. Agency for International Development ("USAID"), the
principal conduit through which U.S. bilateral funding for
health care flows to Kenya and to the developing world.8 First
adopted in 1984 under the Reagan Administration,9 the Mexico
City Policy was rescinded by President Clinton in 1993 for a pe-
riod of seven years."0 In 1999, the policy was revived statutorily
by Congress, which attached it as a condition to an appropria-
tion act for the 2000 fiscal year. 1 President Bush restored it on
4. See Global Gag Rule Impact Proj., Access Denied: The Impact of the Global Gag Rule
in Kenya [hereinafter Access Denied: Kenya], available at http://www.globalgagrule.org/
pdfs/casestudies/GGRcase-kenya.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2005) (claiming that five
family planning clinics closed as a result of the country's two leading reproductive
health organizations refusing to follow the restrictions, thus severely disrupting wo-
men's access to vital services).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See Access Denied: Kenya, supra note 4, at 3.
7. See Memorandum on Restoration of the Mexico City Policy, 37 WKLY. CoMp.
PRES. Doc. 216 (Jan. 22, 2001).
8. See Memorandum for the Acting Administrator of the USAID: Restoration of
the Mexico City Policy, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,303 (Mar. 28, 2001) [hereinafter USAID
Memo].
9. See Policy Statement of the United States of America at the United Nations In-
ternational Conference on Population (Mexico City, Aug. 6-14, 1984), reprinted in 10
POPULATION & DEV. REv. 574, 578 (1984) [hereinafter Mexico City Policy]; see also Sharon
Camp, The Impact of the Mexico City Policy on Women and Healthcare in Developing Countries,
20 N.Y.U. J. Ir'L L. & POL. 35, 37-38 (1987). The policy was initially enforced against
the International Planned Parenthood Federation ("IPPF") in 1984. Id. at 38. In 1985
it was officially implemented by the U.S. Agency for International Development
("USAID") by inserting a "standard clause" in contract grants. Id.
10. See Bush Moves to Outflank Democrats on Abortion Finance Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
25, 2001, at 23.
11. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropria-
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an ongoing basis in 200112 and, two years later, extended it be-
yond USAID to all foreign population assistance programs
within the purview of the U.S. Department of State.'" The Mex-
ico City Policy became one point of difference during the 2004
presidential campaign when Senator Kerry stated that, if elected,
he would revoke it.' 4 President Bush's reelection, however, vir-
tually guarantees that the restrictions will continue at least until
2009.
This Report culminates a year-long project undertaken by
the Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights
to study the impact of the Mexico City Policy in Kenya and to
analyze the applicable international human rights standards.' 5
As such, it is the first study to focus upon how the Mexico City
Policy implicates international law and to do so with reference to
a specific country. In this effort the Report has benefited greatly
from a substantial literature on the impact of the Mexico City
Policy upon the developing world. For the most part, this litera-
ture confirms predictions that U.S. restrictions on its develop-
ment funding would undermine the goals of improving the pro-
vision of reproductive and general health care in countries
where these services are lacking. 6 Such studies, however, have
documented the effects of the Mexico City Policy from the per-
spective of health care or development.' 7 Whether the docu-
mented effects violate international obligations such as the right
to health have, for the most part, been addressed in passing. In
addition, much of the existing literature examines the Mexico
tions Act, Pub. L. 106-113, §§ 599(C), 599(D), 113 Stat. 1501, app. 130, 130-33 (1999)
[hereinafter Appropriations Act].
12. See USAID Memo, supra note 8, at 3.
13. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush for the Secretary of State
Regarding Assistance for Voluntary Population Planning, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,323 (Aug. 22,
2003).
14. See Reproductive Health: Ten Years'Hard Labor, ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 2004, at 65.
15. See Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights, Home Page,
http://www.crowleyprogram.org (providing background information regarding the
Crowley Program).
16. See, e.g., Access Denied: Kenya, supra note 4; see also Ctr. for Reproductive Rights,
Expanded Global Gag Rule Limits Women's Rights and Endangers Their Well-Being
(Dec. 2, 2003), http://www.crlp.org/hill-int-ggr-hiv.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2005);
Global Gag Rule Impact Proj., The Impact of the Global Gag Rule in Ethiopia (Sept.
2003), http://www.globalgagrule.org/pdfs/casestudies/GGRcaseethiopia.pdf;
Global Gag Rule Impact Proj., The Impact of the Global Gag Rule in Kenya (Sept.
2003), http://www.globalgagrule.org/pdfs/case-studies/GGRcase-kenya.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Access Denied: Kenya, supra note 4.
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City Policy on a regional basis and does so with a statistical em-
phasis. By contrast, this Report explores whether, and to what
extent, the Mexico City Policy violates human rights obligations,
in particular the rights to health, to free expression, and to be
free from discrimination based upon gender. It considers the
extent to which these obligations bind developing nations in the
first instance, yet also addresses the novel issue of the responsi-
bility of donor nations, such as the United States, when they en-
courage violations of these rights through their funding policies.
To apply this legal analysis, this Report concentrates on the ex-
perience of a particular developing nation - in this case, Kenya
- and highlights the personal testimony of individuals whose
fundamental rights are at issue.
The Fordham delegation studying these issues was led by
Professors Martin S. Flaherty and Tracy E. Higgins, and the
2003-2004 Crowley Fellow, Mehlika Hoodbhoy, and included six
second-year Fordham Law students: Robin Boucard, Lindsay
Ernst, Amy Howlett, Erin Kelly, Kenneth Powers, and Michael
Yim.
Following the Program's established practice, the Crowley
delegation undertook an intense program of academic study in
the year leading up to the mission."8 This course of preparation
included a seminar focusing on the Mexico City Policy in Kenya
specifically. While in Kenya, from May 14 to May 31, 2004, the
delegation met with Kenyan government health officials, repre-
sentatives of USAID, 19 health care administrators from non-gov-
18. See Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Tracy E. Higgins, No Recourse: Trans-
national Corporations and the Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Bolivia, 27
FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 1663, 1666 (2004); Nicole Fritz & Martin S. Flaherty, Unjust Order:
Malaysia's Internal Security Act, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1345, 1347 (2003); Jeanmarie
Fenrich & Tracy E. Higgins, Promise Unfulfilled: Law, Culture, and Women's Inheritance
Rights in Ghana, 25 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 259, 261 (2001); Crowley Program in Int'l
Human Rights & Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez, Presumed
Guilty?: Criminal Justice and Human Rights in Mexico, 24 FOROHAM INT'L L.J. 801, 804-05
(2001); Crowley Program in Int'l Human Rights, One Country, Two Legal Systems?, 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 3-4 (1999); Crowley Program in Int'l Human Rights & Lawyers
Comm. for Human Rights, Justice on Trial: State Security Courts, Police Impunity, and the
Intimidation of Human Rights Defenders in Turkey, 22 FORDHANI INT'L L.J. 2129, 2132
(1999).
19. Much of the information regarding USAID policy that we present here was
gleaned from research on the agency's website and other documentary sources. Al-
though we made many requests to interview USAID staff both in Washington, D.C. and
Nairobi, those requests were either declined or ignored with few exceptions.
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ernmental organizations ("NGOs"), human rights advocates,
doctors, nurses, and health care clients throughout the country.
The delegation conducted over 100 interviews in all."'
This Report sets out the findings and legal analysis that re-
sulted. Following this Introduction and a cataloguing of our rec-
ommendations, Part I examines those international human
rights obligations that the Mexico City Policy most obviously im-
plicates. Most important in this regard is the right to health, as
set out in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"), especially as elaborated by the
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ("CESCR")
and the U.N. Rapporteur on the Right to Health.2 This Part
will also make clear the relevance of the rights of free expression
and the prohibition against gender discrimination set out in,
among other instruments, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). 2 z With respect to fulfillment of
such rights, this Report begins by spelling out our recommenda-
tions to the U.S. Government, the Kenyan Government, and the
international legal community.
In Part II, the Report turns to the impact of the Mexico City
Policy upon these rights in Kenya. It first considers Kenya's
health care system, Kenya's necessarily heavy reliance as a devel-
oping nation upon outside donors, and the historic role played
by USAID in addressing Kenya's systemic health care needs.
Next, Part I sets out in detail how USAID policy changed under
the complex restrictions on funding embodied in the Mexico
City Policy. Finally, Part II sets out and summarizes the Crowley
Program's extensive interviews with individuals directly affected
by the Policy. Taken together, these interviews suggest that the
Policy has had a significant impact upon many communities in
Kenya and confirm the findings of more general regional stud-
ies.
Part III of this Report turns to the understudied question of
whether and to what extent donor nations, such as the United
States, are or should be held responsible by the international
20. See infra Annex 1 (detailing Crowley delegation's itinerary in Kenya).
21. See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 12,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]
(Kenya acceded on May 1, 1972).
22. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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community for the violations of international law that their poli-
cies promote. Here the Report concludes that there exists some
basis for establishing such responsibility, but there are, nonethe-
less, significant gaps in current international law that the inter-
national legal community should consider and address.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
A. To the United States Government
1. The Bush Administration should rescind the Mexico City
Policy and direct that USAID funding be dispensed without re-
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strictions concerning discussion of abortion as a means of family
planning.
2. At a minimum, the Mexico City Policy should be modified so
that it is no more restrictive than limits that obtain with regard
to domestic health care funding within the United States.
3. The Bush Administration and USAID should undertake a
comprehensive study with regard to the impact of the Mexico
City Policy on the provision of reproductive and general health
care in all countries in which the restrictions apply.
4. More generally, the U.S. government and USAID should
consider whether and to what extent funding decisions would
cause or facilitate the violation of the human rights obligations
previously assumed by the recipient State. Toward that end, U.S.
funding agencies should undertake "human rights impact assess-
ments" in implementing funding decisions.
5. The United States should take a leading role in promoting,
and at a minimum not impede, efforts by the international legal
community to expand definitions of third-party State responsibil-
ity, especially in the context of developed States deploying their
economic power in ways that pressure developing States to vio-
late their human rights obligations.
6. The United States should ratify the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men.
B. To the Kenyan Government
1. To the greatest extent possible, the Kenyan government
should adopt budgetary priorities that would better insulate re-
productive health providers from dramatic shifts in donor poli-
cies.
2. The Kenyan government should seek to close the gap in re-
productive health care funding that has resulted from the Mex-
ico City Policy by soliciting donors who do not restrict the provi-
sion of health care in the same manner.
3. The Kenyan government should ensure that third parties do
not interfere with the provision of services, supplies, and medi-
cally sound information in a manner that leads to retrogression
in the level of health care.
4. The Kenyan government should fulfill its obligations under
CEDAW Committee Recommendation 24 and the commitments
[Vol. 29:1
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it made at the International Conference on Population and De-
velopment by allocating the resources necessary to implement its
comprehensive national health strategy.
5. The Kenyan government should reallocate health care fund-
ing to emphasize preventative rather than curative care. With
respect to reproductive care, it should upgrade existing health
and family planning facilities that serve poor populations in or-
der to improve access. It should also pay particular attention to
providing reproductive health care in a manner that maximizes
women's access to such services.
6. The Kenyan government should ensure that health facilities
are equipped with the infrastructure, supplies, and medical per-
sonnel necessary to provide the highest feasible quality of care as
per the General Comment Fourteen on the Right to Health.
7. The Kenyan government should ensure access to informa-
tion about reproductive health services including contraceptives,
family planning, safe abortions (as allowed by the Kenya Penal
Code) and HIV/AIDS prevention.
8. The Kenyan government should ensure that adolescents
have access to appropriate services, including information about
reproductive health and HIV prevention.
C. To the International Legal Community
1. The international legal community generally should con-
sider the problem of the state of international law in situations
in which wealthy States use their wealth and influence to pres-
sure developing countries in particular to violate their human
rights obligations.
2. Where possible, transnational, government, and non-govern-
mental bodies interpreting human rights instruments should
seek to expand their extraterritorial effect, especially with regard
to economic, social, and cultural rights.
3. The International Law Commission and relevant U.N. bod-
ies should reconsider the Draft Articles on State Responsibility in
light of third-party donor State actions that facilitate recipient
State human rights violations.
4. Derivative responsibility under Draft Article 16 needs to be
broadened and clarified. Specifically, the requirement that an
assisting State must itself be bound by the human rights obliga-
tions the principal State has violated as a result of the assisting
State's actions should be eliminated.
2005]
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5. Likewise, the Article 16 standard for the assisting State's
knowledge concerning whether its actions would result in
human rights violations should be clarified to include situations
in which the assisting State had objective reason to know of po-
tential violations.
6. Derivative responsibility under Article 18 should be ex-
panded by broadening the definition of coercion to include
State actions that make it substantially or overwhelmingly diffi-
cult to take any other course.
7. Similarly, the Article 18 standard for the assisting State's
knowledge concerning whether its actions would result in
human rights violations should be clarified to include situations
in which the assisting State had objective reason to know of po-
tential violations.
8. The international legal community needs to recommit to
the concept of an international duty to cooperate in the realiza-
tion of economic, social, cultural, and development rights. Such
an effort should be designed to complement the current Millen-
nium Development Goals.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW
The denial of foreign aid to organizations that "perform or
actively promote abortion as a method of family planning"23 im-
plicates several fundamental rights recognized in international
law. Foremost is the right to health.24 Where a policy retards or
reverses the progressive realization of adequate health care, a
violation has presumptively occurred. Likewise, the Mexico City
Policy further raises questions with regard to freedom of speech
and expression to the extent it restricts health-related informa-
tion and silences health care practitioners and providers. Given
that any adverse effects on the provision of reproductive health
care by definition affect women more than men, the Policy's
funding constraints also potentially jeopardize core interna-
tional prohibitions against discrimination based upon sex. This
Part will analyze these three sets of rights and consider the obli-
gations that they entail.
23. See Mexico City Policy, supra note 9, at 578.
24. See, e.g., The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable
Standard of Physical and Mental Health, U.N. Comm. on Human Rights Res. 2003/28,
59th Sess., 56th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/28 (Apr. 22, 2003).
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The Mexico City restrictions raise further issues still - ques-
tions that approach the current frontiers of international human
rights law. In conventional analysis, obligations to abide by
human rights standards run to the nation within whose territory
or jurisdiction violations occur. It follows that in the first in-
stance, Kenya stands responsible for insuring the rights to
health, free speech, and gender equality within its borders, espe-
cially since Kenya itself has acceded to various international in-
struments establishing these rights.25 It is important to note,
however that - to the extent that it accounts for violations of
any or all of these rights - the Mexico City Policy issued not
from Kenya, but from the United States. The Kenyan govern-
ment in no way welcomed the imposition of the new funding
restrictions.26 As a practical matter, the United States, as a
wealthy donor nation, can be understood to have caused any rel-
evant human rights infringements - both directly and by pres-
suring Kenya as a developing recipient nation to violate its own
human rights obligations. Nor is this framework limited to the
health care context. A similar situation would arise, for exam-
ple, if the United States or another prosperous nation condi-
tioned its foreign aid to a heavily dependent developing nation
upon the proviso that the recipient government subject detain-
ees suspected of terrorism to interrogation methods that would
violate at least that nation's treaty obligations to refrain from
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.27
This Report will defer to Part III the complex issue of poten-
tial U.S. legal responsibility for the effects of the Mexico City
Policy in nations such as Kenya.2" This Part will emphasize Ke-
nya's obligations with respect to the rights at issue. It will do so
for several reasons: First, these obligations do run to the govern-
25. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 21; see also infra note 30.
26. See, e.g., News Release, Population Council, Do Population Policies Matter?
(Sept. 18, 1998), available at http://www.popcouncil.org/mediacenter/newsreleases/
jain.html (stating that "in Kenya... external forces - principally the World Bank and
the U.S. - [are] seen as having played [a] significant role in policy determination").
27. Such a situation is hardly fanciful, given the practice of "extraordinary rendi-
tion," through which the United States allegedly hands over detainees directly to na-
tions in which illegal mistreatment is a significant concern. See Comm. on Int'l Human
Rights & Ctr. for Human Rights and Global Justice, N.Y.U. School of Law, Torture by
Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to "Extraordinary Renditions," 60 RECORD
OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 13, 28-34 (2004).
28. See infra Part Ill.
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ment of Kenya as a formal matter. Second, though not a focus
of this Report, it may be that Kenya could have taken measures
to avoid or minimize the impact of the Mexico City Policy upon
its human rights commitments, regardless of the magnitude of
U.S. funding at stake. Finally, and most importantly, Kenya's for-
mal violation of its human rights obligations potentially serves as
a predicate for U.S. responsibility in ways that will be explored in
Part III. This analysis cannot be done, however, without first
considering the rights themselves.
A. The Right to Health
1. Substance and Objectives
The principal treaties setting forth the right to health gener-
ally, and reproductive rights in particular, are the ICESCR29 and
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women ("CEDAW") .3o Kenya has acceded to both
instruments.3 The general definitions of the rights set out in
these documents have been clarified by treaty-implementation
bodies, such as the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights ("CESCR"), through General Comments.3 2 CESCR Gen-
eral Comments Three3 3 and Fourteen 4 address in detail matters
affected by the Mexico City Policy. Further elaboration of health
29. See ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 12.
30. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
art. 11, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (Kenya acceded on Mar. 9, 1984) [hereinafter
CEDAW]. The right to health is also protected in the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5, March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S.
195 (Kenya acceded on Sept. 13, 2001) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
art. 24, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (Kenya acceded on July 30, 1990) [hereinafter
CRC].
31. See Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Ratification Status of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, http://
www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/3.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005); see also
Div. for the Advancement of Women, Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, States Parties to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, http://
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
32. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights [CESCR], Report on the Twentieth and Twenty-First Sessions, 51, U.N. Doc. E/
2000/22 (2000) (describing the role of General Comments).
33. ECOSOC, CESCR, The Nature of States Parties Obligations, CESCR General Com-
ment 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1990/4 (1990) [hereinafter General Comment Three].
34. ECOSOC, CESCR, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, CESCR
General Comment 14, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter General
Comment Fourteen].
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and reproductive rights appears in the Beijing Platform for Ac-
tion ("Beijing Platform") 5 and the Cairo Programme of Action
("Cairo Programme")3 6 declarations. The Beijing Platform and
the Cairo Programme have been adopted by the world commu-
nity, and Kenya is a party to both. 7 Finally, judicial decisions
from other jurisdictions also bear upon the proper interpreta-
tion of international health care rights.3" While none of these
sources that lend additional definition to the Treaty text are
binding in their own right, they do constitute persuasive author-
ity and can serve as evidence of customary international law. 9
Article 12(1) of the ICESCR generally proclaims the "right
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard
of physical and mental health."4 Article 12(2) specifies that full
realization of this right requires, among other things, "[t] he cre-
ation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and
medical attention in the event of sickness."4 Turning toward
reproductive rights, Article 12(2) also requires "provision for the
reduction of the stillbirth rate and of infant mortality and for the
healthy development of the child. '4 2 Also relevant is the further
stipulation that governments provide for "[t]he prevention,
treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational, and
other diseases."43 CEDAW, in its own Article 12, takes up both
35. See Fourth World Conference on Women, Sept. 4-15, 1995, Beijing Declaration
and Platform for Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (Oct. 17, 1995) [hereinafter Beijing
Platform].
36. See Int'l Conference on Population and Dev., Sept. 5-13, 1994, Cairo Programme
of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (Jan. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Cairo Programme].
37. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAM [UNDP], HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: KENYA NA-
TIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 28-29 (1999) [hereinafter KENYA HDR 1999].
38. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1) (d),
59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187 (stating that national court decisions can be
used to interpret international laws); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31(3)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (stating
that "subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which established the agree-
ment of the parties regarding its interpretation" should be used for treaty interpreta-
tion) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Mary Ann Torres, The Human Right to Health,
National Courts, and Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment: A Case Study from Venezuela, 2 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 105, 108-09 (2002) [hereinafter Venezuela Case Study] (noting ways in which
national court decisions can "inform international legal analysis").
39. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 102, 103 cmt. c (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
40. ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 12(1).
41. Id. art. 12(2)(d).
42. Id. art. 12(2)(a).
43. Id. art. 12(2)(c).
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discrimination against women and reproductive rights by requir-
ing State Parties to "take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a
basis of equality of men and women, access to health care ser-
vices, including those related to family planning."44 The second
part of CEDAW Article 12 sets out further reproductive rights,
including "appropriate services in connection with pregnancy,
confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services
where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy
and lactation.""
General Comment Fourteen breaks down the general right
to health into several components. 46 It details that health ser-
vices, goods, and facilities must be made: 1) available, 2) accessi-
ble, 3) acceptable, and 4) medically appropriate and of high
quality.47 First, General Comment Fourteen stipulates that
health care "facilities, goods and services, as well as program-
mes," should be available in "sufficient quantity."48 Second, gov-
ernment health care must be accessible in terms of ease of physi-
cal access and provided on a non-discriminatory basis and cost to
everyone, including marginalized and vulnerable groups.4" Ac-
cessibility also encompasses access to information, which implies
the "right to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas
concerning health issues."50 Third, acceptable health care must
be provided through a system that is "respectful of medical eth-
ics and culturally appropriate, i.e. respectful of the culture of
individuals . . . and communities [and] sensitive to gender and
lifecycle requirements. '51  Lastly, General Comment Fourteen
unequivocally states that it is not enough to simply build facili-
ties. Fulfilling the provision of health care "requires skilled med-
ical personnel, scientifically approved and unexpired drugs and
hospital equipment and reproductive health."52
Expository sources also shed light on reproductive health
44. CEDAW, supra note 30, art. 12(1).
45. Id. art. 12(2).
46. See General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 12.
47. See id. 1 12(a).
48. Id. 12(a).
49. See id. I 12(b).
50. Id.
51. Id. 12(c).
52. Id. 12(d).
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rights in particular. 53 According to the Beijing Platform, "repro-
ductive health is a state of complete physical, mental and social
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in
all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its func-
tions and processes. '54 Thus, reproductive rights encompass a
broad span of health issues.55 They include issues surrounding
conception, such as the right to access contraceptives, to space
births, to have adequate information about contraceptive
choices, and to enjoy safe sex.56 They also involve pregnancy-
related issues such as access to quality pre- and post-natal care,
and they stress the importance of delivering healthy babies who
will have adequate chances for survival. 57 The ICESCR grants
the right to prevention, treatment, and control of epidemic and
endemic diseases. 5' As the Cairo Programme clarifies, this sub-
section is relevant to protecting reproductive rights, as many dis-
eases are directly related to reproductive health - for example,
AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases ("STDs").9
In addition, CEDAW ensures equal access to family plan-
ning services for women and "appropriate services in connection
with pregnancy, confinement, and the post-natal period, grant-
ing free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition
during pregnancy and lactation."6 CEDAW Recommendation
Twenty-Four also imposes specific obligations on governments to
create comprehensive national health strategies; 6' to commit the
required budgetary, human and administrative resources; 62 to
apply a gender perspective in the creation of policy;63 to remove
53. ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Right of Everyone to the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, 1 41, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2003/58 (Feb. 13, 2003).
54. Beijing Platform, supra note 35, 1 94.
55. See Cairo Programme, supra note 36, 1 7.2.
56. See id.
57. See id.; see also THE RIGHT TO KNow: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO REPRODUC-
TIVE HEALTH INFORMATION, ch. 2 (Sandra Coliver ed., 1995).
58. See ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 12(2) (c).
59. See Cairo Programme, supra note 36, 11 7.27-7.33.
60. CEDAW, supra note 30, art. 12(1).
61. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Report
of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 1 29, U.N. CAOR, 54th
Sess., Supp. No. 38, U.N. Doc. A/54/38/REV.1 (Aug. 20, 1999) [hereinafter CEDAW
Recommendation Twenty-Four].
62. See id. 1 30.
63. See id. 31(a).
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barriers to access to care for women;6 4 to prevent unwanted
pregnancies and liberalize abortion laws;65 to monitor the provi-
sion of health care;6 6 to provide conditions that ensure privacy
and informed choice; 67 and to ensure personnel are given train-
ing on health and human rights.68 CEDAW extends reproduc-
tive health rights to the work place, requiring provisions for ma-
ternity leave, prohibitions on discrimination in hiring and firing
due to pregnancy, and special protection to women from harm-
ful work conditions during pregnancy.69
2. Implementation and Obligations
The ICESCR sets out in Article 2 the extent to which State
Parties are legally obligated to observe the rights it specifies:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take
steps, individually and through international assistance and
cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maxi-
mum of its available resources, with a view to achieving pro-
gressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including partic-
ularly the adoption of legislative measures.70
This provision raises the familiar challenges associated with
so-called "affirmative" or "second generation" rights.7 ' In con-
trast to the ICCPR, the ICESCR requires State Parties, "to take
steps ... to achieve progressively" the full realization of Cove-
nant rights, "to the maximum of its available resources. '72 An
older view contrasts a right to health with, for example, a prohi-
bition on torture, insofar as a nation may in the first instance
fulfill that obligation by simply refraining from a practice rather
than by providing a service. Yet, as has long been recognized,
64. See id. 1 31(b).
65. See id. 31(c).
66. See id. 31(d).
67. See id. 31(e).
68. See id. 31(f).
69. See CEDAW, supra note 30, art. 11 (2).
70. ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 12(1). Article 2 also includes a broad non-discrimi-
nation provision, stating that "[t]he States Parties ... undertake to guarantee that the
rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of
any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth, or other status." Id. art. 2(2).
71. See infra Part I.A.2.a.
72. ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 12(1).
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the dichotomy between negative and affirmative rights in inter-
national law is easily overstated.7 3 As an initial matter, CESCR
provisions, such as the right to health, establish obligations that
are binding in law, and which have been treated as justiciable."4
In addition to establishing affirmative duties, the right to health
establishes negative obligations upon State Parties.75 Moreover,
significant affirmative aspects of the right to health must be es-
tablished immediately; the balance cannot be rolled back or in-
definitely deferred on account of national resources. As with the
underlying substantive rights, the obligations set forth under the
ICESCR and CEDAW have been elaborated in official commen-
tary and case law.7 6
a. Obligations Elaborated
i. Negative Obligations
Though often characterized as affirmative in nature, the
right to health, and the reproductive rights that follow, impose
prohibitions as well as duties upon State Parties.77 These nega-
tive obligations, in part, arise from the Covenant's requirement
that States respect the rights involved - a concept more akin to a
civil or political right barring State action.7" General Comment
Fourteen confirms this idea, stating that: "The right to health
contains both freedoms [negative rights] and entitlements [posi-
tive rights] .''7  Accordingly, most rights to health entitlements
have negative analogues, prohibiting States from interfering with
health care and reproductive rights. Unlike obligations to "take
steps," which are subject to progressive realization, negative
prohibitions are immediately enforceable. The ICESCR and
complementary documents make specific mention of certain ar-
73. Catherine Powell, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Culture, Constitutionalism, and Wo-
men's Human Rights in Post-September 11 America, 57 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2005)
(manuscript at 8 n.29, on file with author) (citing HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSIS-
TENCE, AFFLUENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 35-40 (1980)).
74. See infra Part I.A.2.a.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 8. See generally Treatment Action
Campaign and Others v. Minister of Health and Others 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T) (S. Mr.),
affid, Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002 (10)
BCLR 1075 (CC) (S. Mr).
78. See supra notes 41-42, 48 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 77.
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eas where such affirmative commissions of rights violations are
prohibited."s
First, the CSECR has made clear that "the obligation to pro-
tect requires States to take measures that prevent third parties
from interfering with [right to health] guarantees."8 This can
be accomplished, inter alia, "through the adoption of legislative
measures . . . to ensure that privatization of the health sector
does not constitute a threat to the availability, accessibility, ac-
ceptability and quality of health facilities, goods and services. 82
In this way, a State must not only ensure it is not violating the
right to health, but must also ensure others are not violating the
right to health of its citizens. This obligation will be of particular
importance in the present study of Kenya, because it is USAID,
and through it the United States as a third party, rather than the
Kenyan government, that has instituted the Mexico City Policy.
Second, General Comment Fourteen prohibits interference
with "the right to control one's health and body, including sexual
and reproductivefreedom... and the right to be free from... non-
consensual medical treatment."83 It also requires States to "re-
frain from limiting access to contraceptives and other means of
maintaining sexual and reproductive health."84 The Cairo Pro-
gramme affirms these rights, recognizing the right "to decide
freely ... the number, spacing, and timing of... children."85
Third, General Comment Three makes clear that "under-
taking to guarantee ...rights [that] will be exercised without
discrimination" is immediately enforceable.86 This prohibition
on discrimination stems from: ICESCR Article 2(2), providing
that "rights will be exercised without discrimination of any
kind,"87 Article 3, confirming "the equal right of men and wo-
men to the enjoyment of... [reproductive health] rights,"8 and
Article 12 of CEDAW, requiring "all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women... in access to ... fam-
80. See generally ICESCR, supra note 21.
81. General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 33.
82. Id. 35.
83. General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 8 (emphasis added).
84. Id. 34 (emphasis added). See also Beijing Platform, supra note 35, 1 97.
85. Cairo Programme, supra note 36, 7.3. (emphasis added).
86. General Comment Three, supra note 33, 1.
87. ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 2(2).
88. Id. art. 3.
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ily planning."89 The positive aspect of the right - "undertaking
to guarantee" - connotes a State action requirement, such as
requiring States to enact policies to ensure reproductive health
services are delivered without discrimination.90 But on a nega-
tive level, if it is clear that access to, or the delivery of, health
facilities, goods, or services is occurring in a discriminatory fash-
ion, either de facto or de jure, this constitutes a violation of the
right to health.9' Thus, States should not only pursue non-dis-
criminatory health policies based on the minimum core content,
but also, they cannot discriminate in the delivery or access to
health services.
Finally, though not a minimum core obligation like the pro-
hibition on discrimination, access to information is an obligation
of comparable priority.9 2 It too has a negative analogue. Gov-
ernments must not only undertake to make information and ed-
ucation available, but they must also not deliberately "censor or
withhold ... health-related information, including sexual educa-
tion and information."93 Of relevance to this paper, the Global
Gag Rule prohibits clinics receiving U.S. family planning funds
from dispersing information on abortion. If Kenya is found re-
sponsible for effectively prohibiting the dissemination of infor-
mation, it could constitute a deliberate withholding of informa-
tion and therefore violate the right to health.
ii. Minimum Core Content
The thirty years in which the ICESCR has been in force have
foreclosed the argument that every right it specifies is subject to
gradual implementation. To the contrary, the CESCR has made
clear that certain rights together have ripened into an immedi-
ately enforceable "minimum core content" from which States
cannot derogate.94 General Comment Three first set out the
89. CEDAW, supra note 30, art. 12. See also General Comment Three, supra note
33, 1 34.
90. See General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 1 50; see also Beijing Platform,
supra note 35, 1 96-97.
91. See General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 1 50; see also Beijing Platform,
supra note 35, 1 96-97.
92. See General Comment Three, supra note 33, 1 10.
93. General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 11 34, 50 (emphasis added).
94. See id. 1 30. See generally Treatment Action Campaign and Others v. Minister of
Health and Others 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T) (S. Ar.), affd, Minister of Health and Others v.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002 (10) BCLR 1075 (CC) (S. Afr).
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concept of minimum core obligations in 1990:
[O]ver a period of more than a decade ... a minimum core
obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, mini-
mum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon
every state party .... [F]or example, a State party in which
any significant number of individuals is deprived of ... essen-
tial primary healthcare . . . is, prima facie, failing to discharge its
15obligations ....
Ten years later the Committee reaffirmed this idea and set out
specific core obligations:
[E]nsur[ing] access to health facilities, goods and services on
a non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or
marginalized groups;.., to provide essential drugs; to ensure
equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and ser-
vices; to adopt a national public health strategy and plan of
action ... [which] shall give particular attention to all vulner-
able or marginalized groups.
9 6
The CESCR stresses that "a State party cannot, under any cir-
cumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the[se]
core obligations .... which are non-derogable."97
In addition to this minimum, non-derogable core, General
Comment Fourteen outlines several rights of "comparable prior-
ity."98 The first right obliges States to "ensure reproductive, ma-
ternal (pre-natal as well as post-natal) and child healthcare."9 9
The second and third rights, which are closely related, require
States to "provide immunizations against major infectious dis-
eases occurring in the community," and they further obligate
States to "take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic
and endemic diseases."' 0 0 Taken in tandem, these rights of com-
parable priority require a country to make available measures for
prevention and treatment of any diseases that affect reproduc-
tive rights, such as healthy child birth, infant mortality, and safe
pregnancies. Such obligations have special salience in a nation
such as Kenya, where AIDS and other STDs are epidemic. The
fourth obligation of comparable priority requires States to "pro-
95. General Comment Three, supra note 33, 10 (emphasis added).
96. General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 43.
97. Id. 47.
98. Id. 44.
99. Id.
100. Id.
[Vol. 29:1
EXPORTING DESPAIR
vide education and access to information concerning the main
health problems in the community, including methods of
preventing and controlling them.""'' Accordingly, the Kenyan
government faces a present international obligation to provide
education and information on significant problems in reproduc-
tive health such as unsafe abortions' 1 2 and AIDS.
iii. Prohibition on Retrogressive Measures
The most sweeping express prohibition on incompatible
State action is the prohibition on retrogressive measures - in
other words, States cannot backslide with regard to their right to
health obligations. According to the CESCR, "any deliberately
retrogressive measures . . .would require the most careful con-
sideration and would need to be fully justified ..".1."0 A retro-
gressive measure that is "incompatible with the [minimum] core
obligations [is] ... a violation of the right to health" that cannot
be justified."°4 For example, if a government repeals or sus-
pends right to health legislation or adopts "legislation or policies
which are manifestly incompatible with pre-existing domestic or
international.., right to health [obligations]," such government
action constitutes an impermissible retrogressive measure.10 5
Here again, the minimum core obligations will be useful in
assessing whether Kenya has violated the right to health. Put
simply, if Kenya has taken steps backward in an area governed by
a minimum core standard, it has per se violated the right to
health. Thus, the twin concepts of retrogressive measures and
minimum core content will be powerful tools in analyzing
whether the Mexico City Policy has resulted in backsliding in Ke-
nya's reproductive health care policies.
iv. Steps To Respect, Protect, and Fulfill Health care
and Reproductive Rights
Both the ICESCR and CEDAW require that States employ all
appropriate means, including and especially legislative mea-
sures, to realize the health care and reproductive rights they set
101. Id.
102. In Kenya, about 700 women die each week from unsafe abortions. See Caro-
line Karobia, Kenya Divided Over Abortion, B.B.C. NEWS (London), July 17, 2003.
103. General Comment Three, supra note 33, 9.
104. Id.
105. Id. 48.
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forth.' 6 As a general matter, the CESCR has stated that legisla-
tion may be "indispensable ... [in] fields such as health [and]
the protection of children and mothers."0 7 Further, "appropri-
ate means" include "administrative, financial, educational and
social measures."'0° These means should ensure the availability,
accessibility, acceptability, and quality of health facilities, goods
and services. 0 9
The Beijing Platform and the Cairo Programme detail the
more specific steps implicit in these general requirements:
a. Make Information Available and Accessible
Access is a prerequisite for the realization of reproductive
and health rights. 10 The Cairo Programme requires States to
"enable and support" voluntary choices about methods of family
planning and contraception,' 1 ' through access to quality infor-
mation, in order to make informed choices."12 States should
therefore "ensure that comprehensive and factual information"
on reproductive and other health services is "accessible, afforda-
ble, acceptable and convenient to all users."'13 They must fur-
ther facilitate access to information on all methods for fertility
regulation that are not illegal." 4 Beyond this, the Beijing Plat-
form stresses the importance of disseminating information to ad-
olescent girls, because "the trend towards early sexual experi-
ence, combined with the lack of information and services, in-
creases the risk of unwanted and [too-early] pregnancies, HIV
infection and other sexually transmitted diseases, as well as un-
safe abortions.""' In addition, States "should ensure that third
parties do not limit people's access to health-related informa-
106. See ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 2(1); see also CEDAW, supra note 30, art. 2.
107. General Comment Three, supra note 33, 3.
108. Id. See also Cairo Programme, supra note 36, 7.3.
109. See General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 1 12(a)-(d); see also Cairo Pro-
gramme, supra note 36, 1 7.5(a). Access to health care must also be granted in a non-
discriminatory fashion, encompass physical and economic access, and include informa-
tion on reproductive health. See Beijing Platform, supra note 35, 30.
110. See Young Mi Kim et al., Informed Choice and Decision-Making in Family Planning
Counseling in Kenya, 24 INT'L FAM. PLAN. PERSp. 4, 4 (1998).
111. See Cairo Programme, supra note 36, 7.5 (b); see also CEDAW, supra note 30,
art. 10(h).
112. See Cairo Programme, supra note 36, 7.5(a).
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. Beijing Platform, supra note 35, 7 95-96.
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tion."'' 6
b. Take Steps to Reduce Infant Mortality and Still-Births
The ICESCR expressly requires states to make "provision [s]
for the reduction of still-birth rate [s] and infant mortality [rates]
and for the healthy development of the child.""' 7 A primary
method for doing so is enhancing the quantity and quality of pre
and post-natal care. Such care is also crucial for preventing ma-
ternal death. Accordingly, reproductive health care should in-
clude "education services for pre-natal care, safe delivery, and
post-natal care,"11 giving particular attention to maternal and
emergency obstetric care. Another specific method for doing so
is the promotion of breastfeeding through education and sup-
port services.
c. Promote Contraception and Family Planning
Governments should promote voluntary choice in family
planning.119 This task first requires that States make informa-
tion and education available concerning the "widest possible
range" of family planning methods.1 20 Health care workers, in
turn, must also receive expanded and upgraded training in fam-
ily planning issues to learn how to more effectively counsel and
communicate with patients.121  Secondly, individuals acting
upon this information, should have access to a "continuous sup-
ply of essential, high-quality contraceptives. " t2 2 Governments
should therefore also "ensure a reliable, continuous supply of
high-quality . . .contraceptives" and other necessary reproduc-
tive supplies, "using the [World Health Organization] Model
List of Essential Drugs as a guide,' 1 23 which the ICESCR has
made a minimum core obligation. As an alternative to, or in
conjunction with other forms of contraception, programs should
promote breastfeeding as a mechanism to enhance birth spac-
116. General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 35.
117. ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 12(a).
118. Cairo Programme, supra note 36, 7.6.
119. See id. 7.15.
120. Id. I 7.23(c).
121. See id. 7.23.
122. Id. 7.23(c).
123. Beijing Platform, supra note 35, 106(u) [hereinafter WHO Model List] (cit-
ing World Health Organization ("WHO") Model List of Essential Drugs, (14th ed., Mar.
2005)).
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ing. 124 Third, governments should ensure "appropriate follow-
up care, including treatment for side effects of contraceptive use
... and availability of related reproductive health services on-site
through a strong referral system."1 25
Although neither the Cairo Programme nor the Beijing
Platform states that abortion should be promoted as a method of
family planning, they require "humane treatment and counsel-
ing of women" who have had abortions. 26 Further, they call
upon States to "recognize and deal with the health impact of
unsafe abortion as a major public health concern. "127 Women
with unwanted pregnancies should have access to "reliable infor-
mation and compassionate counseling," and "in circumstances
where abortion is not against the law, such abortion should be
safe." 1 21 Moreover, any decisions about abortion policy should
be made at the national or local level through appropriate legis-
lative processes. 121
The Cairo Programme pays special attention to the family
planning needs of adolescents, because "motherhood at a very
young age entails a risk of maternal death much greater than
average, and the children of young mothers have higher levels of
morbidity and mortality." ' Therefore, the provision of age-suit-
able services should be made available with the aim of prevent-
ing "pregnancies, unsafe abortion, STDs and HIV/AIDS," and
information and services should be made available to adoles-
cents. 131
d. Prevent and Treat Diseases Related to Reproductive Health
The ICESCR requires measures to prevent and treat epi-
demic and endemic diseases - an obligation that the CESCR
commentary has affirmed. In this regard, HIV/AIDS has tragic
salience in both Kenya and Africa generally. Other STDs and
reproductive tract infections are diseases directly linked to re-
productive health in particular. Women are especially vulnera-
124. See Cairo Programme, supra note 36, 9 7.14(f), 7.23(h).
125. Id. 7.23.
126. Id. 7.24; see also Beijing Platform, supra note 35, 107(k).
127. Beijing Platform, supra note 35, 107(i).
128. Id. 106(k).
129. See id.
130. Cairo Programme, supra note 36, 7.41.
131. Id. 19 7.41, 7.44.
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ble to all of these diseases. 3 2 The ICESCR, Cairo Programme,
and Beijing Platform all stress the importance of accessibility to
health services, especially for marginalized or vulnerable groups
of society.133  Treatment for severe reproductive health
problems should be made available and accessible, especially
with regard to the reproductive health of women. 34 Given that
the provision of essential drugs is a minimum core obligation,
governments are immediately obligated to make medications
available and accessible for the treatment of AIDS, STDs, and
reproductive tract infections to the extent that these are on the
WHO Model List.
The Cairo Programme and the Beijing Platform also re-
quire that information on family planning methods include a
discussion of health risks and effectiveness in the prevention of
AIDS and other STDs.'35 To this end, the Cairo Programme re-
quires special outreach efforts to those who do not have access
to services and specialized training for health care workers in the
prevention and detection of STDs, AIDS, and reproductive tract
infections."' Similarly, information and counseling should be
made available for "responsible sexual behavior and effective
prevention of sexually transmitted diseases and HIV."' 37 As part
of this disease prevention program, the government should pro-
mote a "reliable supply and distribution of high-quality con-
doms." 1318
e. Involve Women and the Community
The Cairo Programme and the Beijing Platform require
participation by women and other members of the community
132. See id. 7.28. This is due to their:
[E]xposure to high risk sexual behavior by partners . . . and for women the
symptoms of infections are often hidden . . . and consequences are often
greater, including increased risk of infertility and ectopic pregnancy. The risk
of transmission from infected men to women is also greater than from in-
fected women to men, and many women are powerless to take steps to protect
themselves.
Id.; see also WArHO Model List, supra note 123.
133. See generally Beijing Platform, supra note 35; see also Cairo Programme, sura
note 36.
134. See Beijing Platform, supra note 35, 107(m).
135. See Cairo Programme, supra note 36, 7.23(c).
136. See id.
137. Id. 7.32.
138. Id. 7.33.
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in designing reproductive and health care programs.1"9 They
further recommend that States decentralize public health man-
agement and partner with local NGO private health clinics. 4 '
f. Monitoring
In addition to taking the steps outlined above, State Parties
are required to submit reports every five years to the relevant
treaty-monitoring bodies, such as the CECSR and the CEDAW
Committee, regarding reproductive rights.141 The committees
respond to State reports with recommendations and observa-
tions. This reporting procedure is the primary international en-
forcement mechanism for health rights. But, as one commenta-
tor points out, the CEDAW Committee has "little if any power to
criticize or condemn what appears in these reports." '42 Others
have noted similar deficiencies in the CEDAW Committee's en-
forcement powers.1 4 3 The Cairo Programme adds an additional
layer by requiring not only periodic reports, but also that an in-
stitutionalized system of monitoring be put into place in each
State to ensure the quality of services and to control abuses in
family planning services.144
g. Resource Constraints
Finally, Article 2(1) of the ICESCR permits States to "take
steps . . . to the maximum of its available resources." '45 This adds a
possible hindrance to the enforcement of reproductive rights
under the right to health umbrella, to the extent that poorer
nations, such as Kenya, can simply defend violations by citing a
lack of available resources. Even dubious retrogressive mea-
sures, such as those which have potentially occurred in Kenya,
139. See Cairo Programme, supra note 36, 7.1(e), 7.7-.8; see also Beijing Plat-
form, supra note 35, 1 106; General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 1 11 (sug-
gesting that community participation is appropriate); Amy Kaler & Susan Cotts Wat-
kins, Disobedient Distributors: Street-Level Bureaucrats and Would-Be Patrons in Community-
Based Family Planning Programs in Rural Kenya, 32 STUD. IN FAM. PLAN. 254, 256-58
(2001).
140. See Cairo Programme, supra note 36, 1 7.9; see also Beijing Platform, supra
note 35, 107(c).
141. See ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 16(1); see also BRIGIT C.A. TOEBES, THE RIGHT
TO HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 140-158 (1999).
142. See Venezuela Case Study, supra note 38, at 108.
143. See Louis HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 359 (1999).
144. See Cairo Programme, supra note 36, 1 7.17.
145. General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 1 47 (emphasis added).
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will be heavily scrutinized "in the context of the full use of the
maximum available resources."' 46 Yet the resource-constraints
defense is not a panacea for State inaction. It, too, has limits.
First, "inability" to allocate necessary funds must be distin-
guished from an "unwillingness" to do so.' 4 7 Unwillingness is
not justifiable. The State bears the burden of establishing that
derogations have resulted from inability rather than unwilling-
ness. 4 8 Instead, "it must demonstrate that every effort has been
made to use all resources .. .at its disposition.""' Second, the
State's obligations to monitor the realization of health rights
"and to devise strategies... for their promotion, are not in any
way eliminated as a result of resource constraints."'5 0 Third, the
resource-constraints defense cannot be used for violations of the
ICESCR's minimum core obligations. Paragraph forty-seven of
General Comment Fourteen says that the minimum core obliga-
tions are non-derogable, and a State "cannot, under any circum-
stances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance."'' Accordingly,
"retrogressive measures incompatible with core obligations ...
constitute a violation."'152
Recent cases have confirmed this limitation. 153  In Cruz
Bermnidez, et al. v. Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social,'54 the
Venezuelan Supreme Court in 1999 held that access to essential
antiretroviral ("ARV") drugs for HIV/AIDS is a minimum core
obligation 155 and implicates reproductive health rights.' 56 The
Court so held, notwithstanding the government's main defense
146. General Comment Three, supra note 33, 9, 13, 32.
147. See General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 1 47.
148. See General Comment Three, supra note 33, 10; see also General Comment
Fourteen, supra note 34, 1 47.
149. General Comment Three, supra note 33, 10.
150. Id. 11.
151. General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 47.
152. Id. 48.
153. Because there has been a dearth of cases dealing with reproductive health
rights on the international level, these cases, though not from a Kenyan jurisdiction,
shed light on how the Covenant should be interpreted, and provide a hint of how
courts will deal with future resource-constraints defenses. See supra note 79 and accom-
panying text; see also Venezuela Case Study, supra note 38, at 108.
154. In the Matter of Cruz Berm6dez, et al. v. Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia
Social (MSAS) (1999), Case No. 15789, reprinted in DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND PUBLIC HEALTH: MATERIALS ON AND ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL HEALTH JURISPRUDENCE
316-26 (2000).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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of a lack of available resources. The Court explicitly rejected this
defense. 57 In 2001, the High Court of South Africa, in Treatment
Action Campaign, rejected the resource-constraints defense under
similar circumstances. 5 ' The High Court held that South Africa
had violated the right to health of its citizens by limiting distribu-
tion of ARVs to prevent mother-to-child AIDS transmissions.
The government's contention that it lacked the resources to pro-
vide the services "because of the lack of trained counselors....
counseling facilities . . . and budgetary constraints"' 59 was re-
jected by the court.16 °
Finally, the resource-constraints defense cannot be used for
violations against "vulnerable members of society [who] can, and
indeed must, be protected by the adoption of relatively low-cost
targeted programmes."'16 ' Because women are more vulnerable
to certain reproductive health diseases, and arguably more vul-
nerable when it comes to reproductive health issues in general,
the possibility for successful use of this defense is weakened. Na-
tions such as Kenya must also protect any other "vulnerable"
groups - perhaps those living in rural or poor urban areas -
despite resource constraints.
B. Other Relevant Rights
With respect to the right to health, Kenya has an obligation
to respect, protect, and promote the right to health of its citi-
zens.1 62 Therefore, Kenya must take steps to ensure the core
content of the right against threats from whatever source, in-
cluding U.S. domestic politics. The analysis of the Mexico City
Policy with respect to the rights of expression and against gender
discrimination is somewhat different. In connection with these
rights, the responsibility of Kenya is less direct. First, it should
be noted that, were a State Party to implement the restrictions
contained in the Mexico City Policy directly on individuals
within its jurisdiction, the restrictions would almost certainly vio-
157. Id.
158. See Treatment Action Campaign and Others v. Minister of Health and Others 2002
(4) BCLR 356 (T) (S. Mr.), affd, Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Cam-
paign and Others 2002 (10) BCLR 1075 (CC) (S. Afr).
159. Id. 1 54.
160. See id. 68, 71, 73.
161. General Comment Three, supra note 33, 12.
162. See ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 2(1); see also CEDAW, supra note 30, art. 2.
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late both the rights to freedom of expression and against gender
discrimination. Second, Kenya has an obligation to ensure that
these rights are protected from interference by others. Both of
these claims, and the legal standards upon which they are based,
are explored further in this section. The more difficult ques-
tion, whether a donor State may be held liable for violations of
these rights, is deferred to Part III.
1. Freedom of Expression
The ICCPR's provisions on freedom of expression are gen-
erally modeled after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("UDHR") .163 The UDHR states that "everyone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless
of frontiers."' 6" Article 19 of the ICCPR secures for individuals
the right to form his or her own opinions free from outside in-
fluence and to defend them without fear of external repres-
sion. 65 Specifically, Article 19(2) includes the rights to seek, re-
ceive, and impart ideas. It does not distinguish between expres-
sion and seeking of information. In effect, Article 19(2) protects
the free flow of ideas, identifying speech rights of both the con-
veyer and the seeker of information.
163. See ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 19; see also Universal Declaration of Human
Rights art. 19, G.A. Res. 217A(III), at 74, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
164. See UDHR, supra note 163, art. 19. For purposes of this paper, "Article 19"
refers to provisions under the ICCPR and not the UDHR. Article 19 of the ICCPR
states:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall in-
clude freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or imprint, in the form of art,
or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the right provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article carries
with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to cer-
tain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are
necessary:
a. For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
b. For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or
of public health and morals.
ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 19.
165. See SCOTT N. CARLSON & GREGORY GISVOLD, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 119 (2003).
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Given the broad scope of Article 19, the Mexico City Policy
potentially affects two groups of rights-bearers - NGO recipi-
ents of USAID funds and their clients. Insofar as the Mexico
City Policy restricts not only how the NGO may use USAID funds
to communicate information and ideas, but also how it may use
non-USAID funds, the policy represents a serious threat to the
NGO's freedom of expression. 166 Second, to the extent that the
Mexico City Policy reduces the availability of information con-
cerning reproductive health to the clients of such NGO's, it may
compromise their rights under Article 19 as well.
Assuming that the restrictions of the Mexico City policy
would have violated Article 19 had they been implemented di-
rectly by the Kenyan government, what is the scope of Kenya's
obligations with respect to the impact of the U.S. policy on indi-
viduals within its jurisdiction? Here Kenya's obligation stems
from its commitment not only to respect the rights guaranteed
under Article 19 but to ensure their enjoyment by persons under
Kenyan jurisdiction.'67 The obligation to ensure enjoyment of
the right includes an obligation to protect that enjoyment from
interference by third parties, including other States.' 68 This ob-
ligation to ensure the right may not correspond directly to the
obligation to respect the right. In other words, just because an
action taken by a State toward individuals within its jurisdiction
would violate Article 19 does not necessarily mean that the State's
failure to prevent the same action by a third party constitutes a
violation of the obligation to ensure.'69 Such a broad interpreta-
tion would greatly expand State responsibility for third party ac-
166. It is worth noting in this connection that the Mexico City Policy goes further
than its domestic counterpart under Title X, which limits the scope of the "gag" to the
federal funds, leaving U.S. NGOs free to use other funds as they see fit, so long as they
segregate the funding streams. Moreover, in upholding this "domestic gag rule" in Rust
v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court implied that this limitation in scope might well be
required by the U.S. Constitution. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991) (stating
that domestic cases involving "situations in which the Government has placed a condi-
tion on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service" may
be unconstitutional because it "thus effectively [prohibits] the recipient from engaging
in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program.").
167. See ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 2(1).
168. See Sarah Joseph, A Rights Analysis of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 5
J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 57, 74 (1999) (noting that "the general obligation to 'respect and
ensure' treaty rights implies an obligation to protect people from human rights abuses
by private entities with regard to all civil and political rights").
169. See id. (noting that "the extent to which States are required by international
human rights law to control private human rights abuse is very uncertain. Presumably
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tions. Nevertheless, if the actions taken by a third party have a
significant impact upon the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed
by the ICCPR, the State's failure to respond may represent a
breach of its obligation to ensure enjoyment under Article 2.70
2. Gender Discrimination
In both the ICESCR and in CEDAW, the right to health and
the right to gender equality overlap and reinforce one another.
As described above, the ICESCR protects against gender discrim-
ination with respect to the right to health, and CEDAW specifi-
cally addresses the right to health, particularly reproductive
health, as an important aspect of women's equality. 71 Yet, apart
from and in addition to this right to health, Kenya is obligated to
respect and protect the broader right of its citizens to be free
from gender discrimination. CEDAW mandates this in very
broad terms. First, CEDAW defines gender discrimination as:
Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of
sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespec-
tive of their marital status, on the basis of equality of men and
women, of human fights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.'
7 2
Second, according to Article 2, State Parties must "take all appro-
priate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by
any person, organization or enterprise." 73
CEDAW's definition of gender discrimination has been in-
terpreted to include policies that expressly classify on the basis of
gender and policies that, although facially gender-neutral, have
a disparate impact on the basis of gender.'7 4 Insofar as it has
affected the availability of reproductive health services sought
exclusively or primarily by women, the Mexico City Policy, at a
their duties to control private entities are not as strict as their duties to control public
agents.").
170. See, e.g., Carlos M. Vasquez, Direct v. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under
International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927 (2005) (noting that human rights
treaties do not generally bind private actors directly, rather they obligate States to regiu-
late certain types of conduct by private actors).
171. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing the protections af-
forded to women under the ICESCR and CEDAW).
172. CEDAW, supra note 30, art. 1.
173. Id. art. 2.
174. See General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 1 43.
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minimum, implicates the latter form of discrimination. In addi-
tion, to the extent that the reduction in the availability of repro-
ductive health services has led to unwanted pregnancy, early
motherhood, and/or inadequate spacing among children, it
may undermine women's equality more generally by reducing
women's ability to engage in market work or acquire education.
Thus, had the policy been implemented directly by the Kenyan
government, it almost certainly would violate broad obligations
undertaken in connection with CEDAW.
Given that the policy was imposed on the Kenyan govern-
ment by an outside donor, what is the scope of Kenya's obliga-
tions with respect to the impact of the U.S. policy on individuals
within its jurisdiction? Here the text of CEDAW addresses this
issue, at least at a general level, by imposing on Kenya a clear
obligation to eliminate discrimination against women by third
parties. 17 5 As in the context of freedom of expression, this obli-
gation does not translate every instance of private (or third
party) gender discrimination into a violation of international
human rights by virtue of a State's failure to prevent it. Never-
theless, it does oblige States, at a minimum, to address discrimi-
nation by third parties that is widespread and persistent. 76
Thus, the discriminatory impact of the Mexico City policy on
Kenyan women may give rise to an obligation on the part of Ke-
nya to remedy, or at least ameliorate, its effects.
II. HEALTH CARE [N KENYA, USA1D, AND
THE MEXICO CITY POLICY
A. Health Care in Kenya
This Part examines the impact of the Mexico City Policy on
the provision of reproductive health care in Kenya. The first sec-
tion provides a brief overview of health care in Kenya - tracking
the development of the health care system and particularly Ke-
nya's reliance on outside donors, including USAID. The first
section also emphasizes the degree to which Kenya has relied on
175. See CEDAW, supra note 30, art. 2.
176. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD],
Communication No. 4/1991, L.K. v. Netherlands, U.N. Doc. A/48/18, Annex IV, at 130
(1993) (finding that the Netherlands had breached its duty under Article 4(1) of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination by
failing to investigate and punish acts of racial distcrimination and violence against the
plaintiff).
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such donors, not simply to fund expansion of the system, but
also to participate in the development of national health care
policy. The second section provides a very brief overview of
USAID and its work in Kenya. It then goes on to describe in
some detail the Mexico City Policy - a policy first adopted in
1983, then suspended under President Clinton's Administration,
and, finally, reinstated in 2001 by the Bush Administration. Fi-
nally, the third section documents the experiences of two of the
most important family planning NGOs in Kenya - the Family
Planning Association of Kenya and Maries Stopes International
- both of which lost substantial USAID funding as a result of
their decision to not agree to the restrictions imposed by the
Mexico City Policy.
1. Overview
Since attaining independence in 1963, the Kenyan govern-
ment has made efforts both to modernize its health care system
and expand access to care. Indeed, a pledge to provide "free"
health services was part of the government of Kenya's initial de-
velopment and poverty-alleviation plan.17 7 The overall strategy
was to "alleviate poverty and ensure social equity" by developing
a network of government subsidized services, staffed by govern-
ment trained health personnel, within walking distance for most
of the population. 178 Consistent with this commitment, Kenya's
health care system grew rapidly and access to health care ex-
panded in the latter part of the twentieth century. For example,
the quantity of health institutions rose from 861 in 1964 to 4557
in 2003,179 and the number of hospital beds and cots increased
from 11,344 in 1964 to 60,657 in 2003.18° The number of medi-
cal personnel also rose. In 1965, Kenya had 710 doctors, 26 den-
tists and 148 pharmacists.18' By 1996, there were 3971 doctors,
177. See Wasunna Owino & Maureen Were, Enhancing Healthcare Among the Vulnera-
ble Groups: The Question of Waivers and Exemptions 2 (Inst. of Policy Analysis and Research
Discussion Paper No. DP/014/98, 1998), available at http://www.ipar.or.ke/DP14.pdf.
178. Id.
179. See id.; see also Gov't of Kenya, Cent. Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning
and Nat'l Dev., Health Institutions and Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 2003 [here-
inafter Bureau of Statistics], http://www.cbs.go.ke/health-summary.html (last visited
Sept. 23, 2004).
180. Id.
181. See Germano Mwaba et al., Health Service Provision and Health Status in Af-
rica: The Case of Kenya and Cameroon 22 (Feb. 2003) (revised version of paper
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685 dentists and 1447 pharmacists,1 1 2 and by 2002 there were
4740 doctors, 761 dentists and 1866 pharmacists." 3 This reflects
an improved ratio of providers per 100,000 people from 7.8 doc-
tors, 0.3 dentists and 1.6 pharmacists in 1964 to 15.1 doctors, 2.6
dentists and 5.9 pharmacists in 2002.184
Nevertheless, these increases have not resulted in a substan-
tial improvement in the delivery of health services for at least two
reasons. First, the HIV/AIDS crisis in Kenya has placed serious
constraints on the health care system, diverting resources from
other types of services."8 5 Indeed, despite these increases in ca-
pacity, the Kenyan government itself estimates that 30% of hos-
pital beds in urban areas and 50% to 55% of all beds at the dis-
trict hospital level are occupied by AIDS patients." 6 Second, the
facilities and personnel have not been distributed in a way that
ensures access for the largest number of Kenyans. For example,
medical personnel are heavily concentrated in Nairobi."8 7 Nai-
robi residents have 21.6 beds and cots per 100,000 people com-
pared with the Northeastern Province, which has 14.2.188 In-
deed, on a national basis, fewer than half of all Kenyans live
within four kilometers of a health care facility.'8 9 Because many
poor Kenyans, in both urban and rural settings, cannot afford to
pay for transportation to health facilities, health services must be
located within walking distance in order to provide meaningful
access. It is not surprising, therefore, that one recent study
found that 40% of the rural population had no access to health
services of any kind. 9 '
presented at the Global Development Network Conference, Prague, Czech Republic,
Apr. 2002), available at http://www.gdnet.org/pdf2/gdn-library/global-research_
projects/MERCK -health/KenyaCameroonstudy.pdf.
182. See Paul K. Kimalu et al., A Review of the Health Sector in Kenya 67 (Kenya Inst.
for Pub. Policy Research and Analysis Working Paper No. 11, Mar. 2004) [hereinafter
Review of the Health Sector], available at http://www.kippra.org/Download/WPNo.11 .pdf.
183. See Bureau of Statistics, supra note 179.
184. See id.
185. See Review of the Health Sector, supra note 182, at 49.
186. See KENYA HDR 1999, supra note 37, at 54.
187. See Review of the Health Sector, supra note 182, at 31.
188. See Bureau of Statistics, supra note 179.
189. See KENYA HDR 1999, supra note 37, at 50.
190. See Wasunna Owino, Delivery and Financing of Health Services in Kenya: Critical
Issues and Research Gaps 23 (Inst. of Policy Analysis & Research Discussion Paper No.
DP/002/97, 1997) [hereinafter Research Gaps], available at http://www.ipar.or.ke/
dp02.pdf.
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Recognizing this problem of access to health care among
the poor, the Kenyan government has established a goal to "in-
crease accessibility to appropriate health care facilities and ser-
vices, particularly in informal urban settlements, rural areas, arid
and semi-arid areas, with emphasis on promoting healthy behav-
ior and better provision of services for the poor." '191 Yet, its re-
cent budget allocations and spending patterns reflect a failure to
implement such a policy. 19 2 Indeed, government spending on
rural health services has fallen below even its own planned
budget allocations."' Spending was budgeted to grow from
14% of all recurrent expenditures in 1999-2000, to 31% in 2000-
2001 and to 34% in 2001-2002.' However, actual spending was
only 9% of all recurrent expenditures in 1999-2000, 10.2% in
2000-2001, and only 10.8% in 2001-2002.1"' Particularly prob-
lematic is the government's failure to allocate development
funds to rural health centers and dispensaries; only 27% of the
approved budget for this category was actually spent, and only
15.8% of the overall development budget was spent on rural
health centers and dispensaries. 196
Even when some form of health care is available, the quality
of care is often poor. For example, one measure of the quality
of care is access to essential medicines. 9 7 According to a recent
191. Office of the Vice-President of Kenya, Ministry of Home Affairs, Heritage and
Sports, National Gender and Development Policy § 7.2.2.d (Feb. 2000) [hereinafter Gender
and Development Policy].
192. Currently, the Ministry of Health is headed by Hon. Charity Ngulu, an ap-
pointee of President Kibaki. She is assisted by a permanent secretary and a Director of
Medical Services, who are responsible for administration and technical coordination,
respectively. Headquartered in Afya House in Central Nairobi, the Ministry of Health
sets policies; oversees the activities of NGOs; and manages, monitors, and evaluates
health policies on the national level. Guidelines from the headquarters flow through
to the provincial level, which serves as an intermediary between the central ministry and
the district level. At the district level, the focus is on the provision of health services and
creating budgets and expenditure plans based on the guidelines that come from above.
See Research Gaps, supra note 190, at 2.
193. See HenryJ. Kaiser Family Found., Kenyan Government to Lobby United States for
Antiretroviral Drug Funding (Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://www.thebody.com/kaiser/
2004/apr7_04/kenyahiv.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
194. See GOV'T OF KENYA, MINISTRY OF HEALTH, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEW 2003
15-16 (2003), available at http://www.ministryofhealth.go.ke/pdf/publicexp-2003.pdf
[hereinafter PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEW].
195. See id. at 16.
196. See id. at 15.
197. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director-General, World Health Org. [WHO], Access
to Essential Medicines as a Global Necessity, Address Delivered at the 25th Anniversary of
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report by a Kenya-based NGO, only 36% of Kenyans have access
to even these most basic drugs. 198 The Kenyan government re-
ports that it spent only US$0.70 per person to guarantee access
to essential drugs - less than half of the level of spending rec-
ommended by the WHO."9
Even apart from the inadequate level of expenditure on
health, the Kenyan government has not allocated its expendi-
ture in a way that maximizes effectiveness. A widespread consen-
sus exists that, given scarce resources, allocating funds to pre-
ventative care rather than curative care results in a more equita-
ble and efficient use of those resources. 2°0 For example,
General Comment Fourteen states that "[i]nvestments should
not disproportionately favor expensive curative services which
are only accessible to a small privileged fraction of the popula-
tion, rather than primary and preventative health care, benefit-
ing a far larger part of the population. ' 2 1' And yet, although the
government has recognized the importance of preventive care,
analysis of actual spending levels of the 2001-2002 budget reveals
that 48.5% of the overall budget was spent on curative care as
compared to only 5.2% of preventative and promotive care.20 2
The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis
("KIPPRA"), a leading Kenyan policy research institute, warns
that "failure to adequately fund preventative and promotive ser-
vices in a sustainable manner implies that the existing facilities
will continue to be burdened with cases of illness than could
have been averted. 20 3
Although misallocation of existing resources has contrib-
uted to Kenya's failure to achieve its goals of improving access to
health care, an overall lack of resources to expend on health
the WHO (Oct. 20, 2002), available at http://www.who.int/dg/brundtland/speeches/
2002/whoessentialmedicines/en/index.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
198. Ken Opala, Ministry Loses Millions in Irregular Tendering, NATION (Kenya),Jan.
10, 1999.
199. See PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEW, supra note 194.
200. See, e.g., General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 1 19.
201. General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 1 19.
202. See PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEW, supra note 194, at 8. This is true, despite
draft budgets requesting a shift from curative to both preventive and rural health care.
The Public Expenditure Review admits that the 2001/2002 budget "overshoots" alloca-
tions to curative care by 180%. It does not offer an explanation of how this came to be.
See id. at 9.
203. Review of the Health Sector, supra note 182 at 37.
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care has, of course, limited its progress as well.20 4 In 2001-2002,
the Ministry of Health spent 17.6% of the GDP on health. 2 " As
of 2001, health spending per capita was approximately
US$6.20. 90 6 Moreover, over 90% of the Ministry of Health's
budget is devoted to supporting existing capacity,20 7 including
paying salaries and maintaining facilities. 208 The balance, less
than 10%, makes up the development budget, which goes to-
ward the creation of new programs and the expansion of ex-
isting ones. 2 09 This allocation of concededly limited resources
favors the maintenance of service to relatively better-served areas
at the expense of developing new programs in underserved ar-
eas.
The government of Kenya has attempted to increase its
health care resources through user fees and cost-sharing pro-
grams. Most recently, the government reintroduced cost-sharing
at the district level in 1991 by funding the USAID Healthcare
Financing Project. 210 Overall, cost-sharing has made a signifi-
cant contribution to financing health in Kenya and has gener-
ated funds to cover non-wage recurrent expenditures, thereby
enabling government hospitals to remain open during times of
economic crisis. 21' However, there is ample evidence that the
imposition of user fees effectively prevents the poorest of the
poor from being able to access health care.212 Moreover, al-
204. See id.
205. See WHO, WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2004 - CHANGING HISTORY 139 (2004)
[hereinafter CHANGING HISTORY]. According to the 1999 Kenya Human Development
Report, the most recent and only such report, government spending only covers about
60% of what is needed to provide minimum health services. See KENYA HDR 1999, supra
note 37, at 52.
206. See CHANGING HISTORY, supra note 205, at 139; see also Interview with Dr. Rich-
ard 0. Muga, Director, Nat'l Council on Population and Dev., in Embu, Kenya (May 19,
2004) (on file with Crowley Program). Health services are financed from three sources.
Approximately half of all healthcare funding comes directly from the government to
the Ministry of Health and indirectly through other agencies with health-related portfo-
lios - for example, the National Council on Population and Development and the
Ministries of Water and Home Affairs. Another one-third is provided by multilateral
and bilateral donors, with the balance coming from the private sector and non-govern-
mental organizations. See KENYA HDR 1999, supra note 37, at 52.
207. See PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEW, supra note 194.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 5.
210. See Kenya KENYA HDR 1999, supra note 37, at 54; see also USAID, SUMMARY OP
USAID PROJECr 6150245: HEALTHCARE FINANCING, available at http://www.dec.org.
211. See Owino & Were, supra note 177, at 4.
212. One analyst of the Kenyan healthcare system notes:
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though Kenya's Health Policy Framework emphasizes strength-
ening the waiver system in cost-sharing for the poor, the pro-
gram is poorly administered and inadequately publicized. Stud-
ies have revealed that providers are not well trained about the
purpose of the wavier and exemption system, nor on how to ad-
minister the system.2 1 3 One study found that a majority of the
administrative staff interviewed did not want to encourage fur-
ther loss of revenue and opposed publicizing the system to the
intended beneficiaries. 214 As a result, potential users were "ill-
informed" about the system and how to best benefit from the
waiver scheme. The same study found that only one in three
patients seemed to have any information about the waivers and
exemptions system and uncovered differences between the infor-
mation held by inpatients and outpatients as well as between
men and women. 215
2. Reproductive Health
These problems with the overall provision of health care in
Kenya are equally apparent in the area of reproductive health,
the focus of this study. Reproductive health includes family
planning, maternal/child health (including pre-natal, maternity,
and post-natal care) and the prevention and treatment of STDs.
This section provides an overview of each area, giving particular
attention to gender issues and adolescents.
a. Family Planning
Although Kenya was the first African State to undertake a
family planning initiative and made some progress in reducing
overall fertility in the 1980's and 1990's, progress in the area has
either slowed or reversed in recent years.2 1 6 For example, the
With the lack of a clear 'fee policy' in the Public Health Sector, the [District
Health Management Boards] are likely to continue increasing fees arbitrarily
without due regard to the vulnerable. Indeed, declines in utilisation have
been evidenced in poverty stricken areas and/or facilities serving farmers, no-
mads, squatters and land clash victims.
Wasunna Owino, Public Health Sector Pricing Policy: The Question of Fee Adjustments 19
(Inst. of Policy Analysis Discussion Paper No. DP/013/98, 1998).
213. Owino & Were, supra note 177, at 7.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 17 (noting that 16% of inpatients were aware of the waiver system, as
opposed to 27% of outpatients).
216. See GOV'T OF KENYA, CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, KENYA DEMOGRAPHIC AND
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2003 Kenya Health and Demographic Survey ("KDHS") reports
that while total fertility had declined to 5.4 births per woman in
1990-92 and reached a low of 4.7 in 1995-97, it increased to 4.9
in 2000-2003.217 The percentage of contraceptive users among
currently married women rose from 33% in 1993, peaked at 39%
in 1998 but remained flat in 2003.21 The 2003 KDHS points out
that the unmet need for family planning remains high. 21 9 The
recent findings echo the 1998 KDHS, which indicated that "if all
women who wanted to space or limit child-bearing were to use
family planning, the contraceptive prevalence rate would in-
crease from the current level of 39% to about 66%."220
The family planning and reproductive health care system in
Kenya has long been plagued by the lack of a coordinated system
to obtain and distribute contraceptive supplies. At present, the
public sector drug supply system is centrally managed by the
Ministry of Health and the Kenya Medical Supplies Agency,
which, by the Kenyan government's own admission, are "unable
to meet the challenges of providing quality services in the pro-
curement, warehousing and distribution of drugs and medical
supplies due to organizational and operational problems. ' 22 1 Al-
though Kenya is in the process of revamping the system, pros-
pects for reform seem bleak; the Medical Supplies Coordination
Unit received only 0.3% of the total Ministry of Health
budget.222 In addition, management of the system has been de-
centralized to a non-government entity - the Kenya Medical
Supplies Agency ("KEMSA") - which, the government admits,
is severely underfunded. 223 By extension, this affects the provi-
sion of reproductive health commodities at government-run fa-
cilities and at the NGO clinics that rely upon the Kenyan govern-
ment to distribute these supplies obtained from donor agencies.
A circular dated January 14, 2004, released by the logistical unit
of the KEMSA and copied to the Reproductive Health Division
HEALTH SURVEY 54 (2003) [hereinafter KDHS], available at http://www.cbs.go.ke/pdf/
KDHS2003%20Full%20Report.pdf.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 68 tbl.5.4.
219. See id. at 105-07.
220. GOV'T OF KENYA, CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, KENYA DEMOGRAPHIC AND
HEALTH SURVEY 107 (1998), available at http://www.cbs.go.ke/pdf/.
221. See PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEW, supra note 194, at 28.
222. See id. at 8.
223. See id. at 19.
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of the Ministry of Health, shows that the government ran out of
stock of Norplant, progesterone-only pills (contraceptive), and
female condoms in May 2003.224
Apart from problems of supply, the contraceptive distribu-
tion scheme often fails to ensure that women are able to make
fully informed decisions about contraceptive use.22 5 For exam-
ple, the first point of care for almost half of Kenyan women is
either a government or private dispensary.2 26 Yet these women
are often unable to obtain appropriate information and counsel-
ing when they choose a contraceptive method. Despite evidence
that unanticipated side effects of contraception are the main rea-
son women discontinue their use, only 57.1% of women who
visit government dispensaries and 32.2% who use private chem-
ists are informed of the side effects of the family planning
method they purchased.2 2 7 In contrast, 77.4% of women who go
to FPAK for contraceptives report having been informed of side
effects. 228 Although NGO-run family planning clinics are able to
provide far better counseling and information, they currently
serve only a small percentage of the population.
b. Maternal/Child Health
Data from the 2003 KDHS indicate that 88% of Kenyan wo-
men reported having received pre-natal care at some point dur-
ing pregnancy.229 Yet, this high percentage masks potential
problems with the adequacy of care. For example, only 18% re-
ceived care from doctors, with 70% getting care from only a
nurse or midwife.23 ° Moreover, Kenyan women, on average,
seek care relatively late in pregnancy-during the fifth month.231
Finally, of those obtaining care, only 36% reported having been
informed of the signs of pregnancy complications,232 and only
224. See Alarm Over Birth Pills Shortage, NATION (Kenya), Feb. 4, 2004.
225. The Kenyan government reports that 20.7% of women obtain contraceptives
from a government facility and 21.9% from a private dispensary. See KDHS, supra note
216, at 75.
226. See id.
227. See id. at 77.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 123-24.
230. See id. at 124.
231. See id. at 126.
232. See id. at 127.
[Vol. 29:1
EXPORTING DESPAIR
32.8% reported that they were given information about HIV.2 3 3
With respect to childbirth itself, only two out of five births in
Kenya take place in a health facility, while the rest are home de-
liveries. 234 This high proportion of home births is problematic
in view of the fact that only one out of five of the women receives
any post-natal care, care that is essential to address delivery-re-
lated complications, especially for births that occur at home.
Only half of those obtaining care did so within two days of deliv-
ery.235 Moreover, whether taking place at home or in a health
care facility, the proportion of births in Kenya attended by
skilled health personnel has been declining in the past decade,
51% in 1989, 45% in 1993, 44% in 1999, down to about 42% in
2003.236 Data from the 2003 KDHS show that nationwide, only
11.4% of babies were delivered under the supervision of a doctor
and 30.2% by a nurse or midwife. 237 Traditional birth attend-
ants, both trained and untrained, conducted 28% of all deliv-
eries in 2003,238 a significant increase from 21% of all deliveries
in 1999.239
c. Abortion
Kenyan abortion law is quite restrictive, allowing abortion
only when it is necessary to save the life of the mother.2 40 Ke-
nya's Penal Code also criminalizes any attempt to induce miscar-
riage, 241 and punishes a woman who attempts to induce abortion
herself.24 2 Yet, the Penal Code also provides that:
A person is not criminally responsible for performing in good
faith and with reasonable care and skill a surgical operation
upon any person for his benefit, upon an unborn child for
the preservation of the life of the mother, if the performance
of the operation is reasonable, having regard to the patient's
233. See id.
234. See id. at 130-31.
235. See id. at 135.
236. See U.N. DEV. GROUP & Gov'r OF KENYA, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS:
PROGRESS REPORT FOR KENvA 132 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 MDG], available at http://
www.undp.org/mdg/kenya.pdf; see also KDHS, supra note 216, at 131-32.
237. See KDHS, supra note 216, at 132.
238. See id.
239. See id.; see also 2003 MDG, supra note 236, at 22.
240. See Penal Code, Laws of Kenya, ch.63, §§ 158-60.
241. See id. § 158.
242. See id. § 159.
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state at the time and to all circumstances of the case. 2 4 3
In some cases this has been interpreted to permit abortion when
necessary to preserve the women's physical or mental health.
244
As a practical matter, the criminalization of abortion has
meant that abortion in Kenya is not uncommon, but simply un-
regulated. Health care facilities may perform abortions under
the euphemism of "menstrual extraction,"'245 or legally, under
circumstances that accord with the exceptions in the penal
code.24 6 Although difficult to document, illegal abortions per-
formed by licensed and unlicensed practitioners appear to be
common. Indeed, one indication of the prevalence of abortion
is that complications from botched abortions account for ap-
proximately 45% of hospital admissions for women in Kenya.2 4 7
The legal status of abortion continues to generate political
controversy in Kenya. For example, the draft constitution has
been criticized by some women's groups and advocates of the
legalization of abortion as constitutionalizing restrictions on
abortion. 24 8 Nevertheless, the government has also shown some
awareness of the serious problem created by the prevalence of
unsafe abortion. For example, the National Population Policy
for Sustainable Development states that, while "abortion will not
be used as a method of family planning in Kenya," women who
undergo the procedure "will not be discriminated against and
will have access to quality services for management of complica-
tions arising from abortion.
249
d. Sexually-Transmitted disease
The AIDS virus was first reported in Kenya in 1984.250 In
243. Id. § 240.
244. See Ctr. for Reproduc. Law & Policy, WOMEN OF THE WORLD: LAWS AND POLI-
CIES AFFECTING THEIR REPRODUCTIVE LIVES, FRANCOPHONE AFRICA 62-63 (1999).
245. See generally Penal Code, Laws of Kenya, ch.63.
246. See id. § 240.
247. See MINISTRY OF HEALTH, KENYA MED. ASS'N, A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
MAGNITUDE AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNSAFE ABORTION IN KENYA 23-25 [hereinafter Na-
tional Assessment] (on file with Crowley Program).
248. Id.
249. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF KENYA & NAT'L AIDS CONTROL COUNCIL, KENYA
NATIONAL HIV/AIDS STRATEGIC PLAN 2000-2005 § 5.6.1 (Oct. 2000) [hereinafter HIV/
AIDS STRATEGIC PLAN].
250. See Boniface 0. K'Oyugi & Jane Muita, Impact of a Growing HIV/AIDS Epidemic
on the Kenyan Children, in AIDS, PUBLIC POLICY AND CHILD WELL-BEING, ch.3 (Giovanni
Andrea Cornia ed., 2002).
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1999, President Daniel Arap Moi declared AIDS a National Dis-
aster,25' recognizing that by the year 2000, over two million
Kenyans, out of a total population of twenty-nine million, were
HIV positive and more than 1.5 million Kenyans had already
died of AIDS.2 5 2 According to the United Nations Human De-
velopment Report, life expectancy in Kenya has dropped from
53.6 years in 1994253 to 45.2 years in 2002.254
In 1999, the government established the National AIDS
Control Council ("NACC") in the Office of the President to
"provide policy and strategic framework for mobilizing and coor-
dination of resources for the prevention of HIV transmission
and provision of care to those infected and affected by the dis-
ease." 255 The National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2000-2005 was
issued in October 2002, with an estimated cost of 14.06 billion
Kenyan Shillings (KSH), approximately US$180 million for the
five year period.256 As part of prevention efforts, the govern-
ment put in place the National Condom Policy and Strategy in
2001 to "ensure adequate national supply and access to con-
doms, coupled with public education and advocacy to increase
use among those who need to use condoms but are not doing
SO." 2 5 7
Much like the Family Planning Implementation Plan, the
National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2000-2005 relies on non-gov-
ernmental and community-based organizations for implementa-
tion. The HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan states that NGOs have been
"actively involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS since the onset
251. See HIV/AIDS STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 249, at iv.
252. See id.; see also UNAIDS Website, Kenya, http://www.unaids.org/en/geo-
graphical+area/by+Country/kenya.asp, (last visited Aug. 16, 2004).
253. See UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997 148 (1997).
254. See UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004 141 (2004), available at http://
www.undp.org.in/hdr2004/HDR2004_complt.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
255. See PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEW, supra note 194, at 2. In 2004, the National
AIDS Control Council ("NACC") was at the center of allegations that the former NACC
chief embezzled NACC funds for her personal benefit. See Gachara to Stand Trial for
Fraud, City Court Rules, NATION (Kenya), Feb. 4, 2004. The World Bank has refused to
release some US$21 million until it receives an audit report for 2002-2003. See Kenya:
Withheld Funds Cripples AIDS Planning, U.N. INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION NET-
woRm, June 23, 2004.
256. See HIV/AIDS STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 249, at 47.
257. MINISTRY OF HEALTH (KENvA) & NAT'L AIDS COUNCIL, NATIONAL CONDOM PoL
ICY & STRATEGY 6 (2001), available at http://www.policyproject.com/pubs/countryre-
ports/KenyaCondomPolicy.pdf.
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of the epidemic. ' 258 Such groups are heavily supported by inter-
national donors. As of 2000, an estimated US$90 million, or
90% of the donor funds for Kenya's HIV/AIDS related efforts,
with the exception of World Bank funding, 259 were disbursed
through NGOs.2 6 0
It is too early to assess the effectiveness of the NACC and the
National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan. To its credit, the govern-
ment has recognized the severity of the crisis and has devoted
available resources to combating the spread of the disease. Nev-
ertheless, it is clear that the HIV/AIDS epidemic has been a ma-
jor contributing factor to the precipitous decline in life expec-
tancy among Kenyans and has created further strains on the al-
ready fragile Kenyan health system. The 1999 Kenya Human
Development report states unequivocally: "The HIV/AIDS pan-
demic has compounded deteriorating health standards, in some
instances reversing the earlier gains. In its wake, the pandemic
has caused a steep rise in the number of orphans, growing desti-
tution and unprecedented levels of poverty.
261
e. Adolescents
The Kenyan government estimates that 20% of all reported
AIDS patients are young people ages 15 to 24.262 However, 88%
of girls ages 15 to 19 and 89.1% of boys believe they face either
"no" or "small" risk of becoming infected with HV.263 Addition-
ally, 46.7% of girls and 97.1% of boys ages 15 to 19 report engag-
ing in high-risk sex in the past twelve months. 26 4 During high-
258. HIV/AIDS STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 249, at 44.
259. In 1995 the World Bank gave the Kenyan government a US$40 million credit
to be used for capacity building to treat sexually transmitted infections. The project
financed the preparation of a Sessional Paper on AIDS, institutional development of
NASCOP and the creation of the National AIDS Control Council. It also provided
funds for nationwide interventions on blood safety; syndromic management of STDs;
treatment of opportunistic infections including tuberculosis; surveillance; education
and publicity and policy dialogue at the district level. Key implementing agencies in-
clude the Ministry of Health, NGOs, municipalities (local government), the Depart-
ment of Defense and the Kenyan Police. See id. at 14.
260. See id. at 13.
261. See 2003 MDG, supra note 236, at 9.
262. See REPUB. OF KENYA, ADOLESCENT REPRODUCIVE HEALTH & DEVELOPMENT
PLAN 11 (2003).
263. See KDHS, supra note 216, at 194 tbl.12.6.
264. See id. at 201 tbl.12.12 (demonstrating that in 2003, pre-marital sex was con-
sidered high-risk).
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risk sex, only 23.4% of girls and 41.3% of boys report using con-
doms.2 6 5 The lack of condom use is also reflected in the fact that
by age nineteen, 45.6% of Kenyan girls have begun childbear-
ing.266 A May 2004 study of unsafe abortion in Kenya revealed
that women and girls ages fourteen to twenty-four accounted for
48% of all abortions.2 6 7
Despite the crisis reflected in these statistics, Kenyan adoles-
cents continue to face significant obstacles to obtaining appro-
priate information about sexual health and reproductive health
services. Because of the social stigma attached to adolescent sex-
uality, reproductive health services for young people ideally
should be provided in a context that is both private and highly
accessible (for example, schools)268 Centers designed especially
to serve adolescent patients are most effective.2 6 9 Yet, as of 2001,
only seven such clinics were located in government-owned
health care facilities.27° Moreover, mission hospitals, which pro-
vide a large part of the health care particularly in rural areas, are
even less likely to provide specialized reproductive health ser-
vices and information to adolescents because of religious pro-
scription of adolescent sexuality.271 The most effective programs
for youth are often those created and run by NGOs, including
FPAK. FPAK-affiliated centers provide family planning informa-
tion to young people and sponsor outreach efforts and training
to reach populations unlikely or unable to visit the centers them-
selves.27 2 These programs, while laudable, are underfunded and
have had to curtail outreach programs in recent years.
27
-
265. Id.
266. Id. at 62 tbl.4.10.
267. See Ministry of Health, Kenya Medical Association, FIDA-Kenya & IPAS, A Na-
tional Assessment of the Magnitude and Consequences of Unsafe Abortion in Kenya 26 (May 6,
2004) [hereinafter National Assessment]; see also FIDA-Kenya Report of a Baseline Survey
Among Women in Nairobi 10 (March 2002) [hereinafter Baseline Survey Among Women in
Nairobi]. The survey sites were Aga Khan Hospital, Kangemi Health Centre, Kenyatta
National Hospital and Pumwani Maternity Hospital. Id.
268. See Peter McIntyre, 'HI-O, Adolescent Friendly Health Sources - An Agenda for
Change, at 27-28, WHO Doc. WHO/FCH/CAH/02.14 (Oct. 2002), available at http://
www.who.int/reproductive.health/publications/can docs/can_02_I 4.pdf.
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. See KENYA HDR 1999, supra note 37, at 51.
272. See Former FPAK Ocharo Interview, supra note 3.
273. See infra Part II.B. (discussing the impact of the Global Gag Rule on FPAK).
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f. Gender and the Provision of Reproductive Health Services
Most Kenyan women report that they do not enjoy complete
autonomy with respect to their own health seeking behavior, in-
cluding their use of contraception. 27 4 According to the Kenyan
government, only 39.8% of married women have the final say in
decisions relating to their own health care. 275 Perhaps even
more striking is the finding that only 41.6% of unmarried women
in Kenya, which includes never married, divorced, separated and
widowed women, say they make their own health decisions.2 7 6
Even fewer adolescent women (20%) reported that they have
any say in health care decisions.277 Predictably, the regions in
which the fewest adult women report having decision-making
power with respect to their health care are the regions where
HIV is the most prevalent - Nyanza and the Western Prov-
inces. 2 7 8
One result of women's lack of control over their reproduc-
tive health care decisions is that 25% of all pregnancies in Kenya
are mistimed and 20% are unwanted. 279 According to govern-
ment data, the overall preferred number of children is 3.6
whereas the actual number is 4.9.2 ° This gap between wanted
and observed fertility is greatest among poor women, those liv-
ing in rural areas, and those with less than secondary educa-
211tion.
When a woman does decide to seek reproductive health
care on her own, the decision is not without potential conse-
quences. Health care is not free, and often women have to ne-
gotiate with their husbands to obtain the money required for
routine health care, including family planning. The necessity of
such negotiation, of course, undermines a woman's ability to
seek health care without her spouse's knowledge or over his ob-
jections. In addition, a woman's decision to seek health care,
including the decision to use family planning, may precipitate
274. See KDHS, supra note 216, at 42-50.
275. See id. at 42 tbl.3.10. Of married women, 42.9% say their husband has final
say with 14.3% reporting that such decisions are made jointly. Id.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 43 tbl.3.10.
278. See id.
279. See id. at 110 tbl.7.6.
280. See id.
281. Id. at 110.
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domestic violence. According to the 2003 KDHS, the first to in-
clude questions about domestic violence, almost one-fifth (19%)
of married women experienced violence within the first two
years of marriage, and one-third (32%) experienced violence in
the first five years of marriage. 28 2 According to the KDHS,
18.1% of urban women and 27.3% of rural Kenyan women have
experienced violence during the past twelve months.28 3 The
2003 KDHS found that 29.4% of women and 24.6% of men felt
that a woman's refusal to have sex was a justification for wife-
beating.2 4 With respect to the link between reproductive health
and domestic violence, a 2002 study conducted by FIDA-Kenya
found that, among Nairobi women seeking care at either prena-
tal clinics or emergency rooms at a mix of private and public
facilities, 2 5 women seeking pregnancy and OB/GYN services re-
ported the highest rate of domestic violence.28 6
Finally, polygamy, which is legal and reasonably widespread
in Kenya, affects women's health care decisions in subtle but im-
portant ways.28 7 For example, a woman might be reluctant to
use birth control to limit the number of children, because her
husband might assume that she is infertile and seek a second
wife. Similarly, a woman might be reluctant to seek other kinds
of medical care because to do so might signal to her husband
that she is weak or ill, again prompting him to take another wife.
In sum, women's subordination in Kenyan society creates
particular obstacles to their access to health care and requires a
system of delivering health care that takes into account these ob-
stacles. In the area of reproductive health, the Kenyan govern-
ment has recognized the importance of a gender-sensitive health
policy, particularly with respect to family planning.288 Among
the most effective modes of delivery are those developed in part-
nership with NGO's such as FPAK and Marie Stopes - both of
which have lost funding as a result of the Mexico City Policy de-
scribed below.
282. See id. at 247 tbl.15.5.
283. See id. at 242 tbl.15.1.
284. See id. at 46 tbl.3.12.1.
285. See Baseline Survey Among Women in Nairobi, supra note 267, at 10.
286. See id. at 17.
287. See, e.g., Catherine A Hardee, Balancing Acts: The Rights of Women and Cultural
Minorities in Kenyan Marital Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 712 (2004) (discussing the preva-
lence of polygamy and the effect upon women's power in the marital relationship).
288. See Review of the Health Sector, supra note 182, at 35, 38.
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3. USAID in Kenya
The development of modern health policy in Kenya has al-
ways been influenced by the policy agendas of donor countries
and institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund
("IMF") and the World Bank. In fiscal terms, the influence is
clear: Multilateral donors contribute 16% of all health care
funding in Kenya and over 28.4% of the Ministry of Health's de-
velopment budget.289 This influence has been felt to an even
greater extent in the area of reproductive rights. In fact, the
Reproductive Health Program, which falls under the Depart-
ment of Preventative and Promotive Health Services, does not
even have a line item in the budget.290 Rather, reproductive
health, including family planning and H1V/AIDS, depends en-
tirely upon the support of donors, including USAID, the United
Kingdom, the European Union, Canada, Sweden, Belgium, Fin-
land, Germany, Japan, Denmark, United Nations Family Plan-
ning Association and the World Bank.29'
Throughout the development of Kenya's reproductive
health program, the single most significant donor has been
USAID.2 9 2 This section provides a very brief description of
USAID's history and mandate and an overview of its involvement
in Kenya.
Created during the Kennedy Administration, USAID has
promoted and funded international family planning since
1965.213 In Kenya, USAID has supported activities in the popula-
tion, health, and nutrition sectors since the early 1970's.294
USAID funded the roll-out of Kenya's family planning program
in the 1970s by supporting the creation of 590 service delivery
points, 400 full-time and 190 part-time, served by 17 mobile units
and the training of personnel at the district and provincial levels
289. See KENA MINISTRY OF HEALTH, KENYA NATIONAL HEALTH ACCoUN-Ts 21-24
(2001-02) (on file with Crowley Program).
290. Interview with Dr. Soloman, Program Manager, Reproductive Health Pro-
grams, in Nairobi, Kenya (May 26, 2004) (on file with Crowley Program).
291. See USAID, USAID/KENYA INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLAN 2001-2005, at III
(2000), available at http://pdf.dec.org/pdf-docs/PDABU260.pdf [hereinafter USAID/
KENYA INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLAN].
292. See id.
293. See USAID, FAMILY PLANNING FUNDING 2001 1 1 (Nov. 2001) available at
http://vv~.usaid.gov/our-work/global-health/pop/publications/docs/fpfund.pdf.
294. See USAID/KENYA INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 291, at vi.
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to staff them.295 Grant funds also went toward the establishment
of a National Family Welfare Center which was to have "day to
day responsibility for the administration [and] coordination of
all [family planning and maternal and child health] clinics in
Kenya. '296 Contemporaneously, USAID provided funds to estab-
lish a Population Studies and Research Institute at the University
of Nairobi that would conduct multi-disciplinary research and
publish a professional journal to generate data to be used by gov-
ernment planners to better design family planning programs. 297
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, USAID funded several pi-
lot projects in rural areas.298 USAID intended for these projects
to demonstrate the efficacy of providing family planning services
at the rural level and in combination with maternal/child health
services. 29 9 The projects also provided an opportunity for offi-
cials in the Ministry of Health to gain hands-on experiences with
project design and management, with the goal that the Ministry
would eventually assume full responsibility for the management
of the projects.3"' USAID, through a contracting agency, pro-
vided consulting services to Ministries of Health and Planning so
that a Division of Planning and Implementation could be cre-
ated to oversee rural health programs and services over the long
term."
ol
These early projects were only partially successful. It quickly
became apparent to USAID and other donors that the Govern-
ment of Kenya lacked the technical expertise and experience to
staff and manage new projects.3 0 2 Thus, in the early to mid-
1980s, USAID, the World Bank, and other donors adopted a
295. See USAID, SUMMARY OF USAID PROJECT 6150161: FAMILY PLANNING (1992),
available at http://www.dec.org.
296. Id.
297. See id. This project also provided scholarships for Kenya scholars to obtain
advanced graduate degrees abroad and the international organization the Population
Council was heavily involved as a project partner. Id.
298. See USAID, SUMMARY OF USAID PROJECT 6150179: KIBWEZI PRIMARY HEALTH
CARE (1979), available at http://www.dec.org; see also USAID, SUMMARY OF USAID PRO-
JET 6150206: KITUI RURAL HEALTH (1982), available at http://www.dec.org.
299. See USAID, EVALUATION OF THE KENYA HEALTH PLANNING AND INFORMATION
PROJECT (1979), available at http://www.dec.org.
300. Id.
301. See USAID, SUMMARY OF USAID PROJECT 6150193: FAMILY PLANNING 11 (1992)
[hereinafter USAID FAMILY PLANNING II], available at http://w,.dec.org.
302. See USAID, POPULATION DYNAMICS - HEALTH EDUCATION (lune 1975), availa-
ble at http://www.dec.org.
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strategy of creating new government entities, supported by a
hand-picked advisory staff, to implement family planning
projects.3"3 This strategy resulted in the creation of the National
Council on Population and Development under the Ministry of
Home Affairs °4  and the National Family Welfare Center
("NFWC") in the Ministry of Health. °5 The former coordinated
activities among public and private agencies working on family
planning,30 6 and the latter provided training to community
nurses and clinical officers to work in dispensaries, health cen-
ters and sub-centers across Kenya, as part of a strategy to decen-
tralize the health system.30 7
At the same time, donors began to collaborate more exten-
sively with the private sector to create and administer programs.
For example, in 1983, USAID started the Family Planning Private
Sector Project which created smaller scale projects to do the
same work of project design and community health worker train-
ing.30 8 In contrast with government efforts, this project ex-
ceeded program targets and implementation time frames, and
became a successful model for implementing family planning
projects in Kenya.3 9 By the mid-1980s, under the Family Plan-
ning Services and Support project, USAID began giving direct
support to NGOs, including the Family Planning Association of
Kenya (FPAK), the Christian Health Association of Kenya
(CHAK) and the Christian Organizations Research Advocacy
Trust.310 These grants were intended to expand further the suc-
cessful community health worker system and to create more inte-
303. See USAID, POPULATION STUDIES AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE (Sept. 1984), availa-
ble at http://www.dec.org; see also USAID, SUMMARY OF PROJECT 6150216: FAMILY PLAN-
NING MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH PROJECT (1983), available at http://www.dec.org.
304. See USAID FAMILY PLANNING II, supra note 301.
305. See id. The National Family Welfare Center ("NFWC") later became the Divi-
sion of Family Health. Id.
306. See USAID, SUMMARY OF PROJECT 6150223: PRIVATE SECTOR FAMILY PLANNING
(1988) [hereinafter PRIVATE SECTOR FAMILY PLANNING], available at http://www.dec.org.
307. See id. Training was provided by the International Training in Health Pro-
gram at the University of North Carolina. Id.
308. See PRIVATE SECTOR FAMILY PLANNING, supra note 306..
309. Id. Lessons learned included: 1) service providers which provided integrated
care were more successful than those with solely FP interventions, 2) local IEC subcom-
mittees increased service provider success, 3) contraceptives should be promoted and
distributed by non-threatening persons rather than senior managers, and 4) better con-
traceptive supply and logistics systems are needed. Id.
310. See USAID, SUMMARY OF USAID PROJECT 6150241: CHILD SURVIVAL AND FAM-
ILY PLANNING (Feb. 1987), available at http://www.dec.org.
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grated primary health and family planning service delivery loca-
tions.3 1 During this time, USAID funded contraceptive market-
ing efforts that, in 1990, became the Contraceptive Social
Marketing Project. 1 2 Under the 1991-1997 Private Sector Fam-
ily Planning II project, a follow-up project to the 1983 Family
Planning Services and Support effort, USAID continued to work
with many small organizations, including religious groups, and
stated that: "all organizations assisted under this project will be
helped to access contraceptive supplies available from the Minis-
try of Health. ' 13
In 1995, USAID launched the AIDS Population and Health
Integrated Assistance (APHIA) project to "consolidate all USAID
support to public healthcare" to "reduce fertility and the risk of
HIV/AIDS transmission in Kenya through integrated health and
family planning service delivery. ' 314 This effort, implemented
by Kenyan NGOs and the Ministry of Health, in collaboration
with the Japan International Cooperation Agency and several
USAID Washington-based projects, combined past efforts in
public and private service delivery and sustainable financing
(aimed at reducing dependency on outside support) with dis-
trict-level activities.315 On the government side, new elements of
USAID efforts included strengthening the Ministry of Health Re-
productive Health Logistics Unit and upgrading the Ministry of
Health Rural Health Training Centers. 6 On the NGO side,
USAID earmarked funds to help FPAK, CHAK, and Chogoria
Hospital become financially stable.3" 7 The focus on HIV/AIDS
resulted in funds being directed to Nyanza, Western and Coast
Provinces "where the need is the greatest. 3 1
In 1998, USAID began working with the Government of Ke-
nya to shape a new health strategy that would aid in the imple-
311. See USAID, EVALUATION OF THE FPPS PROJECT: FAMILY PLANNING PRIVATE SEC-
TOR (May 1990), available at http://www.dec.org.
312. See USAID, SUMMARY OF USAID PROJECT 6150251: CONTRACEPTIVE SOCIAL
MARKETING Uuly 1990), available at http://www.dec.org.
313. See USAID, SUMMARY OF USAID PROJECT 6150254: PRIVATE SECTOR FAMILY
PLANNING II, available at http://www.dec.org.
314. See USAID, SUMMARY OF USAID PROJECT 6150264: AIDS POPULATION AND
HEALTH INTEGRATED ASSISTANCE (May 1999), available at http://www.dec.org.
315. See id.
316. See id.
317. See id.
318. See id.
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mentation of the 1994 Health Policy Framework and make good
on Kenya's commitments to fulfill the International Conference
on Population and Development's Program of Action in a way
that was consistent with USAID's Integrated Strategic Plan for
Kenya.3" 9 This included providing major funding - with contri-
butions from the United Kingdom's Department for Interna-
tional Development and the United Nations Population Fund -
for the 1998 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey3 20 and col-
laborating with government and private actors to develop an
HIV/AIDS strategy.32' The Center for Disease Control, which
had been working in Kenya on efforts with a bio-medical slant,
especially in malaria, also at this time began to shift into HIV/
AIDS activities with an emphasis on hard-hit Kisumu in Nyanza
Province.322
This brief history of USAID's work on reproductive health
in Kenya suggests that outside donors have had a profound influ-
ence not just on the quality and accessibility of health care in
Kenya, but also on the structure of the health care delivery sys-
tem. 23 For example, in recent years, grants from outside do-
nors, including USAID, have shifted from family planning to
HIV/AIDS.3 24 This shift in donor priorities may or may not re-
flect the policy priorities of the government of Kenya. In any
event, they inevitably precipitate a shift in focus among grantees
- both governmental and nongovernmental. Whatever the
merits of such a shift in terms of public health policy, they have
the unintended consequences of undermining the coherence of
health policy at the national level and creating transition costs in
319. See USAID/KENYA INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 291, at 107.
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. See id. at 110.
323. See BETSY HARTMANN, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE GLOBAL POLI-
CIES OF POPULATION CONTROL 87 (1995). For example, in 1982, the World Bank made
the release of part of Kenya's Second Structural Adjustment Loan contingent on the
establishment of a National Council on Population & Development (NCPD) to be
housed outside the Ministry of Health, despite the Ministry's opposition to the creation
of a "donor driven" entity. Id. at 87 (citing Ronald Ridder, World Bank, Population and
the World Bank: Implications from Eight Case Studies 54 (Operations Evaluations Study,
World Bank, 1992). The implication here is that the Ministry of Health was considered
incapable of making the required reforms and implementing the spending cuts man-
dated by the structural adjustment loan. See Warren C. Robinson, Kenya Enters the Fertility
Transition, 46 Pop. STUD. 455 (1992).
324. See USAID, SUMMARY OF PROJECT 6150264: AIDS POPULATION AND HEALTH
LNrEGRATED ASSISTANCE (1995), available at http://www.dec.org.
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a highly under-resourced system. Thus, one commentator from
the International HIV/AIDS Alliance stated:
[T]he significant increase in resources is welcome, however
donor ambitions and frequent changes in international fi-
nancing mechanisms are absorbing much needed human ca-
pacity and forcing structural changes. A case study of Kenya
shows that the Ministry of Health has profoundly changed its
role from being focused on policy-making, planning and
quality assurance, technical support and coordination to one
of resource mobilization activities and managing multiple re-
lationships with donors .... In addition, there is no mecha-
nism to prevent duplication of effort.325
As a result, Kenya's control over the provision of health care is
undermined even while Kenya remains accountable under inter-
national law for ensuring the right to health of its citizens.
With respect to the delivery of health care services, donor
support has shifted toward NGO's and away from block grants at
the national level.3 26 For example, the USAID Kenya Integrated
Strategic Plan 2001-2005 outlines a plan to "reduce fertility and
the risk of H1V/AIDS transmission through sustainable, inte-
grated family planning and health services. '3 27 Specifically, the
Integrated Plan states that USAID/Kenya
[W]ill combine and refocus its separate clinic, community-
based, and quality improvement [reproductive health] activi-
ties to take a more facility-based, comprehensive approach to
service delivery at the district level. An NGO, or consortium
of NGOs, will be selected to work with USAID/Kenya and its
cooperating agencies ... [to increase the] availability of com-
munity-level family planning . . . , reproductive health
and child survival . . . services .... [I]ncluding HIV/AIDS/
325. Alvaro Bermejo, HIV/AIDS in Africa: International Responses to the Pandemic, 11
NEW ECONOMY 125, 165-66 (2004).
326. See USAID/KENYA INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 291, at 111 (ex-
plaining that, with regard to the health sector, "due to difficulties of tracking donor
funds through the public sector, particularly at the national level, donor support has
shifted toward NGOs or toward district-level activities").
327. See id. at 112. The components are: 1) recognizing HIV/AIDs as a multi-
sectoral crisis, 2) integrating HIV/AIDS and STI services into family planning, maternal
and child health services, 3) integrating private sector (including NGO) programs in
targeted geographic areas, 4) recognition of the need for behavior change and positive
health-care-seeking behavior, 5) giving young people priority attention, and 6) enhanc-
ing efforts to strengthen the policy environment and manage sector resources. Id.
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STI prevention.3 28
Although this strategy of reliance on NGO's may have resulted
in more efficient use of donor funds, whether it has resulted in a
more efficient use of health care dollars overall is less clear.
More importantly for the purposes of this Report, the strategy
helped to create a system that is particularly vulnerable to restric-
tions imposed by the United States through the Mexico City pol-
icy described in the next section.
4. Mexico City
The early years of USAID's reproductive health policymak-
ing were characterized by a position of political neutrality toward
the regulation of family planning. For example, a 1967 Guide-
line for Assistance to Population Programs stated "[USAID] does
not advocate any specific population policy for another country,
nor any particular method of family planning. Its aim is to pro-
vide needed assistance upon request so that people everywhere
may enjoy the fundamental freedom of controlling their repro-
duction, health, and welfare as they desire."3 29 According to
President Johnson, "The United States cannot and should not
force any country to adopt any particular approach [of popula-
tion control]. It is a matter of individual and national con-
science.330
During the 1970's, however, the domestic politics of abor-
tion in the United States began to influence its international
family planning agenda. The earliest example of this influence
was the Helms Amendment adopted in the wake of the Supreme
Court's landmark decision, Roe v. Wade,33 striking down a crimi-
nal abortion statute and limiting the degree to which abortion
could be regulated in the United States. 32 The Helms Amend-
ment prohibits the use of population assistance either to pay for
the performance of abortions or to coerce any woman to have an
328. Id. at 123.
329. R. T. Ravenholt, The A.LD. Population and Family Planning Program - Goals,
Scope, and Progress, 5 DEMOGRAPHY 561, 562 (1968) (quoting U. S. AGENCY FOR INT'L
DEV., GUIDELINES FOR ASSISTANCE TO POPULATION PROGRAMS, M.O. 1612.57 (1967)).
330. Lyndon B.Johnson, Special Message to Congress on the Foreign Aid Program
(Feb. 1, 1966), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, LYNDON B.
JOHNSON, Vol. I at 119 (1967).
331. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
332. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f)(1) (2000).
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abortion.3 3
One year after the enactment of the amendment, the
United States attended the 1974 Bucharest Conference on Popu-
lation, where it formally recognized family planning as a basic
human right.33 4 Along with this ideological rhetoric came tacti-
cal change. USAID began to modify its approach to population
programming, shifting from "supply-side" theory, which empha-
sized the use of contraceptive supplies as a means of limiting
births, to "demand-side" or "developmental" theory, entailing ec-
onomic reforms aimed at reducing demand for children.335 But
with the election of Ronald Reagan, neither human rights nor a
demographic-economic imperative would be the guiding princi-
ple of population assistance .336 By 1983, with a cooperative
leader in the White House, anti-abortion advocates were paying
more attention to what they could accomplish on an interna-
tional level. 337 Thus, at the United Nations International Con-
ference on Population in Mexico City, James L. Buckley, the U.S.
delegate, recited the position of the United States: "The United
Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) calls for
legal protection for children before birth as well as after birth.
In keeping with this obligation, the United States does not con-
333. See id. The Amendment states:
(f) Prohibition on use of funds for performance or research respecting abor-
tions or involuntary sterilization.
(1) None of the funds made available to carry out subchapter I of this
chapter may be used to pay for the performance of abortions as a method
of family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abor-
tions.
(2) None of the funds made available to carry out subchapter I of this
chapter may be used to pay for the performance of involuntary steriliza-
tions as a method of family planning or to coerce or provide any financial
incentive to any person to undergo sterilizations.
(3) None of the funds made available to carry out subchapter I of this
chapter may be used to pay for any biomedical research which relates, in
whole or in part, to methods of, or the performance of, abortions or invol-
untary sterilization as a means of family planning.
Id.
334. SeeJeannie L. Rosoff, The Politics of Birth Control, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 312, 313
(1988).
335. See generally Ruth Dixon-Mueller, U.S. International Population Policy and "the
Woman Question," 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 146, 155 (1987).
336. See id. at 166.
337. See Barbara B. Crane & Jason L. Finkle, The United States, China, and the United
Nations Population Fund: Dynamics of US Policymaking, 15 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 23, 30
(1989).
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sider abortion an acceptable element of family planning pro-
grams. 338
More critically, the United States would cut off USAID fund-
ing to foreign non-governmental organizations ("FNGOs") that
"perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family
planning," even with non-USAID funds."3 9 Foreign governments
would be permitted to receive USAID funding while supporting
abortion, as long as USAID funds were not used for abortion-
related activity. Furthermore, the funds were to be kept in a seg-
regated account.3 4 °
In providing its statement to the conference, known popu-
larly as the "Mexico City Policy,"' 4 the United States declared
that population growth was "not necessarily good or ill," but be-
came problematic in conjunction with other factors.3 42 Accord-
ing to the U.S. argument, where the effects of population were
338. Mexico City Policy, supra note 9, at 578 (citing Declaration of the Rights of the
Child, supra note 30); see also RebeccaJ. Cook, U.S. Population Policy, Sex Discrimination,
and Principles of Equality Under International Law, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 93, 125
(1987) (criticizing U.S. reliance on the Declaration on the Rights of the Child tojustify
an anti-abortion stance as contrary to the substance of international human rights law).
339. Mexico City Policy, supra note 9, at 578. The Statement says that first, where
U.S. funds are contributed to nations which support abortion with other funds, the U.S.
contribution will be placed into segregated accounts which cannot be used f0r abu-
tion; second, the United States will no longer contribute to separate non-governmental
organizations which perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family plan-
ning in other nations; and third, before the U.S. will contribute funds to the United
Nations Fund for Population Activities ("UNFPA"), it will first require concrete assur-
ances that the UNFPA is not engaged in, and does not provide funding for, abortion or
coercive family planning programs. Should such assurances not be possible, and in
order to maintain the level of its overall contribution to the international effort, the
United States will redirect the amount of its intended contribution to other, non-
UNFPA family planning programs. See id. This softer governmental requirement was a
late concession to the policy. See ACLU REPROD. FREEDOM PROJECT, U.S. POPULATION
POLICY AS ANNOUNCED IN MEXICO CITY, 1984, at 2 (1984) [hereinafter PROJECT]. The
original pre-conference draft circulated by the White House in May, 1984, applied the
advocacy restriction to governments as well as FNGOs. See id. But in response to criti-
cism, and to reconcile the new restrictions with foreign policy and sovereignty consider-
ations, the U.S. position amended the policy. See id.; see also Camp, supra note 9, at 36;
Cook, supra note 302, at 98-99 (reasoning that the Administration recognized that com-
pelling other States to refuse to support abortion services would violate their sover-
eignty).
340. See Mexico City Policy supra note 9, at 574.
341. The policy is also known pejoratively as the "global gag rule" because of its
effect of silencing abortion recommendation and advocacy. See discussion infra Part
III.B.1.
342. Mexico City Policy, supra note 9, at 576. See VERNON RUTrAN, UNITED STATES
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE POLICY. THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID
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detrimental they could be relieved by rapid economic growth. 43
The Reagan Administration was essentially identifying economic
underdevelopment as the real problem, and excessive popula-
tion growth as merely a symptom. 3" This perspective signaled
an explicit abandonment of a position advocated for two de-
cades: that slowing population growth is essential to economic
development.1 -
Following the U.S. policy statement in Mexico City, USAID
promulgated agency guidelines to administer the new funding
restrictions. 346 Essentially, into each new grant and each renewal
grant for population assistance USAID inserts a "standard
clause," or a boilerplate contractual provision detailing the rele-
vant restrictions.' Funding is contingent on a recipient's ratifi-
cation of the clause.348
USAID population assistance grants are administered in
three ways: (1) directly to foreign governmental agencies, (2)
directly to FNGOs, or (3) indirectly to FNGOs through U.S.-
based family planning intermediaries known as Office of Popula-
tion Cooperating Agencies ("Cooperating Agencies") .349 Coop-
erating Agencies enter into cooperative agreements to issue sub-
125 (1996). Population growth was actually characterized as a "neutral phenomenon"
in the pre-conference draft. See Mexico City Policy, supra note 9, at 575.
343. See Mexico City Policy supra note 9, at 578-79.
344. See Mueller, supra note 335, at 166. Michael S. Teitelbaum notes that, ironi-
cally, pressure from the New Right was significant enough to force Ronald Reagan, the
quintessential Cold Warrior, to embrace planned economic development policies
thereby "trad[ing] ideological places on population issues with ... communist adversa-
ries." Michael S. Teitelbaum, The Population Threat, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992-1993, at
70.
345. See Rosoff, supra note 334, at 317.
346. See A.I.D. HANDBOOK #13, Trans. Memo. 13:43, at 4C-47 to 4C-53, 413-53 to
4D-60 Uune 19, 1987)) [hereinafter HANDBOOK 13] cited in John Blane & Matthew
Friedman, Mexico City Policy Implementation Study, app. A (Population Technical Assis-
tance Proj. Occasional Paper No. 5, 1990) [hereinafter Study]. The restrictions con-
tained in the handbook are virtually identical to the restrictions currently in effect.
Compare HANDBOOK 13, supra at 4C-47 to 4C-53; 4D-53 to 4D-60 with USAID Memo,
supra note 8, at 17,303-13. The single substantive difference between the policy provi-
sions as enacted by USAID and President Bush's memo in 2001 is that the latter docu-
ment exempts from the restrictions the performance or advocacy of post-abortion care.
See id. at 17,306, 17,311.
347. See Camp, supra note 9, at 38 (detailing the development of the standard
clause, including negotiation with the first affected parties).
348. See generally id.
349. See Study, supra note 346, at 1.
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grants to FNGOs on behalf of USAID. 350 Foreign NGO's receiv-
ing funds either from USAID directly or through a Cooperating
Agency may further grant portions of funds received to "sub-
recipients" and "sub-subrecipients. 35
1
In any case, all cooperative agreements with U.S. domestic
Cooperating Agencies and all grant contracts to FNGO recipi-
ents and subrecipients must contain the appropriate standard
clause rendering any recipient ineligible for USAID funding if
they perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family
planning.352 USAID funds may be provided to government fam-
ily planning programs that perform or promote abortion but
none of the USAID money may be used for such purpose and
must be maintained in a segregated account.353 The govern-
ment exemption also extends to government-sponsored entities
such as universities and research facilities.154 Because they are
U.S.-based, Cooperating Agencies are likewise eligible for
USAID population assistance without regard to their non-
USAID-funded abortion activities, but they must agree not to
provide U.S. funds to FNGOs "unless the foreign NGO certifies
in writing that it does not currently and will not during the term
of a cooperative agreement perform or actively promote abor-
tion as a method of family planning" or provide funds to any
NGO that conducts such activities?'
Under the Mexico City Policy, "to perform abortion" means
to operate a facility in which abortions are performed as a
"method of family planning.31 56 To promote abortion "actively"
350. See Study, supra note 346, at 1. Some examples of Cooperating Agencies in-
clude the Pathfinder Fund and the International Planned Parenthood Federation/
Western Hemisphere Region. See id. at app. D.
351. See USAID Memo, supra note 8, at 17,304.
352. See Study, supra note 346, at 1.
353. See id. (citing HANDBOOK 13, supra note 346 at 4C-47 to 4C-53; 4D-53 to 4D-
60).
354. See Camp, supra note 9, at 36. An example of this exemption might entail
funding to a national university which sponsors a publication advocating abortion or
provides abortion-related medical training. See id.
355. See Study, supra note 346, at 2 (quoting HANDBOOK 13, supra note 311 at 4D-53
to 4D-55).
356. USAID Memo, supra note 8, at 17,311. The memo defines what constitutes
abortion in the context of family planning:
Abortion is a method of family planning when it is for the purpose of spacing
births. This includes, but is not limited to, abortions performed for the physi-
cal or mental health of the mother but does not include abortions performed
if the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term
[Vol. 29:1
2005] EXPORTING DESPAIR
means to commit financial resources "in a substantial or continu-
ing effort to increase the availability or use of abortion. 357 In
signing this agreement, an FNGO grantee agrees to permit
USAID to check for compliance at any time by inspecting virtu-
ally any documents or evidence.358 If an FNGO violates its agree-
ment while receiving USAID funds, the FNGO's grantor Cooper-
ating Agency must terminate the subgrant and withhold further
disbursement. 59
The major exceptions to the restriction on abortion per-
formance or promotion are where the life of the mother would
be endangered by the fetus being carried to term and where a
pregnancy is the result of rape or incest. 6 ° The policy also stipu-
lates that "passive" referral for abortion services, or response to
an inquiry, is sometimes acceptable. 6 ' A final exception, in the
or abortions performed following rape or incest (since abortion under these
circumstances is not a family planning act).
Id.
357. Id. The memo further specifies:
This includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(I) Operating a family planning counseling service that includes, as part
of the regular program, providing advice and information regarding the bene-
fits and availability of abortion as a method of family planning;
(II) Providing advice that abortion is an available option in the event
other methods of family planning are not used or are not successful or en-
couraging women to consider abortion (passively responding to a question
regarding where a safe, legal abortion may be obtained is not considered ac-
tive promotion if the question is specifically asked by a woman who is already
pregnant, the woman clearly states that she has already decided to have a legal
abortion, and the family planning counselor reasonably believes that the eth-
ics of the medical profession in the country requires a response regarding
where it may be obtained safely);
(III) Lobbying a foreign government to legalize or make available abor-
tion as a method of family planning or lobbying such a government to con-
tinue the legality of abortion as a method of family planning; and
(IV) Conducting a public information campaign in USAID-recipient
countries regarding the benefits and/or availability of abortion as a method of
family planning.
Id.
358. See id. at 17,304.
359. See id. at 17,305. A refund of amounts already disbursed is not required un-
less fraud was involved in obtaining the subgrant. See id.
360. See id. at 17,306.
361. Id. The term "response" is discussed further:
[P]assively responding to a question regarding where a safe, legal abortion
may be obtained is not considered active promotion if the question is specifi-
cally asked by a woman who is already pregnant, the woman clearly states that
she has already decided to have a legal abortion, and the family planning
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context of advocacy, is that an individual acting on her own and
not as part of an organization may be involved in lobbying or
advocacy for abortion rights provided that the organization for
which she works neither endorses nor provides funding for the
action and takes reasonable steps to ensure that the individual
does not improperly represent the organization.362
The Mexico City Policy was initiated by executive order
under President Reagan and remained in place during the ad-
ministration of his successor, President George H. W. Bush. 361
President Clinton suspended the policy during his administra-
tion.3 6 4 President George W. Bush reinstated the Mexico City
Policy as one of his first executive acts upon taking office in
2001.365
B. The Impact of the Mexico City Policy on Kenya
Two NGO's, Marie Stopes International (MSI) and the Fam-
ily Planning Association of Kenya (FPAK), formerly important
partners of USAID in Kenya, refused to sign the pledge required
under the Mexico City Policy when President Bush reinstated it
in 2001.366 As a result, both NGO's lost significant funding and
were forced to close clinics, curtail services, impose or raise fees,
and reduce outreach and education efforts. 36 v This section de-
scribes some of the consequences of the loss of funds, including
the impact on individual women in some of the poorest sections
of Kenya.
1. The Family Planning Association of Kenya (FPAK)
The Family Planning Association of Kenya (FPAK) is the
oldest family planning organization in Africa and was registered
as an affiliate of the International Planned Parenthood Federa-
counselor reasonably believes that the ethics of the medical profession in the
country requires a response regarding where it may be obtained safely.
Id.
362. See id. at 17,307.
363. See Marc Lacey, House Panel Blocks Order Linking Money to Abortion, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 2001, at Al.
364. See id.
365. See id.
366. See Access Denied: Kenya, supra note 4, at 3.
367. See id.
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tion (IPPF) in 1962.36 Originally a loose network of volunteer
organizations working on family planning,369 FPAK grew into a
professional health organization that set the "standard as family
planning associations across the continent."37 Prior to the rein-
statement of the Mexico City Policy, FPAK operated thirteen
conventional family clinics and three male clinics.37 ' In addition
to family planning, FPAK provides pre- and post-natal obstetric
care as well as routine health check-ups for mothers and in-
fants.3 7 2 Several of these clinics also served as centers for the
Ministry of Health to train doctors and nurses to insert Norplant
and intrauterine devices, perform sterilization procedures, and
run STI/HIV/AIDS counseling programs. 3 FPAK clinics do
not perform abortions, although FPAK offers comprehensive
post-abortion care to women requiring emergency treatment374
and counseling to those who want the procedure. 75
When the Mexico City Policy was reinstated in 2001, the In-
ternational Planned Parenthood Foundation ("IPPF") headquar-
ters in London reviewed the conditions and subsequently ad-
vised all of its affiliates not to sign. 76 However, each country of-
fice had the autonomy to make its own decision. 77 FPAK senior
staff presented the matter to its Board which, according to Dr.
Godwin Mzenge, Executive Director of FPAK, made its decision
with "its eyes wide open" with regard to financial implications.3 78
According to Mzenge, Board Members had several reasons for
choosing not to sign; some cited FPAK's mission and obligation
to its clients; some felt that, as a family planning organization,
complete avoidance of abortion as a medical issue was impossi-
368. See Family Planning Association of Kenya [FPAK] Website, Brief History,
http://www.fpak.org/history.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2005).
369. See id.
370. Access Denied: Kenya, supra note 4 at 3.
371. See FPAK Website, Clinics, http://www.fpak.org/Clinicsl.html.
372. Global Gag Rule Impact Proj., Access Denied: U.S. Restrictions on International
Family Planning, Executive Summary (Sept. 2003), at 3, available at http://www.global
gagrule.org/pdfs/executivesummary/GGRexec-summary.pdf.
373. See Access Denied: Kenya, supra note 4, at 3.
374. See id.
375. Interview with Dr. Godwin Mzenge, Program Manager, and Dr. Linus I.A.
Ettyang, Executive Director, FPAK, in Nairobi, Kenya (May 18, 2004) [hereinafter FPAK
Mzenge and Ettyang Interview] (on file with Crowley Program).
376. Id.
377. See id. (explaining that Ghana, 99% dependent on USAID, and Tanzania,
who later did not get approval for funds, have signed).
378. Id.
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ble; and in the end a decision was made to "stay with one posi-
tion" rather than "hop from one erratic U.S. funding policy to
the next.''379 As a result of this decision, FPAK lost an average of
KSH21 million annually (US$276,300).38 ° IPPF London also de-
clined to sign, and, as a result, lost core support from USAID.3 l
FPAK annual core funding from IPPF-London was therefore re-
duced by an additional KSH16 million.38 2 Overall, the losses
comprised almost 60% of its annual budget.38 3
Faced with this substantial loss of funds, FPAK had to make
difficult decisions about eliminating staff and services. The Asso-
ciation had to balance its competing obligations as a service pro-
vider to poor Kenyans, as an employer, and as an organization
with an international reputation earned over decades of work.
Executive Director Mzenge and Program Manager Dr. Linus I.A.
Ettyang called the decision regarding which clinics to close "con-
tentious and painful. '"3 84 They explained that senior staff re-
viewed service provision statistics including the volume of clients
served, the ability of the clinic to recover costs, the number of
staff who would have to be relocated, and whether FPAK owned
or rented the facility. 8 5 This combination of factors, while rea-
sonable from an economic standpoint, led to the closing of clin-
ics in some of the poorest communities, including Eastleigh,
Embu and Kisii.
a. The Closures
The FPAK Eastleigh clinic, which closed in 2002, had been
operating since 1984 in a densely populated slum neighborhood
that is home to many refugees from the Republic of Congo, Ethi-
opia and Somalia. 38 6 The neighborhood has no government-run
379. Id. See Former FPAK Ocharo Interview, supra note 3 (commenting after one
day of contact with healthcare clients, "[a] day will come when we can see the light.
Funding will have to come back. We have to fight for our cause. We cannot be for the
immediate benefit. We have lost temporarily but in the end we will win.").
380. FPAK, Brief on Financial Position 2004, at 1 [hereinafter FPAK Financial
Brief] (on file with Crowley Program).
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. See Access Denied: Kenya, supra note 4, at 375.
384. FPAK Mzenge and Ettyang Interview, supra note 375.
385. See id.
386. MSI-Kenya, who did not close their Eastleigh clinic, provides pamphlets (on
file with the Crowley Program) with family planning information in Amarric and So-
mali. While MSI-Kenya provides services to all, regardless of refugee background, they
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health clinic.387 Clients visited the Eastleigh clinic for STD
screening and treatment, family planning, pre- and post-natal
obstetric services and check-ups for infants. s3 8 The clinic also
served women who live in Mathare Valley, one of the poorest
sections of Nairobi s.38  The Eastleigh clinic provided important
services directed at adolescents as it was located very near the
Eastleigh Youth Counseling Center (YCC), also sponsored by
FPAK.
The FPAK Embu Town Clinic was located in the capital of
Eastern Province and in the heart of Kenya's tea plantations and
rice farms. Opened in 1978, the clinic provided various forms of
family planning, check-ups, Pap Smears, treatment for STDs and
HIV/AIDS counseling and testing.39 ° FPAK was the only NGO
providing reproductive health services to the community. 391 Dr.
Methuselah M. Ocharo, former FPAK Embu Clinic Manager,
stated that the clinics used to serve between 200 and 300 clients
per month.392 FPAK Embu also ran an extensive outreach pro-
gram to tea plantation and rice irrigation workers. 93 Dr.
Ocharo explained that clinic staff conducted outreach at three
sites, with about seventy-five clients per site adding another 200
do not require their clients to state their status or nationality when they come for ser-
vices. As such, they could not provide statistics on the proportion of refugees in their
client base, but the fact of the multi-lingual materials strongly suggests a significant
presence. See Interview with MSI-Eastleigh staff, in Nairobi, Kenya (Feb. 3, 2004) (on
file with Crowley Program); see also Interview with Tom Chuma, Finance and Adminis-
tration Manager, in Nairobi, Kenya (Feb. 5, 2004) (on file with Crowley Program).
387. See Access Denied: Kenya, supra note 4, at 4.
388. Id.
389. A photograph book of Nairobi states:
[The people of] Mathare, Nairobi's largest and poorest slum, survive with
many things we take for granted. They do not have toilets, running water,
electricity or a good pair of shoes. Working people are lucky if they earn sixty
Kenyan shillings (roughly US$1) a day. Crammed into one-room shacks with
sheets hanging from the ceiling as room dividers, families are large, with five
to ten children. Single mothers run the majority of the households. Many
fathers have left or died, perhaps from AIDS or one of the other illnesses that
plague the slum. This is the Nairobi that most tourists do not see.
SHOOTBACK: PHOTOS BY KIDS FROM THE NAIROBI SLUMS, Epilogue (Lana Wong ed.,
1999).
390. See Former FPAK Ocharo Interview, supra note 3.
391. See Effects of the Gag Rule on FPAK Programme, Summary Version, 2004
[hereinafter Effects on FPAK (Summary)] (on file with Crowley Program).
392. See Former FPAK Ocharo Interview, supra note 3.
393. See Effects on FPAK (Summary), supra note 391.
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to 300 persons served per month.3 94 Dr. Ocharo was involved in
the process that led to the closure. He said that from a business
perspective, FPAK Embu was performing poorly. He agreed to
the closure, although the decision was "very, very difficult," and
acknowledged that "clients were praying we wouldn't close but
we had to."3 95
Kisii is a densely populated town in the center of a vast rural
and agricultural area. Fifty-two percent of the people in Kisii live
below the poverty level. 96 Also, 95.9% of all women of the Kisii
ethnic group have had genital surgery performed. 97 FPAK Kisii
had functioned as a regional training for doctors and nurses to
learn how to perform tubal ligations, vasectomies, and Norplant
insertion and removal. 98 FPAK Kisii also had a youth program
and, when it was open, partnered with an area high school
teacher to distribute reproductive and sexual health information
to some 100 students for four hours on Saturday mornings.399 A
community health worker program was launched in 2000 with
FPAK providing an extensive three-week training program to
prepare the workers to serve youths, pregnant women, and
mothers who want family planning.400
Most directly, the closures of the clinics in Eastleigh, Embu,
and Kisii have made it more difficult - and in some cases im-
possible - for their former clients to obtain basic family plan-
ning services. Members of the Crowley delegation visited all
three sites and interviewed members of the community, many of
whom were former clients of the FPAK clinics. These interviews,
though anecdotal, suggest that the closings had a substantial im-
pact on the availability of reproductive and basic health services
in these communities.
394. See Former FPAK Ocharo Interview, supra note 3.
395. Id.
396. Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Nat'l Dev., Geographical
Dimensions of Social Well-Being in Kenya, Where are the Poor? From Districts to Locations: Vol-
ume 1, Rural Poverty Rates Summary Table, at 73 [hereinafter Geographical Dimensions].
397. See KDHS, supra note 216, at 251.
398. Norplant is particularly popular with rural women whose access to healthcare
facilities is limited and irregular.
399. Interview with Margaret, high school teacher, in Kisii, Kenya (May 20, 2004)
(on file with Crowley Program).
400. Interview with Ben Giseemba, Kennedy Nyakundi Nyandoro and Linet
Osebe, Gusii Community Health Workers, in Kisii, Kenya (May 20, 2004) [hereinafter
FPAK Gusii Volunteers] (on file with Crowley Program).
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As an initial matter, the economic circumstances of many of
their clients made it difficult for FPAK to prepare them for the
closure and help them to arrange for an alternative source for
reproductive health care. Because most clients lacked postal ad-
dresses, FPAK could not notify them by mail. Instead, FPAK
kept each clinic open for at least four months so that clients
could be told in person and be made aware of the alternatives.
In some cases, these clients chose to switch to longer term con-
traceptive methods such as Norplant.
The "face to face" strategy worked with clients using meth-
ods such as the pill and injections as they are required to come
in every three months for a check-up and to obtain a new sup-
ply.4 ' Patients already on longer term methods were still learn-
ing of the closures at the time of the Crowley mission. For exam-
ple, Zipporah Kuamboka, a twenty-four-year-old woman and
mother of three, only found out that the clinic had closed the
day before she was interviewed by the Crowley delegation.0 2
She had visited the FPAK clinic on the recommendation of her
sister and her aunt, who also heard about FPAK from "people
satisfied with the services."4 3 In addition to receiving Norplant,
she obtained basic health care services such as weight and blood
pressure monitoring and a Pap Smear. Her last visit was in 2001.
On the day before the interview, Kuamboka paid KSH100 to
travel to the FPAK clinic in Kisii because the clinic near where
she lives in Bomochoge "gives limited services. ' ' She wanted to
have her Norplant removed because she was bleeding. Instead,
she went to the Aries Medical Clinic which opened in the office
where FPAK had operated. Kuamboka paid KSH600 to have the
Norplant removed, twice the amount FPAK had charged. When
interviewed by the delegation, Kuamboka complained not only
that the new clinic was "too expensive" but that the staff had
simply given her pills and "not told [her] about when to take the
pills or about side effects. ' '
FPAK's strategy of switching patients to long-term methods
such as Norplant helped to alleviate some of the immediate
401. See FPAK Mzenge and Ettyang Interview, supra note 375.
402. See Interview with Zipporah Kuamboka, former FPAK Kisii client, in Kisii, Ke-
nya (May 20, 2004) (on file with Crowley Program).
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id.
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problems created by the clinic closings. But long-term methods
also require monitoring and, eventually, removal. One client,
Angela Owino used to pay KSH70 and travel for an hour from
her village to FPAK Kisii because she felt the clinic was more
"reputable" than what she could find "back home. '"406 Heryne
Ayiemba Dok, who use to work in the FPAK Kisii clinic and has
since been relocated to FPAK Eldoret, explained the problems
that Norplant users face. "The [Kisii District] hospital only does
[Norplant removal] on one day [a week.] FPAK did it every day.
People get discouraged when they show up and can't get the
services they came for.... One woman kept her Norplant in for
seven years because she did not want to go somewhere else to
have it removed."4 ° With the FPAK clinic closure, Ms. Owino
will have to find an alternative for the removal of her Norplant
in 2005. She said simply: "I hope there will be a solution by next
year. 408
Ms. Dok's observations highlight that, in order to serve poor
women effectively, making services available on multiple days
and according to a predictable schedule is essential. Many FPAK
clients have no reliable way to contact the clinic to make or con-
firm appointments or to check whether services will be available
on a given day. Moreover, they often must travel long distances
and bear significant costs to obtain the services. If they are una-
ble to obtain the services on the day they arrive at the clinic, they
may simply be unable to reschedule and return on another day.
For example, Esther Mutui, a forty-five-year-old mother of four,
used to go to the FPAIK clinic in Eastleigh, a ten-minute walk
from her home in Mathare Valley. She now travels two hours
each way to get services at the FPAK Ribeiro clinic, a trip she is
able to make, at most, once a year. Mutui said, "I used to get a
check-up every three months in order to get the pills so I would
go to the clinic. Now I only get a check-up once a year. ' 40 9 In
the meantime, she tries to obtain pills from outreach workers
406. Interview with Angela Owino, former client of FPAK Kissi, in Kisii, Kenya
(May 20, 2004) [hereinafter Owino Interview] (on file with Crowley Program).
407. Interview with Heryne Ayiemba Dok, formerly of FPAK Kisii, Kenya (May 20,
2004) [hereinafter Dok Interview] (on file with Crowley Program).
408. Id.
409. Interview with Esther Mutui, former client of FPAK Eastleigh, in Eastleigh,
Kenya (May 18, 2004) [hereinafter Mutui Interview] (on file with Crowley Program).
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but notes "sometimes the volunteers do not have any pills. 410
Because of the proximity of the Eastleigh clinic, Mutui also
brought her children when they were sick. Now she explains,
"[I] t is hard. If they get sick I usually just go to the chemist for
medicine."41'
Some women like Veronica Ngina, an Eastleigh widow and a
mother of two children, have been cut off completely. She used
to go the FPAK clinic in Eastleigh but says, "now I never go any-
where."4 1 2 She used to receive contraceptive injections at FPAK
but, since she cannot access the clinic, Veronica buys her pills at
the pharmacy for KSH30 a month. At the time of the interview,
Veronica was out of work. "I used to sell cabbages, then I got a
new job cooking, but now I am unemployed. I get some finan-
cial help from the government .... So far, I still have money
because I have not been unemployed too long, but if I don't find
a job soon, I don't know how I will pay. 41 3
In addition to reproductive health services, the FPAK clinics
also served as an affordable-and sometimes the only-source of
primary health care for women. For example, Petwnila
Masimiyu Wanyama, who is twenty-nine and works as a clerk with
Kenya Power, had been visiting FPAK in Embu for five years.
She is neither married nor using contraceptives but went to the
clinic when she was "having trouble with [her] periods." '414 She
had her hormones checked, got a Pap Smear and medicine. A
private clinic staffed by FPAK nurses has opened in the site of
the former FPAK office, and Wanyama compared her past and
present experiences. "Before it was cheaper . . . it was
quicker."415 She used to pay KSH50 per visit. With regard to the
new clinic, she said, "I came once and there was no doctor so I
stopped coming. I went to see a gyn[ecologist]. He was private
and charged KSH300. I will go to him if there is no other op-
tion, but it is very expensive."4 16
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Interview with Veronica Ngina, former client of FPAK Eastleigh, in Eastleigh,
Kenya (May 18, 2004) [hereinafter Ngina interview] (on file with Crowley Program).
413. Id.
414. Interview with Petwnila Musimiyu Wanyama, former client of FPAK Embu, in
Embu, Kenya (May 20, 2004) [hereinafter Wanyama Interview] (on file with Crowley
Program).
415. Id.
416. Id.
20051
68 FORDHAM INTERNA TIONAL LAWJOURNAL
Similarly, Marren Achieng, a former client of FPAK Kisii, a
forty-year-old woman who planned her two pregnancies, com-
plained about the quality of services she obtained when the
clinic closed. Achieng, comparing her past and present exper-
iences with seeking health care, said, "I went to the [FPAK]
clinic every three months and when necessary. I got Pap Smears
and check-ups. It was not difficult to pay for the Pap Smear.
When I was at the clinic, they did counseling, blood pressure,
HIV/AIDS counseling. They offered the services, I did not have
to ask. FPAK provided family planning counseling too." '41 7
Achieng continued,
After they closed, I was stranded.... I did not want to switch
to another doctor. When I went to another clinic, the ser-
vices were not as good. They were expensive and they were
not offered every day. It was discouraging because they al-
ways told me to come back another day. There was not as
much counseling.418
Almost to the person, former clients of the closed clinics
complained about the additional time and financial costs associ-
ated with finding alternatives. Some continue to visit other
FPAK sites at considerable inconvenience. According to Nurse
Imbadi, formerly based at FPAK-Eastleigh and now based at
FPAK-Ribeiro House, "I had a relationship with many clients.
And now those clients travel here to follow me. They know me,
but it is very difficult for them to come here to me now. Some
have to walk very far-even to get to the [bus]."4 19
At the time of the publication of this Report, FPAK was con-
sidering closing two additional clinics that had been funded pri-
marily by USAID. A statement prepared by FPAK's Finance and
Administration Officer regarding the possibility of closing these
two clinics predicted that, based on past levels of service, some
8600 clients would be left without access to services including,
on an annual basis, 17,200 family planning visits, contraceptive
supplies for 2900 couples, 5000 Pap Smear tests for early diagno-
sis of cervical cancer, and counseling for some 900 STD cli-
417. Interview with Marren Anchient, former client of FPAK Kisii, in Kisii, Kenya
(May 20, 2004) [hereinafter Anchient Interview] (on file with Crowley Program).
418. Id.
419. Interview with Sarah Imbadi, Registered Nurse, FPAK Ribeiro Clinic, in Nai-
robi, Kenya (May 18, 2004) [hereinafter FPAK Imbadi Interview] (on file with Crowley
Program).
[Vol. 29:1
EXPORTING DESPAIR
ents.4 20
b. Reduced Services and Higher Fees
Beyond the closing of these three clinics, the loss of USAID
funding also forced FPAK to reduce staff and services at the clin-
ics that have remained open. In total, FPAK laid off forty staff,
including thirty who were directly associated with service provi-
sion.4 2 ' According to FPAK Executive Director Mzenge, "I have
lost most of my senior staff... In 2001, the program-officer level
fell to sixty percent and we have not been able to replace these
people. We have redeployed less-experienced staff back to head-
quarters to replace these people. '4 22 Salary increases were being
planned prior to the 2001 reinstatement of the Mexico City Pol-
icy but fell through and experienced staff people left seeking
higher wages at international organizations which have recently
begun to hire more Kenyan nationals.423 Mzenge says that re-
maining staff are demoralized because they "can't implement
plans or achieve goals."4 24
In Nairobi, FPAK Supervising Physician Dr. J. Osur Odour,
divides his time between FPAK's Phoenix House and Ribeiro
Clinic where the staff has been "cut in half."'4 25 Dr. Odour works
at Phoenix House once a week and at Ribeiro House twice a
week. In addition, he said that "many volunteer doctors used to
come and can't come anymore. '426 Ribeiro House Registered
Nurse Sarah Imbadi complained that "[r]etrenchment made it
difficult for even the staff to travel to the new clinics, so many of
them chose to retire early. I continued to work even though it is
more difficult for me to get here. '"427
420. Effect of the Global Gag Rule on the Programme of Family Planning Associa-
tion of Kenya 2002, at 2 [hereinafter Effects on FPAK] (on file with Crowley Program).
421. Interview with Tom Chuma, Fin. and Admin. Manager, FPAK, in Nairobi, Ke-
nya (May 24, 2004) [hereinafter FPAK Chuma Interview] (on file with Crowley Pro-
gram).
422. FPAK Mzenge and Ettyang Interview, supra note 375.
423. Id. For example, the FPAK communications person got a job at the Joint
U.N. Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the most senior doctor went to the Center for
Disease Control and an advocacy person moved on to Pathfinder. Mzenge asserts that
FPAK's inability to provide competitive salaries is a "direct result of the Gag Rule." Id.
424. Id.
425. Interview with Dr. J.A. Osur Odour, Supervising Physician, FPAK Ribeiro
Clinic, in Nairobi, Kenya (May 18, 2004) (on file with Crowley Program).
426. Id.
427. FPAK Imbadi Interview, supra note 419.
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Director Mzenge described the situation at FPAK in
Kakamega in Western Kenya:
[B]ecause of the Gag Rule, the staff has been reduced to one
third of the pre-Gag Rule number. This has resulted in re-
ducing the number of patients. The lab in that location is not
able to do simple tests. Consequently, patients have to be re-
ferred to the general hospital. When the clients are referred
to the hospital, they tend not to come back to FPAK 4 2 8
Similarly, FPAK Kisumu had a clinical officer and three nurses
on staff prior to the funding cuts. Now, Nurse in Charge Martha
Achesi doubles as nurse and clinical officer and says that many of
her former patients go to government hospitals. Nurse Achesi
also reported that all eight Kisumu-based community health
workers are dormant as are an additional twenty-five community
health workers between the towns of Ugunja and Ukwala. FPAK
had started to build a new clinic in Ukwala but had to stop con-
struction due to a lack of funds. Nurse Achesi suggested that the
rate of family planning has gone down and that the rate of STIs,
botched abortions, and unwanted pregnancies has gone up.429
In order to maintain services at the remaining clinics, FPAK
has been forced to reevaluate its fee structure. Although FPAK
originally provided family planning services free of charge, it
eventually began to impose fees for some services. At the time it
lost USAID funding, FPAK was in the process of implementing a
fee structure under which clients outside of poor neighborhoods
would pay near-market rates for services, and those funds would
be used to subsidize services for the poor. In the wake of the
cuts, FPAK has found that the cross-subsidization scheme does
not generate enough income to fund clinics located in rural and
poor urban communities. Thus, FPAK must now consider intro-
ducing higher fees across the board in order to remain in opera-
tion.43 If FPAK cannot add new services to underwrite family
planning, the ability of Kenya's poorest people to access health
care may be further compromised.
428. FPAK Mzenge and Ettyang Interview, supra note 375.
429. Interview with Martha Achesi, Nurse in Charge, FPAK Kisumu, in Kisumu,
Kenya (May 20, 2004) (on file with Crowley Program).
430. See FPAK Mzenge and Ettyang Interview, supra note 375.
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c. Cuts in Outreach and Education
One of the less obvious but perhaps more devastating ef-
fects of the loss of USAID funding has been to undermine
FPAK's well-developed system for the community-based distribu-
tion of contraceptives. With the financial and technical support
of USAID, FPAK recruited and trained a large network of com-
munity health workers to provide reproductive health education,
contraceptive supplies, and referrals for medical services. In
2001, FPAK's community health workers reached 56,000 people
with reproductive health information, education and counsel-
ing, made 30,000 referrals, provided 75,000 persons with contra-
ceptives and distributed 89,600 condoms.4 31  This network al-
lowed FPAK to reach women whose geographic location or per-
sonal circumstances made it difficult for them to visit a clinic for
care. According to an international consortium of NGOs moni-
toring the effects of the Mexico City Policy, FPAK reduced the
number of community-based distribution agents by fifty per-
cent.432 Finance and Administration Officer Tom Chuma re-
ported that the community health worker component of FPAK is
now only about "twenty percent effective" and operating with
only a "minimal structure. 433
The Crowley delegation interviewed FPAK community
health workers in Eastleigh, Embu, and Kisii and found that, al-
though they were acutely short on contraceptive supplies, many
were still doing their best to provide counseling and referrals.
For example, a former FPAK community health worker in Embu
explained that, in the past, "USAID gave us bicycles, an allow-
ance, and bags," but that now, "we do not have the supplies we
need like we used to."4 34 They estimated that the twenty-five
Embu community health workers used to serve 500 people every
two weeks. One volunteer, Hussein Maljan, complained, "We
still see a lot of people, but we just don't have the same supplies
we used to. '4 5 He added that clients "liked our services before
431. See Effects on FPAK, supra note 391, at 3.
432. See Access Denied: Kenya, supra note 4, at 5.
433. FPAK Chuma Interview, supra note 386.
434. Interview with Nancy W. Kamav, Muchoki Kithinji, Hussein Majan, Mary W.
Nyagah and Halima S. Shaban, members of the Kenya Cmty. Health Volunteers Pro-
gram, in Embu, Kenya (May 20, 2004) [hereinafter Embu Volunteers Interview] (on
file with Crowley Program).
435. Id.
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but not now." '4 3 6 Maijan reported that his clients ask, "Why have
you abandoned us?"4 37 Another community health worker from
Embu, Michoki Kithinji elaborated on the specific case of HIV
patients: "It has reached a point where people with HIV - who
would not go to hospitals because of the fear of the scourge -
began to trust us. Some would be frank about HIV. But we can't
give people pills when we have none. "438 He felt that in the past
"taking services to people really produce[d] results" but that
some clients "are becoming careless now. ' ' 4139
Community health workers in Eastleigh also described the
effects of the shortage on their clients. According to Charles
Kanyi, "[We] could be walking down the street and people
would ask me for contraceptives. "440 He added, "Some stopped
taking pills because they can't get it elsewhere. '44 1 When asked
whether their clients had other alternatives, Virginia Njue re-
ported that "some end up getting abortions. ' 4 2 Grace Adams
added that women "go to bushmen [or] overdose on drugs. 443
Kennedy Nyakundi Nyandoro, a Gusii community health
volunteer who was trained by FPAK, told Crowley delegation
members, "[w]e want to reach out to youth but we do not have
the resources. We haven't been able to get them. We want to
start a program because the FPAK center closed. FPAK clinic
served our youth. We have worked for 2000 youths in [the] year
[before] the program . . . closed." '4 4 4 Linet Osebe, another vol-
unteer said, "The community is still asking us what we did with
the clinic." ''
Apart from undermining the community-based distribution
of contraceptives, the loss of funding has also undercut the edu-
cational function of the community health workers. As Assistant
Program Officer Gertrude Akolo explained, "we used to get re-
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440, Interview with FPAK Eastleigh Youth Center Volunteers, in Nairobi, Kenya
(May 18, 2004) [hereinafter FPAK Eastleigh Youth Center Volunteers] (on file with
Crowley Program).
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. FPAK Gusii Volunteers, supra note 400.
445. Id.
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ferrals from clients in the village for Norplant, Pap Smears, tubal
ligations. We used to send FPAK staff to the municipal hospital
to do tubal ligations once a month, but we don't do this any-
more .... It was easier for some clients to get to the hospital, so
FPAK would offer services there."446 Akolo also said that discon-
tinuing the outreach program has eliminated access for "women
from rural towns [who are] are not allowed to go to town. Their
husbands forbid them. 447
Finally, the loss in funding has also led to cuts in educa-
tional programs including those targeting youth. For example,
the FPAK Youth Counseling Center (YCC) is located in
Eastleigh, near the former site of the FPAK clinic. The Crowley
delegation visited the center and spoke with a group of fifteen
volunteer "Peer Educators." Some forty-eight Peer Educators
are affiliated with the YCC and conduct trainings at schools
throughout Nairobi as well as at the YCC. They explained their
work: "We keep HIV/AIDS, family planning, and reproductive
health books here, as well as brochures. We also have books on
developing life-support skills.... We do counseling - peer edu-
cation and counseling."44 The volunteers also use a technique
they call "Invisible Theater" which involves staging accurate and
detailed conversations about sexual health on public transporta-
tion so that other passengers may overhear and learn.449
Although the Youth Center still operates, its effectiveness
has been reduced due to the closing of the Eastleigh clinic. The
clinic had provided important support for the educational ef-
forts concerning family planning. As one Eastleigh volunteer ex-
plained, the FPAK clinic "was a help to the YCC [Youth Center].
People could be referred there and sent over right away ...
[FPAK] also provided us with publications and we had physicians
nearby."450
The Youth Center in Eastleigh is but one example of FPAK's
efforts to design outreach programs with messages that are both
understandable to and appropriate for their target groups of
adult women and men and adolescents. For example, Linet
446. Interview with Gertrude Akolo, Assistant Program Officer, FPAK-Eldoret, in
Eldoret, Kenya (May 19, 2004) (on file with the Crowley Program).
447. Id.
448. FPAK Easfleigh Youth Center Volunteers, supra note 440.
449. See id.
450. Id.
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Osebe, a community health worker in Kisii, explained that local
chiefs "pick people from the community" to be interviewed for
the positions. 45' Her co-worker, Kennedy Nyakundi Nyandoro,
said that once the community health workers were selected and
trained, "the chief assists us . . . [and] tells the men of the com-
munity that they need to care about family planning." '452 She
added, "we also work with elders... [and] have theater on many
health emergencies including malaria, HIV/AIDS, [and] family
planning. ' 453 The reduction in resources due to the loss of
USAID funding has undermined the effectiveness of these inno-
vative programs.
2. Marie Stopes International-Kenya
Marie Stopes International (MSI) is a U.K.-based family
planning organization, which grew out of an organization
founded by Dr. Marie Stopes in 1921.454 The first overseas office
was established in 1977.455 Today, the MSI Global Partnership
has offices in thirty-nine countries and provides sexual and re-
productive health services to some 4.3 million people world-
wide.456 The MSI-Kenya office opened in 1985.45 7 Until 2001,
MSI-Kenya ran twenty-one clinics and two outreach projects that
offered a wide range of services including screening and treat-
ment of malaria, cervical cancer screening, immunizations,
HIV/AIDS testing and routine primary care for clients and their
children 458
MSI-Kenya had received funds from USAID from its incep-
tion. Between 1998 and 2001, MSI Kenya received some US$1.6
million from USAID to train professionals to provide contracep-
tive services and reproductive health care.4 59 Nevertheless, the
451. FPAK Gusii Volunteers, supra note 400. Those who are nominated for these
positions are those who command respect from others and are expected to be models
of altruism and concern. See Kaler & Watkins, supra note 139, at 258.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Marie Stopes International, About Us, http://www.mariestopes.org.uk/about-
us.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2003) (on file with Crowley Program).
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. See Marie Stopes Website, Kenya, http://www.mariestopes.org.uk/ww/
kenya.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
458. See Marie Stopes Website, About Us, supra note 454.
459. See Access Denied: Kenya, supra note 4, at 3.
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organization refused to agree to the terms of the Mexico City
Policy when President Bush reinstated it in 2001. MSI-London
and some country offices provide abortions in countries where
abortion is generally legal or permitted when necessary to save
the life of the mother. MSI-London therefore decided not to
agree to the Mexico City Policy requirements and lost over US$3
million for MSI Partners in Africa. MSI-London convened
Country Directors in London to discuss the implications of the
policy but left it up to Country Offices to decide whether to
sign.46° In East Africa, decisions taken at the country level led to
the closure of two centers in Kenya, an outreach program servic-
ing poor communities in Ethiopia, and additional centers in
Tanzania.4 61
In Kenya in 2001, MSI was running twenty-one clinics in va-
rious parts of the country. Surplus income from the high-vol-
ume clinics in Nairobi subsidized services for low income clients
in rural and poor urban areas. The MSI website notes that "al-
though some clients, like those in Mathare Valley and Kibera dis-
tricts and the rural communities of Western Kenya, may not be
in a position to contribute towards the costs of their care, ser-
vices are not denied for lack of resources, and these clients are
subsidized by the majority who can afford to pay an appropriate
fee. ' 4 6 2 Because of its large network of clinics, MSI-Kenya was
better insulated from the loss of USAID funding than FPAK,
which was only in the preliminary stages of developing an inter-
nal cross-subsidization strategy when the Mexico City Policy
came into effect. Nevertheless, with the loss of USAID funding,
MSI was forced to close two clinics that had been operating at a
loss. These clinics, serving some of the poorest communities,
were closed by September 2001.463
Despite the consequences, MSI-Kenya Country Director
460. Interview with Richard Olewe, Marie Stopes Kenya Reg. Manager-Western, in
Kisumu, Kenya (May 19, 2004) [hereinafter Olewe Interview]. See Notes from Site Visit
to MSI-Kenya Machakos-Kyawalia, Feb. 6, 2004 [hereinafter MSI-Kenya Machakos-
Kywalia Notes] (on file with Crowley Program); see also Interview with Martha Mutunga,
Manager VSC Projects, in Nairobi, Kenya (February 6, 2004) [hereinafter Mutunga In-
terview] (on file with Crowley Program).
461. Marie Stopes Website, Current Global Campaigns, http://www.mariestopes.
org.uk/ww/advocacy-cur-glob-camp.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
462. Marie Stopes Website, supra note 457.
463. See Access Denied: Kenya, supra note 4, at 4.
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Cyprian Awitti said, "[w]e are confident with our decision. 4 6 4
Regional Manager Western Richard Olewe echoed "[w]e have
our own beliefs to protect.' 465 Martha Mutunga, Manager of
Community Outreach, agreed that "[i] t is important to stand up
in the hopes that the policy will eventually be overturned." 66
When Marie Stopes-Kenya lost USAID funding, the organi-
zation laid off eighty employees, or about one-fifth of its staff,
most of whom were associated with the outreach program as well
as some of the least senior staff members.467 Salaries were cut
and only an "immediate and massive internal reorganization"
and an increase in fees "ensured [MSI's] continued opera-
tion. '  MSI-Kenya has survived the cuts but not without having
to abandon many of its most vulnerable health care clients.
a. The Closures
The Mathare Valley clinic opened in 1987 and was located
in a sprawling slum neighborhood in Nairobi. 4"69 For ten years,
the MSI clinic in Mathare Valley was the only source of health
care for some 300,000 people until a Doctors Without Borders
center opened in 1998.470 The Mathare Valley clinic was located
only a short distance by car from the MSI Eastleigh clinic, which
remains open. Nevertheless, because it is too far to walk easily,
the distance to the well-equipped clinic prevents most women
from Mathare Valley from accessing its services. No bus service
exists and the cost of a taxi ride, approximately KSH500, is pro-
hibitive. For Dorothy Akimyi, who makes her living selling vege-
tables, it is the equivalent of ten days work.1
7 1
As a practical matter, women who live in this part of Nairobi
usually do not leave the area and tend to seek health care only in
the case of emergencies.172 According to Nurse Grace Otiemo,
464. Interview with Mr. Cyprian Awitti, Country Director, Marie Stopes-Kenya, in
Nairobi, Kenya (May 27, 2004) [hereinafter Awitti Interview] (on file with Crowley Pro-
gram).
465. Olewe Interview, supra note 460.
466. Mutunga Interview, supra note 460.
467. See Access Denied: Kenya, supra note 4, at 6.
468. Id. at 5.
469. See id. at 4.
470. See id.
471. Interview with Dorothy Akimyi, former client, Marie Stopes-Mathare Valley, in
Nairobi, Kenya (May 28, 2004).
472. See Access Denied: Kenya, supra note 4, at 4.
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"Since Mathare Valley closed, slum girls just stay there. 473
Grace Achewa and Henrietta Asistu, community health workers
who used to do outreach for the FPAK Eastleigh clinic stated:
Eastleigh is too far away for the women to travel - especially
when they are in labor in the middle of the night. There is
no vehicle to refer the clients to Eastleigh. The women have
to use their own money for transport and they don't have that
much money. People are suffering and women who were de-
livering babies [at the Mathare Valley Clinic] here have no-
where to go.474
Twenty-four year-old Virginia Wambui first learned about
Marie Stopes from community health workers who came to
Mathare Valley and went from house to house to do education.
She noted, "Now that the clinic has closed, I do not see them." '4 7 5
Although she gave birth to her first child at MSI-Mathare Valley,
the clinic had closed by the time her second child was due. In-
stead, she gave birth at Pumwani, a government hospital. When
asked to compare the two experiences, she said, "Marie Stopes
can be expensive and sometimes they have no supplies. [But]
the treatment is good. . . The government hospital has [sup-
plies] but the staff verbally abuse clients and sometimes they
beat you. '  As for her ongoing contraceptive needs, Wambui
cannot afford the transportation costs to MSI-Eastleigh and now
buys her contraceptives from a chemist. 47 7 It is worth noting
that Wambui pays for her reproductive health care, including
her contraceptives, from her own earnings and cannot rely on
her husband's contribution. She said simply: "Husbands do not
tell you how much they earn."47
Kisumu, the third largest city in Kenya, is the capital of Ny-
anza Province.47 9 In Kisumu, 63% of the rural population lives
473. Interview with Grace Otiemo, Facility Manager, Nurse, Marie Stopes Int'l,
Nairobi Women's Clinic in Eastleigh, in Nairobi, Kenya (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter
former MSI-Kenya Otiemo Interview] (on file with Crowley Program).
474. FPAK Eastleigh Youth Center Volunteers, supra note 440.
475. Interview with Virgina Wambui, former client, Marie Stopes Mathare Valley,
in Nairobi, Kenya (May 28, 2005).
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. See Nationmaster.com, Encyclopedia: Kisumu, http://www.nationmaster.
com/encyclopedia/kisumu (last visited Sept. 24, 2005).
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below the poverty line, 48 0 as does 67% of the urban popula-
tion.4 ' The highest rate of HIV infection in Kenya is here,
18.3% for women and 11.6% for men.48 2 The National AIDS
Program and the Population Council estimated that, in 1999,
8.6% of nineteen-year-old boys were infected with HIV and
33.3% of nineteen-year-old girls.483 The prevalence of HIV is es-
pecially high among the fishing communities that live and work
along the shores of Lake Victoria. Most of the fish, which are
caught by women, are sold to middlemen. With little fish left for
community consumption, many women are vulnerable to men's
demands for "sex for fish." '48 4 In short, conditions of poverty in
the region leave women with very little control over their sexual
activity. Given the prevalence of HIV, effective contraception is
essential to women's health.
Before it closed in 2001, the MSI clinic in Kisumu served
some 400 clients, including HIV/AIDS patients, per month. The
clinic also supported a mobile team which provided services to
women who could not travel to town on a regular basis.48 5
b. Cuts in Outreach and Education
One of the most distinctive and important features of MSI-
Kenya's operation is its mobile clinic program in which medical
personnel make scheduled visits to underserved areas to per-
form tubal ligations, vasectomies and Norplant insertions on a
quarterly or bi-monthly basis.48 6 Unlike their FPAK counter-
parts, MSI-Kenya community health workers do not distribute
contraceptives. Rather, their main objective is to encourage cli-
ents to make use of the mobile clinic network by sharing infor-
mation about the importance of reproductive health and the ser-
480. See Geographical Dimensions, supra note 396, at 73.
481. Id. at 76.
482. See KDHS, supra note 216, at 223.
483. Johnathan Brown, Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program (MAP), at 7 (July 1,
2003) (citing National AIDS Programme, Kenya, & Population Council, 1999), available
at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/aids/workshops/fiduciary/MAP%20Presentation_
jonathandcune30.ppt#7.
484. International Family Health UK Website, Sex for Fish Project, Summary of
Findings, http://www.ifh.org.uk/sexforfish.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2005).
485. See Access Denied: Kenya, supra note 4, at 4.
486. See MSI-Kenya Machakos-Kywalia Notes, supra note 460; see also Mutunga In-
terview, supra note 460.
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vices that are offered.487 MSI-Kenya develops the mobile care
schedule based on knowledge about when and where it is most
convenient for women to access services. For example, the mo-
bile team plans visits around market days, harvest and rainy sea-
sons as well as around school holidays.488 For many women in
rural areas, the mobile unit is their only source not just of repro-
ductive health services but also of primary health care.
This Mobile Clinic program was severely affected by the
USAID funding cuts. Currently, two medical teams service the
entire network of outreach sites. Plans to add a third team had
to be abandoned after the loss of USAID funding.4 89 Even with-
out the additional unit, rising fuel and transportation costs
threaten the economic viability of the program. With an annual
cost of servicing an outreach site of approximately US$4500,49 °
MSI has been forced to scale back the program.491 Mr. Awitti,
Country Director of MSI-Kenya, told the Crowley delegation that
only 94 of the 161, or 58%, of outreach sites in operation before
2001 are currently offering services.492 Moreover, even at previ-
ous levels, the services provided were inadequate to meet de-
mand. Women seeking tubal ligations sometimes become preg-
nant between the bi-monthly or quarterly mobile clinic visits.
49 3
c. Affordability and Quality of Care
MSI-Kenya's strategy of self-financing through cross-subsidi-
zation has helped to insulate the operation from changing do-
nor policies. Yet, notwithstanding the organization's commit-
ment to ensure that the fee structure is affordable to the major-
ity of potential clients, higher fees have meant that the services
are unavailable to the poorest women.49 4 According to one fa-
ther whose first child was born at MSI-Eastleigh in 1999, he was
487. See Awitti Interview, supra note 464; see also MSI-Kenya Machakos-Kywalia
Notes, supra note 460; Mutunga Interview, supra note 460.
488. See MSI-Kenya Machakos-Kywalia Notes, supra note 460; see also Mutunga In-
terview, supra note 460.
489. See Awitti Interview, supra note 464; see also MSI-Kenya Machakos-Kywalia
Notes, supra note 460; Mutunga Interview, supra note 460.
490. See Awitti Interview, supra note 464.
491. See id.
492. See id.
493. See MSI-Kenya Machakos-Kywalia Notes, supra note 460; see also Mutunga In-
terview, supra note 460.
494. See generally FPAK Website, supra note 368.
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pleased with both the pre-natal and post-natal services his wife
received there. Yet, he added, "The very poor cannot afford
Marie Stopes. The prices at Marie Stopes seem to have gone up
since we had the baby there. 495
The difference between the pricing strategies of FPAK and
Marie Stopes, with the latter more effectively self-financed than
the former, illustrates the stark choice facing the organizations
following the loss of USAID funds. FPAK's more affordable pric-
ing left a much higher percentage of its facilities vulnerable,
forcing it to close three of its thirteen family planning clinics. In
contrast, after laying off staff, cutting salaries, outreach, and ser-
vices, and reorganizing its clinic structure, MSI limited the num-
ber of clinic closings to two out of twenty-one in operation in
2001. The remaining clinics, however, are less affordable and
offer a more limited range of services.
MSI officials acknowledge that although most clinics remain
open, the loss of funding has in some cases compromised the
quality of care MSI is able to provide. Mr. Richard Olewe, Re-
gional Director of MSI-Western Kenya, who accompanied the
delegation in Kisumu, told the Crowley delegation:
Of late, sometimes we have no space to admit patients .... It
makes things precarious for clients so sometimes they stop
coming. Previously this center had lagged behind in num-
bers of clients, but today we only have one bed open. Yester-
day we turned two clients away and last night we turned
others away. They go away as dissatisfied clients. 49 6
Olewe showed the delegation a room used by clients under ob-
servation, and explained:
The occupancy rate here is almost full-the rate is usually
fifty-to-eighty percent. Here is a ward meant to accommodate
post-delivery patients, but we are not able to have any facili-
ties so that babies are accommodated. It is essential to con-
tinue to monitor babies, but now it is not possible. Ideally, we
would not mix the mothers and the babies together, but we
have to because space is limited. We really need a pediatric
unit but we don't have the funding. We only have one resi-
dent doctor here, but ideally we should have two. We can't
495. Interview with Karoki Elicide, Taxi Driver and Client of Marie Stopes Kenya,
in Nairobi, Kenya (May 17, 2004).
496. See Olewe Interview, supra note 460.
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because of the lack of funding.49 7
Olewe noted the pressure to reduce costs in order to main-
tain the viability of the remaining clinics and admitted, "[t]he
reduction of costs sometimes sacrifices quality. People work ex-
tra time. We use cold water instead of hot.
49 8
Clients have noticed the quality of care in the remaining
clinics has suffered due to internal staff cuts and reduced funds.
When we interviewed her, Elizabeth Bunei had been a client of
Marie Stopes Kisumu for five years. Ordinarily she obtained
physical examinations and contraceptive injections at the clinic.
On the day of the interview she was seeking care for her infant
who was vomiting. Bunei told the delegation that she had
walked "some distance" and then paid KSH20 to take a matatu
(public transport vehicle) to the clinic.4 99 She reported:
Last year [2003], the management was not very good.... You
would come here and wait and nobody was asking you why
you were here. I came here last year with a miscarriage at 10
p.m. and waited for half an hour and there was nobody at the
reception. Then, from January of this year things started get-
ting better. But some of my friends gave up last year when
things started getting bad, and they started going to the pub-
lic hospital.... They don't like the [public] hospitals, [and]
there's nobody there to guide you. 50 0
3. The Impact of the Mexico City Policy on Overall
Strategies to Improve Care
Although it is impossible to measure with precision the ef-
fect of the Mexico City Policy on the delivery of reproductive
services nationwide, the dramatic impact on perhaps the two
most important NGO providers is clear. As documented above,
these NGOs provide vital services to women throughout Kenya
and often serve as the sole source of health care for poor and
rural women. The closure of the clinics has therefore had a se-
vere impact upon the women in the communities they served.
But the significance of FPAK and Marie Stopes goes beyond the
populations directly served by their clinics. These NGOs provide
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Interview with Elizabeth Bunei, client, Marie Stopes, Kisumu, in Kisumu, Ke-
nya (May 19, 2004) [hereinafter Bunei Interview] (on file with Crowley Program).
500. Id.
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integrated outreach and education designed to cultivate clients
who might not be able to access important health services. In so
doing, they have developed a highly effective model of reproduc-
tive health care delivery, one which foreign donors, including
USAID, have promoted for the past two decades in Kenya. The
loss of funding for FPAK and MSI undercuts the further develop-
ment and replication of this model in underserved areas.
Perhaps ironically, USAID itself felt the impact of the Mex-
ico City Policy through the loss of the expertise of FPAK and MSI
in its own project. At the time the Mexico City Policy was rein-
stated by the Bush Administration, USAID had just initiated the
"AMKENI" project, which means "new awakenings" in Kis-
wahili. 50' AMKENI was to be a five-year, 16 million dollar pro-
gram integrating family planning, reproductive health and child
survival services based in part on the model already followed by
FPAK and Marie Stopes (and encouraged by USAID through
grants to these programs). Both FPAK and Marie Stopes were to
have been key participants in AMKENI. Yet, in the wake of the
decision to reinstate the Mexico City Policy, FPAK and MSI
could not be included, depriving the project of their expertise,
their clinics, and their trained networks of community outreach
volunteers. As a result, the effectiveness of the overall project
has been compromised.
The AMKENI experience is just one example of the ineffi-
ciencies in the provision of health care caused by the Mexico
City Policy. Another problem results from the artificial separa-
tion of family planning funds from a larger health policy agenda.
Although from a medical perspective the advantages of combin-
ing information about HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment with
family planning seems obvious, the fact of separate funding
streams for family planning (restricted) and HIV/AIDS (un-
restricted) programs forces organizations to maintain distinct
programs and information campaigns. Margaret W. Gatei, Pro-
ject Manager of Pathfinder PMCT Program expressed frustra-
tion with having to maintain this division. She said:
It is critical to tell women that even if they are on the pill they
must still use condoms to avoid the transmission of HV. ...
You cannot separate family planning from HIV. You must en-
courage women to take the test before having more children.
501. See Access Denied: Kenya, supra note 4, at 5.
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Counseling will be a big part of this service. Once the deci-
sion is made they will choose a method of family planning
and that method must be maintained .... We give informa-
tion and counseling and emphasize the importance of know-
ing one's HIV status.5 ° 2
Although the overall impact of the Mexico City Policy may
defy precise quantification, these examples confirm its direct im-
pact on some of Kenya's most vulnerable people. More broadly,
the policy has created significant inefficiencies in the delivery of
care in a country that has not a single health care dollar to waste.
C. The Right to Health: An Assessment of Kenya's Legal Obligations
1. The Right to Health and the Government of Kenya
Since Kenya gained independence from British colonial
rule in 1963,50 the government has been working to expand
and improve the Kenyan health care system through a combina-
tion of public and private efforts. As described in preceding sec-
tions, the process has entailed a number of different strategies
for health care delivery, a variety of institutional actors, both do-
mestic and international, and many sources of funding. As a re-
sult, the Kenyan government has never exercised anything ap-
proaching complete control over its national health care strat-
egy. Nevertheless, international human rights law on the right
to health, while recognizing the complexities of the provision of
public health care, places responsibility squarely on States for
respecting, protecting, and fulfilling their legally binding obliga-
tions regarding the right to health.50 4 Thus, an assessment of
the human rights implications of the Mexico City Policy must
begin with an examination of Kenya's obligations with respect to
reproductive health.
As the first part of this Report has already elaborated, Arti-
cle 12(1) of the ICESCR generally proclaims the "right of every-
one to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physi-
cal and mental health. ' 50 5 Article 12(2) specifies that among the
502. See Interview with Margaret W. Gatei, Project Manager of Pathfinder PMCT
Program, in Nairobi, Kenya (May 19, 2004).
503. See Nationmaster.com, Africa: Kenya: Background, http://www.nation
master.com/country/ke/Background (last visited Sept. 23, 2005).
504. See supra Part I.
505. ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 12(1).
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steps necessary to achieve the full realization of this right are
"[t]he creation of conditions which would assure to all medical
service and medical attention in the event of sickness. '' 50 6 With
respect to reproductive rights, the provision also requires "provi-
sion for the reduction of the stillbirth rate and of infant mortal-
ity and for the healthy development of the child. ' 50 7 Also rele-
vant is the further stipulation that governments provide for
"[t] he prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic,
occupational, and other diseases."50 8 CEDAW, in its own Article
12, takes up both discrimination and reproductive rights by re-
quiring State Parties to "take all appropriate measures to elimi-
nate discrimination in the field of health care to ensure, on a
basis of equality of men and women, access to health care ser-
vices, including those related to family planning."5 9 The second
part of this Article sets out further reproductive rights, including
"appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confine-
ment and the post-natal period, granting free services where nec-
essary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lacta-
tion. "510
Under the ICESCR, Kenya must "undertake to take steps...
to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achiev-
ing progressively the full realization of the [right to health] by
all appropriate means."5"' Although the framework of progres-
sive realization allows countries - particularly poor countries
such as Kenya - a degree of latitude in allocating resources to
meet their obligations under the treaty, this discretion is not un-
limited. Moreover, the ICESCR imposes certain obligations that
are immediately enforceable. In evaluating the degree to which
Kenya may be in violation of its obligations under the ICESCR,
this section focuses on these immediately enforceable compo-
nents together with the issue of retrogression.
2. Obligation to Respect
A State's obligation to respect the right to health can be
restated as an individual's right to be free from State interfer-
506. Id. art. 12(2)(d).
507. Id. art. 12(2)(a).
508. Id. art. 12(2)(c).
509. CEDAW, supra note 30, art. 12(1).
510. Id. art. 12(2).
511. ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 2(1).
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ence in the exercise of the right to health. A State must refrain
from acting in a way that contravenes access to health services
that its citizens would otherwise enjoy. Thus, General Comment
Fourteen prohibits interference with "the right to control one's
health and body, including sexual and reproductive freedom. . . and
the right to be free from . . . non-consensual medical treat-
ment." '512 It also requires States to "refrain from limiting access to
contraceptives and other means of maintaining sexual and re-
productive health. '513 Importantly, this obligation of noninter-
ference is immediately enforceable.514
Applying this standard to Kenya's record on reproductive
health care suggests that Kenya may be in violation of its obliga-
tion to respect the right. First, although Kenya has made efforts
to expand access to reproductive health and, in particular, to
increase the use of contraception, its budgeting priorities have
left reproductive health care entirely donor-funded. As a result,
the provision of reproductive health services is highly vulnerable
not only to the domestic politics of abortion in the United States
but to other changes in donor priorities. This violation can be
understood either as an interference in the right to health by the
government or, alternatively, as a failure on the part of the gov-
ernment to protect the right from interference by third par-
ties.515
Second, Kenya has a very restrictive abortion law that per-
mits abortions to be performed legally only under narrow cir-
cumstances. 516 Although international law leaves the legal status
of abortion up to individual States, General Comment Fourteen
defines as a violation of the obligation to respect the right to
health "those State actions, policies or laws that contravene the
standards set out in article 12 of the Covenant and are likely to
result in bodily harm, unnecessary morbidity and preventable
512. General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 8 (emphasis added).
513. Id. 34 (emphasis added). See Beijing Platform, supra note 35, 96.
514. See General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 30 ("various obligations...
of immediate effect"); see also id. 1 34 (specific legal obligation of noninterference); id.
1 44 (obligation to "provide education and access to information concerning the main
health problems in the community").
515. See General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 33. The ICSECR has made
clear that "the obligation to protect requires States to take measures that prevent third
parties from interfering with [right to health] guarantees." Id.
516. See supra note 512 and accompanying text (discussing Kenyan abortion law).
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mortality."5" 7 The impact of illegal abortions on women's health
in Kenya has been widely documented, including by the Kenyan
government. 51" The current abortion policy in Kenya makes safe
abortions difficult for women to obtain even in the circum-
stances under which they are permitted under Kenyan law.
Moreover, fear of legal penalties or harassment may prevent wo-
men who have obtained illegal abortions from seeking post-abor-
tion care in the event of complications, or prevent doctors who
have performed such abortions from referring women for
needed care. In sum, although Kenya is under no international
obligation to legalize abortion on demand, it does have an obli-
gation to adopt an abortion policy that does not contribute un-
necessarily to the suffering, sterility, and death of women.
3. Nondiscrimination Obligation
General Comment Three makes clear that the obligation to
"guarantee [that rights] will be exercised without discrimina-
tion" is immediately enforceable. 51' This prohibition on dis-
crimination stems from ICESCR article 2 (2), which provides that
"rights . . . will be exercised without discrimination of any
kind. 52 ° In this connection, the closing of the clinics and the
resulting loss of services has had a discriminatory impact on two,
and perhaps three, vulnerable groups. As documented above,
the closure of two MSI clinics and three FPAK clinics because of
their refusal to sign the Mexico City Policy has left reproductive
health clients in Embu, Kisii, Kisumu and two neighborhoods of
Nairobi (Eastleigh and Mathare Valley) with diminished or no
access to affordable and quality health care. All of the closed
clinics served poor communities, and, in the cases of the
Eastleigh and Mathare Valley clinics, refugees comprised a sig-
nificant part of the patient population.
To be clear, this Report does not suggest that the closing of
these clinics was motivated by discriminatory animus towards the
poor or refugee populations. Nevertheless, the government of
Kenya has an obligation to ensure that a reduction in available
health services does not have a disparate impact on these vulner-
517. General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 1 50.
518. See, e.g., National Assessment, supra note 247.
519. See General Comment Three, supra note 33, 1.
520. ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 2(2).
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able groups.521 Such a discriminatory impact may constitute a
violation of the right to health whether or not the reduction in
health services represents a retrogression in the State's obliga-
tion to protect the right to health, an issue discussed below. In-
sofar as the government of Kenya has created a scheme for pro-
viding reproductive health care that is virtually entirely depen-
dent on the largesse of outside donors, it has helped to create
and reinforce the vulnerability of these groups to the changing
budgetary priorities and political agendas of donor entities.
The reduction in access to reproductive health services, par-
ticularly access to contraception, also has had a discriminatory
impact on women. Although both men and women require and
benefit from reproductive health services, the loss of such ser-
vices affects women more severely than men. This is true for
several reasons. Even when women enjoy control over their
health care decisions and share decision-making about repro-
duction with their partners, the inability effectively to control re-
production affects women's health more profoundly because wo-
men bear the physical burden of pregnancy and nursing. Yet, as
noted above, many Kenyan women, particularly poor women,
lack such control either over health care or sexual decisions.5 22
In such cases, the only way a woman can protect herself from
unwanted pregnancy or sexually-transmitted disease is through
access to contraception. Put differently, women are less able
than men to control the degree to which they engage in high-
risk sexual activity even when they are in long-term relation-
ships. 523 They may be unaware of their partner's sexual liaisons
and, even if they are aware, they lack the right to decline sexual
intercourse with their spouses.5 24
521. See General Comment Three, supra note 33, 1 1.
522. See supra notes 274-288 and accompanying text (discussing women's lack of
control over health care decisions); see also Gender and Development Policy, supra note 191,
at 24.
523. See Gender & HIV/AIDS Technical Sub-Comm., Nat'l AIDS Control Council,
Mainstreaming Gender into the Kenya National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan, 2000-2005, at 2-3
(2002).
524. Although the Kenyan rape statute does not include a marital exemption, re-
fusal of intercourse is grounds for divorce. See The Penal Code, Laws of Kenya, ch. 139
(rape statute); see also EUGENE COTRAN, CASEBOOK ON KENYA CUSTOMARY LAw 121
(describing grounds for divorce under Kenyan law).
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4. Obligation to Fulfill Right to Health
a. Minimum Core Content
As discussed above, the CESCR has determined that certain
affirmative obligations in connection with the right to health
have ripened into "minimum core content," and are therefore
immediately enforceable.525 In addition to the nondiscrimina-
tion obligation, these include the obligation "to provide essential
drugs... ; to ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities,
goods and services; to adopt and implement a national public
health strategy and plan of action ... [which] shall give particu-
lar attention to all vulnerable or marginalized groups. ' 5 26 In ad-
dition, General Comment Fourteen outlines several rights of
"comparable priority. ' 527 The first obliges States to "ensure re-
productive, maternal (pre-natal as well as post-natal) and child
healthcare. '' 52' The second and third require States to "provide
immunizations against major infectious diseases occurring in the
community," and further obligates them to "take measures to
prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases. "529
Taken together, these rights require a country to make available
measures for prevention and treatment for any diseases that af-
fect reproductive rights. The fourth obligation of comparable
priority requires States to "provide education and access to infor-
mation concerning the main health problems in the community,
including methods of preventing and controlling them. 53 °
When they were in operation, the five clinics described in
this Report were responsive to the rights included as "minimum
core content" and rights of "comparable priority. '53' They pro-
vided basic medications and screening as well as an array of child
birth and reproductive health services. In addition, through
youth centers and community outreach volunteers, they served
as an important source of basic and reproductive health infor-
mation to poor communities. With the closing of these clinics,
the fulfillment of Kenya's core and comparable obligations has
525. See ICESCR, supra note 21, 14.
526. General Comment Fourteen, supra note 34, 43.
527. Id. 44.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. U.N. ECOSOC, 9th Sess., 42nd mtg. 14, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/SR.42 (Dec.
6, 1993).
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been compromised. Again, although the Kenyan government is
not responsible for the reinstatement of the Mexico City Policy,
it is nevertheless responsible for fulfilling the right to health,
notwithstanding the U.S. policy. Moreover, insofar as Kenya's
scheme of health care financing relies heavily on private health
care providers and NGOs, particularly in the area of reproduc-
tive health care, the Kenyan government helped to create the
conditions under which the provision of such services could eas-
ily be compromised by changes in donor priorities or donor
country politics.
With respect to the realization of core or comparable obli-
gations on a national scale, Kenya has adopted various national
health plans, including the Kenya Health Policy Framework.
Yet, the effectiveness of such plans is unclear. As explained
above, the Kenyan government has failed to make budget alloca-
tions that reflect a commitment to better serving the rural and
urban poor, to preventative as opposed to curative services and
to improving the distribution of reproductive health commodi-
ties. Over the years, Kenya has been collecting valuable bench-
mark data through the Kenya Demographics and Health Surveys
and recently has begun monitoring progress toward meeting the
Millennium Development Goals. Yet, by the government's own
admission, its capacity to incorporate statistical analysis into pol-
icy planning and resource allocation mechanisms is mixed in key
areas.532 This capacity is rated as "weak" with regard to monitor-
ing gender equity;5 3 "fair" on reducing child mortality; 534 "fair"
on maternal mortality;53 5 and "fair" with regard to tracking HIV/
AIDS, malaria and other diseases. 5 6 As described above, Kenya
has failed to provide health care facilities, goods, and services on
a scale that keeps up with the population growth rate. Finally,
Kenya has failed to make significant progress in reducing mater-
nal and child mortality.
532. See generally 2003 MDG, supra note 236. Capacity is rated "strong" if new in-
formation is systemically fed into policy making, planning and resource allocation;
"weak" if this does not happen; and "fair" if this happens irregularly. Id. at 7.
533. Id. at 17.
534. Id. at 20
535. Id. at 23
536. Id. at 26.
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b. Nonretrogression
The principle of nonretrogression simply means that a State
may not backslide with respect to the realization of rights pro-
tected under the ICESCR.53 7 Particularly problematic are mea-
sures that are either deliberately retrogressive and/or bear on
the minimum core obligations. With respect to the right to re-
productive health, the Kenyan government cannot fairly be
charged with deliberate retrogression, though its funding priori-
ties have resulted in the vulnerability of reproductive health ser-
vice providers as described above. Nevertheless, with the clinic
closings, the availability of reproductive health services to several
poor communities has either declined or been eliminated alto-
gether. This constitutes retrogression-whether deliberate or
not-in an area of core or comparable obligation and therefore
a violation of the ICESCR.
5. Freedom of Expression
As described above, the Mexico City Policy penalizes NGOs
outside the United States based on the point of view they express
about abortion. Even putting aside the issue of whether limiting
the use of USAID funds to projects unrelated to abortion advo-
cacy would violate the NGOs' freedom of expression, the Mexico
City Policy goes further: It restricts the uses to which an NGO
may put non-USAID funds as well. To be clear, an FNGO receiv-
ing funding from USAID may not expend funds from any source
to advocate for the legalization of abortion. Whether the United
States can be held accountable for this regulation of speech is
addressed in the next section.
With respect to Kenya's responsibility, the critical question
is whether this burden on the expressive rights of individuals
and organizations within its jurisdiction violates Kenya's affirma-
tive obligation to ensure the enjoyment of the right, protecting it
from interference by third parties. There are several reasons to
answer this question in the affirmative. First, although the
Kenyan government is not responsible for imposing the Mexico
City Policy, it does exercise control over the structure of its
health care delivery system and the funding of private providers.
In the context of reproductive health, and especially family plan-
537. See ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 5(1).
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ning, Kenya relies heavily on private providers for the delivery of
services and on outside donors for funding. The government's
policy and funding choices have thus rendered NGOs more vul-
nerable to the changing priorities of donors. Put differently,
Marie Stopes' and FPAK's decision to decline USAID funding
rather than agree to the Mexico City Policy had more severe fi-
nancial consequences because of Kenya's decision to rely almost
exclusively on outside funding to support reproductive health.
Second, USAID funding directed to the government of Kenya
itself is not subject to the full restrictions of the Mexico City Pol-
icy - such funds cannot themselves be used to support abortion
but the government may allocate other funds for such purposes.
In short, this means that the government of Kenya could allocate
non-USAID funds to Marie Stopes and FPAK to make up for
their lost funding without jeopardizing any agreement it might
have directly with USAID. Third, the Mexico City Policy has
been in place periodically since 1984. Its impact on freedom of
expression is ongoing and could be anticipated and addressed
through the budgeting process. For these reasons, we conclude
that Kenya has not fully met its obligation to ensure the freedom
of expression of NGOs subject to the Mexico City Policy.
III. DONOR NATION RESPONSIBILITY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Holding Kenya responsible for the effects of a policy insti-
tuted by the United States may appear beside the point in any
setting other than international law. As this Report notes, Kenya
has assumed binding obligations to realize the right to health,
the elimination of discrimination based upon gender, and free-
dom of expression.538 As this Report further documents, the im-
pact of the Mexico City restrictions within the country suggest
that, in the first instance, the Kenyan government has failed to
make good on these legal obligations. 9 This legal conclusion,
however, begs the practical reality. But for the Mexico City Pol-
icy, the reductions in health and reproductive care, dispropor-
tionate impact on women, and attempted censorship of repro-
ductive medical information described here would not have oc-
curred. This is not to say the Kenyan government was powerless
538. See supra Part I.
539. See supra Part II.
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to anticipate and mitigate these effects. Yet at the end of the
day, the effective causes for the challenges under review com-
prise the funding restrictions, USAID, and the United States.
This part of the Report examines whether and to what extent the
current international human rights regime captures this reality.
These questions go well beyond the current case study and
implicate underappreciated limits of international law. As an in-
itial matter, potential U.S. responsibility for facilitating human
rights violations in Kenya logically runs to any State in which the
Mexico City Policy has resulted in similar effects.54 ° Nor would
possible third-State responsibility end with the United States
were any other donor nation to institute comparable aid restric-
tions with comparable results. Most importantly, nothing limits
the problem of donor State responsibility to the Mexico City Pol-
icy as opposed to restrictive aid in general. Consider, for exam-
ple, a so-far hypothetical case in which a developing State over
decades has become dependent on a donor nation for the bulk
of both its military and social services. Then suppose the donor
nation informs the dependent State that it will withdraw all aid
to the government or domestic NGOs unless the developing
country agrees to violate its obligations under treaties and jus
cogens and subject persons suspected of terrorism to interroga-
tion practices amounting to torture. 541 Can and should wealthy
and powerful States be held accountable for the human rights
violations effectively forced upon weak and developing nations
in such a situation?
Within the context of the Kenyan example, this Report sets
out three lines of legal argument that point toward third-State
responsibility. The first looks to the specific treaties and related
law that set out the relevant human rights obligations in the first
place. In particular, the ICESCR general provisions require re-
spect and promotion of the rights it establishes, including re-
spect and promotion through international cooperation. These
540. See generally, Access Denied: Kenya, supra note 4.
541. In less stark form, something like this dynamic was at work when the United
States announced that it would withhold military aid for allies signing the Statute of
Rome establishing the International Criminal Court unless they took out a reservation
agreeing not to extend ICC jurisdiction to U.S. personnel. See Elizabeth Becker, U.S.
Suspends Aid to 35 Countries Over New International Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2003, at A12.
Of course in this instance, the United States was deploying restrictions on aid to prevent
other States from assuming new international obligations rather than to pressure them
into violating obligations already assumed.
[Vol. 29:1
EXPORTING DESPAIR
provisions directly bind the United States as a signatory to the
extent it must refrain from frustrating the object and purpose of
the Covenant. The second line builds upon recently articulated
concepts of State responsibility under the Draft Articles on Re-
sponsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and their
related Commentaries. 54 2 Among other things, these sources
map out ways in which a State is responsible with another State
in the commission of an internationally wrongful act through
either aid and assistance, or actual coercion. 54" The final ap-
proach centers upon the international obligation to cooperate
in the promotion of human rights and development as set out in
the general provisions of major treaties as well as in the U.N.
Declaration on Friendly Relations. 44
None of these approaches, however, compels the conclu-
sion that the United States bears any responsibility for the
human rights violations resulting from the Mexico City Policy.
To the contrary, each line of argument reflects the ongoing
strength of classical notions of State sovereignty despite the facts
of increasing State interdependence and persistent inequality of
power and wealth. These resulting limits obtain, moreover, even
though the question of formal enforcement is not at issue and
all that is at stake is the implementation through shaming. Iden-
tifying the limits of fixing legal responsibility on the United
States therefore marks a critical and often overlooked border of
current international law. Nonetheless, only by marking off the
current territory of human rights can it be expanded.
A. Direct U.S. Treaty Obligations
The most immediate way to fix U.S. responsibility for the
impact of the Mexico City Policy is also the most evasive. The
United States in theory could have signed and ratified an inter-
national instrument expressly assuming responsibility for viola-
tions of standards it had undertaken even when committed
outside its own borders. State responsibility in these circum-
542. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp.
No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC 2001 Report - Draft Articles].
543. See id. arts. 16-19.
544. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 124-25, U.N. Doc. A/
8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
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stances would be the direct result of a solemn treaty obligation.
In practice, however, few treaties prescribe extraterritorial obli-
gation in this manner, even with regard to fundamental human
rights.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets forth
the established rule that "a treaty is binding on each party in
respect of its total territory" unless "a different intention appears
... or is otherwise established. 54 5 The rule's apparent concern
against reading treaties as having less than full territorial effect
stems not from an implicit acceptance of an extraterritorial pre-
sumption but instead from the reality that States typically seek to
reduce rather than extend the international obligations they un-
dertake. The presumption of full territorial scope, in other
words, means interpreting treaties as extending to no less, but to
no more, than the extent of a country's borders.546
However revolutionary in other ways, human rights instru-
ments fall under this rule. Some human rights treaties do rebut
the general presumption, but only to the extent that they refer
to a State party's territory and 'jurisdiction, '547 which is generally
defined as the authority of a State to prescribe, adjudicate, and
enforce its domestic law. 54" Rarely, if ever, do human rights
agreements go further. Some, to the contrary, expressly set
forth the standard territorial and jurisdictional limits. Others
leave these constraints implicit by simply failing to provide for
extraterritorial operation. Even human rights theory, which
might clear the way for further evolution of legal principles, gen-
erally declines to conceive of fundamental obligations as cross-
ing borders, whether these standards be civil and political rights,
or social and economic.549
The three main human rights treaties that bear upon the
Mexico City Policy confirm the traditional practice. To some ex-
tent the United States has agreed to abide by the ICESCR, the
ICCPR, and CEDAW. None of these instruments, however, re-
buts the general presumption against extraterritoriality. 55 °
545. Vienna Convention, supra note 38, art. 29.
546. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, § 322(2) & reporter's Note 3.
547. Id. § 322, reporters' Note 3.
548. See id. § 401.
549. See Martin S. Flaherty, Rights, Reality, and Utopia, 72 FORDHAm L. Rv. 1789
(2004).
550. See generally EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (Fons
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1. International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights
President Clinton signed the ICESCR in 1992, but the Sen-
ate has yet to give its consent, and so U.S. ratification remains
pending. By signing the Covenant the United States has none-
theless assumed a basic legal obligation not to undermine it. Ar-
ticle 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codi-
fies the established international law rule that when a State has
signed a treaty, it "is obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose" of the instrument.55 1
To this extent, the key question becomes whether U.S. obli-
gations under the ICESCR apply only within its borders and ju-
risdiction, or whether they extend to the nation's relevant ac-
tions abroad. Without more, the text of the Covenant might ap-
pear to leave open the possibility that State Parties undertake to
fulfill the rights set forth both domestically and extraterritorially.
Article 2, which sets out the general obligations that a State as-
sumes, notes that each Party undertakes to take steps, to the
maximum of its available resources and with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the recognized rights, but
with no language limiting this undertaking to realizing the rights
within its territory alone.552 Indeed, the provision states that a
State Party shall take steps both "individually and through inter-
national cooperation."553 None of the specific provisions of the
Covenant, moreover, expressly limits operation of the obliga-
tions set forth to a State Party's territory. 4
Coomans & Menno T. Kammiga, eds., 2004) (discussing broad and narrow views of
applying human rights treaties in an extraterritorial fashion).
551. Vienna Convention, supra note 38, art. 18. It was to avoid this obligation that
President George W. Bush "unsigned" the Statute of the International Criminal Court,
which President Clinton had signed in the waning days of his Administration. See Chris-
toper Marquis, U.S. is Seeking Pledges to Shield its Peacekeepers from Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 2002, at Al.
552. See ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 2(1).
553. Id. Similarly, Article 11 (1) refers to the "essential importance of international
co-operation based on free consent" in each State Party's obligation to take steps to
realize an adequate standard of living, while Article 11 (2) provides that each State Party
agrees to take steps "individually and through international co-operation" to fulfill the
right to be free from hunger. Id. arts. 11(1) and 11(2).
554. ICESCR, supra note 21, passim. Conversely, Article 2 does signal a preference
for State Parties adopting legislative measures to fulfill the relevant rights. Id. art. 2(1).
Elsewhere the provision accords developing countries some latitude in distinguishing
between nationals and non-nationals in the full provision of the rights. Id. art. 2(3). Yet
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Despite the text's potential breadth, the prevailing view has
always been that the Covenant's rights obligations do not run
beyond a State Party's territory and jurisdiction. First, no word-
ing in the treaty expressly commits a State Party to act otherwise
or otherwise rebuts the usual presumption that treaties do not
apply extraterritorially. Second, the context and travaux con-
firm that extraterritorial application was not contemplated, espe-
cially given that the idea of international law regulating a State's
behavior toward those within its jurisdiction was a radical
enough departure for its time.555 Third, subsequent commen-
tary with few exceptions has not addressed the question of gen-
eral extraterritorial application, concentrating instead on the
problems of resource constraints and progressive realization.556
At most, some commentators have suggested that the
ICECSR imposes an obligation on wealthy States, not to take
steps to realize such rights as health or education in equal mea-
sure at home and abroad, but at least to provide assistance to
developing nations to realize such rights for their citizens when
they cannot otherwise do so due to lack of resources. Even this
more limited proposition has proved to be "difficult, if not im-
possible, to sustain. 557 On one hand, references to interna-
tional cooperation in Articles 2 and 11 better support some duty
to aid than they do for extraterritorial application in general.558
On the other hand, however, the travaux and general subse-
quent understandings show only marginal support for deriving a
legal obligation for aid. Such a position is distant even among
theorists. This is not to say that under certain circumstances an
obligation to provide assistance might not be plausibly asserted.
It remains, however, a long way off before the plausible becomes
the generally accepted.559
For these reasons, the ICESCR does not yield substantial
even these provisions could be read in an extraterritorial fashion. In the first instance,
there is no reason why domestic legislation that promotes the specified rights could not
do so abroad as at home, as in a foreign aid appropriation. In the second instance, the
developing country provision may be read as an exception to both the principle of non-
discrimination based on nationality and a principle of extraterritorial application.
555. See generally Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
556. See supra Part I.
557. Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of State Parties' Obligations
Under the ICESCR, 9 Husi. RTS Q. 156, 186 (1986).
558. See supra note 553 (discussing Article 11).
559. Id.
[Vol. 29:1
EXPORTING DESPAIR
promise in constructing an argument that the United States has
violated its obligations under the Covenant. In practical terms,
the Mexico City Policy may well not simply fail to promote, but
significantly undermine, the full realization of health and repro-
ductive rights among Kenyans. Yet absent a substantial shift in
prevailing interpretations, the direct responsibility of the United
States under the ICESCR runs to those within the country, not
generally to each and every State Party. More plausibly, if Article
2's injunction to international assistance and cooperation is to
have any binding meaning, then the case of a vastly wealthy na-
tion such as the United States adopting aid restrictions that lead
to retrogression in specified rights in a developing country such
as Kenya would be a strong candidate for finding the violation of
such a duty. Increased attention to this and other such cases, it
is hoped, will prompt interpretation of the Covenant further in
this direction.
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
In contrast with the application of the ICESCR, the United
States has assumed the obligations of the ICCPR more fully.
However, the Covenant itself sharply limits its extraterritorial
reach. President Carter signed the ICCPR in 1978, though the
Senate did not submit its approval until 1992. Accordingly, the
United States has fully ratified the ICCPR and is bound by its
provisions in international law.5 6 °
The Senate nonetheless insisted upon several reservations,
understandings, and declarations, as is typical of the American
approach to ratification of most international human rights trea-
ties. 56 Two such conditions bear upon possible application of
the ICCPR to the Mexico City Policy in Kenya. The first is a res-
ervation concerning freedom of expression. This condition
states that nothing in Article 20 shall authorize restrictions of
freedom of speech under the Constitution of the United
States. 62 Aimed to foreclose overbroad regulation of propa-
560. See generally ICCPR, supra note 22 (ratified by the United States on Sept. 8,
1992).
561. See Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 567, 574-75 (1997).
562. U.S. Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, no. 1(]), 138 CONG. REc. 8068 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter ICCPR Reservations].
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ganda and other hate speech, the reservation would not limit the
ICCPR's general Article 19 free speech protections in this in-
stance: first, because they expand the right rather than constrict
it, and second, since the Mexico City Policy does not implicate
propaganda or hate speech in any event.
The second relevant U.S. condition is an understanding
concerning discrimination, including gender classifications.
Here, the United States indicated that it would read the ICCPR's
Article 2 anti-discrimination provisions as requiring no more
than that a classification based upon gender, race, religion, or
like factors be deemed lawful if it is rationally related to a legiti-
mate governmental end.5 6' Further, the understanding states
that under Article 4(1), discrimination cannot be inferred
merely on the basis of disproportionate impact "in time of public
emergency." '564 As a threshold matter, these understandings
would operate as reservations under the ICCPR in the face of
contrary, authoritative interpretations. In this instance, they
would nonetheless not preclude application of the ICCPR's pro-
hibition against gender discrimination. First, it would be hard to
envision how the Mexico City Policy's effective discrimination
against women would survive even a U.S.-style rational relation-
ship test. Beyond that, the rejection of disparate impact analysis
in the extreme instance of public emergency by negative infer-
ence leaves open resort to such an approach in other contexts,
such as aid restrictions on women during times of relative na-
tional calm.
Unfortunately, the real hurdle to application of the ICCPR
comes from the language of the Covenant itself. Unlike its sib-
ling, Article 2 of the ICCPR expressly states that each State Party
"undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized." '56 5 As
indicated, the Covenant's language extends its applicability be-
yond a State Party's territory to its jurisdiction in the sense of
effective control.566 This extension notwithstanding, under no
plausible reading can it be said that Kenya is or has ever been
563. Curiously, with regard to race and gender, this level of scrutiny falls below
U.S. constitutional standards. See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
564. ICCPR Reservations, supra note 562, no. II(1).
565. ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 2 (emphasis added).
566. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. In the domestic setting, the U.S.
Supreme Court recently concluded that effective and exclusive U.S. control of Guanta-
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subject to U.S. jurisdiction in the sense meant in Article 2. That
said, U.S. violations of ICCPR provisions, such as Article 19's pro-
tection of freedom of expression, may nonetheless furnish a ba-
sis for finding U.S. responsibility for the resulting effects within
Kenya on a theory of derivative responsibility.
3. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women
CEDAW, finally, also fails to provide a promising basis for
direct U.S. accountability for the consequences of the Mexico
City Policy abroad. The reasons in part echo the problems with
the other principal human rights treaties just considered.
As with the ICESCR, President Clinton signed CEDAW, but
the Senate has yet to give its consent. To this extent, the United
States has assumed the customary law obligation "to refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of the Cove-
nant.567 This duty of course falls short of full assumption of
CEDAW's provisions, even with reservations, as is the case with
the ICCPR. Yet even the more attenuated duty not to defeat the
object and purpose could prohibit policies that produce such
radically disparate treatment as is the case with the Mexico City
Policy.
Similar to the ICCPR's express text and the ICESCR's im-
plicit understanding, the direct CEDAW approach ultimately
fails because the standards it imposes upon a ratifying State do
not run beyond its territory and jurisdiction. In this regard,
CEDAW's text falls between that of the two Covenants. The Con-
vention lacks the express limiting language contained in the
ICCPR. It nonetheless makes clear that its obligations are essen-
tially domestic, and in this sense, speaks more forcefully than the
ICESCR. Article 2, for example, enjoins State Parties specifically
to undertake to embody "the principle of equality of women in
their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation;"56
to "adopt appropriate legislation; '"569 to ensure effective protec-
tion of women against discrimination through "national tribu-
namo Bay, Cuba, expanded its jurisdiction beyond the territorial sovereignty of the
United States. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 2690-91 (2004).
567. Vienna Convention, supra note 38, art. 18.
568. CEDAW, supra note 30, art. 2(a).
569. Id. art. 2(b).
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nals and other public institutions; 5 7 and to "repeal all national
penal provisions "571 that discriminate against women. Other ar-
ticles likewise clearly contemplate domestic actions, such as elim-
inating discrimination through the banning of prostitution, the
provision of equal voting rights, and the granting of non-discrim-
inatory rules with regard to securing nationality. Conversely, no
provision expressly sets forth extraterritorial obligations. For
these reasons, one scans commentary on CEDAW in vain for in-
terpretations that impose responsibility on State Parties for dis-
crimination that occurs outside their territory and control.
Yet once again, the failure of the treaty itself to establish
human rights obligations outside the State Party's own jurisdic-
tion is not necessarily the end of the story. Given that Kenya
bears responsibility under CEDAW to promote gender equality
and - more to the point for present purposes - prevent dis-
crimination by any party, it would in the first instance face re-
sponsibility at least for any systemic discriminatory impact the
Mexico City Policy yields on its watch. Nonetheless, the United
States as author of the Policy may still have to shoulder indirect
responsibility to the extent that international law imposes obliga-
tions on third-party States for facilitating human rights violations
formally committed by others.
B. U.S. Responsibility in Connection with the Acts of Kenya
A second and more promising approach to holding the
United States responsible for the effects of the Mexico City Pol-
icy centers upon concepts of State responsibility for acts of an-
other State. The international community has set out these con-
cepts most comprehensively in the Draft Articles on State Re-
sponsibility ("Draft Articles"), as well as their associated
Commentaries, each adopted by the International Law Commis-
sion ("ILC") in 2001.572 Though neither a treaty nor otherwise
directly binding law, the Articles represent a culmination of the
ILC's five-decade long effort to codify and develop international
rules concerning the scope of State obligations generally applica-
ble in international law.573 As such, they reflect a consensus of
570. Id. art. 2(c).
571. Id. art. 2(d).
572. See ILC 2001 Report-Draft Articles, supra note 542.
573. James Crawford has noted that the Draft Articles and Commentaries:
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the world's leading jurists, are designed to provide the basis for a
global, multilateral treaty,574 and furnish evidence of developing
customary international law.57 5
Ordinarily a State is responsible only for human rights viola-
tions that it commits against persons within its jurisdiction or
under its effective control.5 7 6 Article 2 of the Draft Articles sets
forth the general analytic framework, stating that "[t] here is an
internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting
of an action or omission: (a) [i]s attributable to the State under
international law; and (b) [c]onstitutes a breach of an interna-
tional obligation of the State. '5 7 7 In the conventional situation,
a State does not bear responsibility for the human rights viola-
tions of another State on the ground of both legal attribution
and international obligation. First, international law does not
ordinarily attribute the actions of one State to an outside State
out of a presumption that the primary State exercises sovereign
power within its territory or jurisdiction. Second, treaties - in-
cluding human rights treaties - generally obligate the primary
State to undertakings only within its territory or control. The
ICCPR, for example, expressly limits State Party obligations to
individuals "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction. 5 7
[A] re the product of nearly forty years of work by the I.L.C., guided by a series
of Special Rapporteurs.... They are a contribution to the codification and
progressive development of a fundamental chapter of international law. In
this respect, potentially at least, they rank alongside the Draft Articles of the
Vienna Law of Treaties of 1966, which became, with limited changes, the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSI-
BILITY: INTRODCUTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES iX (2002) [hereinafter TEXT AND COM-
MENTARIES].
574. Id.
575. Cf Martin Flaherty, Human Rights Violations Against Defense Lawyers: The Case
of Northern Ireland, 7 HARVARD HUM. RTS. L.J. 87, 91-92 (1994) (discussing how the U.N.
Declaration on the Role of Lawyers and similar declarations furnish evidence of cus-
tomary international law).
576. As an initial matter, the Articles make clear that the actions of USAID are
directly attributable to the United States on the ground that:
[T]he conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State
under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, ju-
dicial or any functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the
State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central government or
territorial unit of the State.
ILC 2001 Report - Draft Articles, supra note 543, art. 4(1).
577. Id. art. 2.
578. ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 2(1); see also Convention for the Protection of
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By contrast, express or even implicit obligations concerning the
rights of persons outside a country's authority - such as those
analyzed in the previous part - are the exception rather than
the rule.
The Articles nonetheless recognize that in certain situations
the actual inequality among States belies the presumption of sov-
ereign equality that normally insulates one country from the ef-
fects of its policies within another. Chapter IV of the Articles
specifies three situations in which one State may be responsible
for the act of another State in the commission of an internation-
ally wrongful act: (1) when the outside State provides aid and
assistance for the primary State's breach; (2) when it directs or
controls commission of the primary State's wrongful act; or (3)
when it coerces the primary State's violation."' In each of these
contexts, the Articles extend what counts as an act or omission
attributable to the external State beyond its immediate actions.
As further explained in the Commentaries, each instance de-
scribes a case of "derived responsibility. '5 0 With regard to coer-
cion, the Articles also expand the scope of the external State's
obligations to include those undertaken by the primary State.581
For the purposes of the Mexico City Policy, the two most promis-
ing approaches involve firstly, aid and assistance, and secondly,
coercion.
1. Derived Responsibility Through Aid and Assistance
Article 16 "deals with the situation where one State provides
aid or assistance to another with a view to facilitating the com-
mission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter."5 2 In
essence it sets out three elements for the outside State to be held
responsible. First, the State must "aid . . . or assist ... another
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) (stating "[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure
to everyone in their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this
Convention."); American Convention on Human Rights art. 1 (1), Nov. 22, 1969, OAS
Treaty Ser. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (1978) (stating that the State Parties to the Con-
vention undertake to ensure to all persons within their jurisdiction the free and full
exercise of the rights recognized in the Convention).
579. See TEXT AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 573, at 148, 151, 156.
580. Id.
581. See id. at 64, 145-59.
582. Id. at 148.
[Vol. 29:1
EXPORTING DESPAIR
State in the commission" of the internationally wrongful act.58 3
Second, the State must do so "with the knowledge of the circum-
stances" of the wrongful act.58 4 Finally, the wrongful act in ques-
tion must be "internationally wrongful if committed by that
State. ' 585
Several, though not all, features of this standard either ex-
pressly or implicitly limit the responsibility that may be attrib-
uted to the assisting State. As a threshold matter, the Commen-
taries make clear that the "assisting State will only be responsible
to the extent that its own conduct has caused or contributed to
the internationally wrongful act. '5 6 Conversely, the aid or assis-
tance need not itself necessarily be unlawful.5"7 Nonetheless, Ar-
ticle 16 expressly requires that the aiding State must act with ex-
press knowledge of the internationally unlawful act.5 88 While
the aid or assistance itself need not necessarily be unlawful, the
aid or assistance must at least be given "with a view to facilitating
the commission of the wrongful act," a requirement that limits
responsibility to "cases where the aid or assistance is clearly
linked to the subsequent wrongful conduct.""5 9 Finally and most
importantly, the final condition limits the assisting State's culpa-
bility to the breach of obligations by which it is itself bound.
This limitation reflects the standard principle in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties590 that "a State is not bound
by the obligation of another State vis-a-vis third States. "591 Given
the comparative U.S. reluctance to sign and ratify human rights
instruments - and especially to do so without reservations592
this limitation has potentially far-reaching consequences for as-
signing responsibility based upon aid and assistance that contrib-
ute to human rights violations in another country.
These limitations place substantial hurdles before any effort
to hold the United States accountable for the effects of the Mex-
ico City Policy in Kenya. That said, some requirements are less
583. Id. at 64.
584. Id.
585. Id.
586. Id. at 148.
587. Id. at 150-51.
588. Id. at 64.
589. Id. at 149.
590. See id.; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 38, arts. 34-35.
591. TEXT AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 573, at 149.
592. See Spiro, supra note 561, at 567.
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problematic than others. As noted, a colorable case can be
made that the restrictions placed upon USAID health care fund-
ing, while lawful by themselves, bear a direct causal connection
to retrogression in health care, a disparately onerous impact on
women, and a chilling effect on medical counseling. Moreover,
a case can also be made that U.S. and USAID authorities would
have been fully aware of these consequences as the likely result
of the Mexico City restrictions, especially since previous un-
restricted USAID funding had helped establish and sustain the
NGO health care structure that the restrictions would threaten.
Translated into the language of the Commentaries, the Mexico
City limitations are "clearly linked" to Kenya's failure to sustain
progressive realization of its health care obligations or to meet
its core minimum obligations, among other wrongful acts.59
More difficult to overcome is the barrier requiring that the
United States accept the same international obligations as Kenya
before State responsibility can attach. Consider first the right to
health. As noted, the United States has yet to ratify the ICESCR.
Yet, as also noted, the United States as a signatory to that instru-
ment must nonetheless refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and the purpose of the Covenant.594 The strongest argu-
ment for U.S. responsibility would be that the ICESCR obligates
a State Party to promote the rights set forth not just within its
own territory or jurisdiction, but generally among all State Par-
ties. According to this interpretation, Draft Article 16 would
merely reinforce the U.S.'s direct obligation not to undermine
Covenant rights in the territory or jurisdiction of other State Par-
ties, as discussed in the previous section. An intermediate inter-
pretation would hold that, even if the ICESCR does not impose a
direct obligation on a State Party to promote rights beyond its
borders, signing the Covenant nonetheless satisfies Article 16's
requirement that the assisting State be bound at home by the
obligations it helped violate abroad. On this view, to the extent
that the United States is under a duty not to frustrate the object
and purpose of an obligation within its own borders, it could be
held responsible for undermining the same obligation in Kenya.
In this way, Article 16 would deliver the "derived responsibility"
593. See supra notes 579-89 and accompanying text.
594. See supra notes 579-89 and accompanying text.
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that this Chapter of the Draft Articles address.5"5 Finally, the
most mechanical reading of the provision would be that United
States bears no responsibility even under Article 16 on the
ground that any obligation it has to promote health care runs
solely within its borders, that it would not be wrongful for the
United States to violate health care rights within Kenya, and
therefore that its assistance in Kenya's own violations creates no
"derived responsibility."
Of these possibilities, the most sensible is to read Article 16
as requiring only that an assisting State be bound by the same
human rights undertakings within its own territory or jurisdic-
tion rather than by human rights undertakings that bear directly
on the assisted State. On one hand, mandating that an assisting
State affirmatively sign on to parallel obligations goes some dis-
tance in addressing the classic concern that nations should not
be held responsible for international commitments they them-
selves have in no way accepted.5 6 This interpretation reinforces
the importance of not reading too broadly a State's human
rights commitments. On the other hand, the intermediate inter-
pretation of Article 16 addresses Chapter IV's basic concern that
States be held responsible for international wrongs to the extent
they have helped bring about their commission.59 7 More specifi-
cally, this reading helps prevent a situation in which an individ-
ual whose human rights have been violated can complain only to
their own State rather than to an outside State whose actions
may have had as much, or more, to do with bringing about the
violation. That said, it is clear that the Commentaries do not
deal with this type of situation.5 8 To this extent, both Article 16
and its supplementary materials require further clarification
along the lines proposed.
A similar analysis applies with even greater force to freedom
of expression under the ICCPR. As discussed, in this instance
the United States has both signed and ratified the Covenant, al-
beit with reservations.59 9 Conversely, the ICCPR's express limita-
tion that a State Party ensure the recognized rights to all individ-
595. See TEXT AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 573, at 147.
596. See supra notes 579-89 and accompanying text.
597. See id.
598. By contrast, Article 18, which deals with coercion, expressly discusses this
problem. See TEXT AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 573, at 157.
599. See supra notes 579-89 and accompanying text.
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uals "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction" precludes
direct U.S. responsibility with regard to such rights as expres-
sion.600 Nonetheless, derivative responsibility under Article 16
may be asserted. First, the Mexico City Policy aids and assists the
violation of the right to free expression, as the epithet "Global
Gag Rule" implies.6"1 Second, U.S. officials adopted the policy
with an even greater knowledge and awareness that it would lead
to such violations given that prohibiting speech was the center-
piece of the new rules.60 2 Finally, U.S. ratification of the ICCPR
fulfills the requirement that an assisting State may be held re-
sponsible for an international wrong so long as it has assumed
the same obligations within its borders that the principal State
has within its territory.60 3
For these reasons, derived responsibility through aid and as-
sistance also applies to the prohibition against gender discrimi-
nation contained not just in CEDAW, but in the general anti-
discrimination provisions of the Covenants themselves. Once
again, the Mexico City Policy closely aided and assisted the viola-
tion of the relevant rights, here through the disproportionately
adverse effects on Kenyan women.60 4 Likewise, it would have
been difficult for U.S. officials not to know that the proposed
funding restrictions would have anything other than the type of
disparate impact that this Report has identified.60 5 And lastly,
U.S. signature of CEDAW, as with the ICESCR, carries the basic
obligation not to frustrate the object and purpose of the Con-
vention. Again, on a reading of Article 16 that requires States to
600. ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 1.
601. See supra notes 579-89 and accompanying text.
602. See supra notes 579-89 and accompanying text.
603. Nor, in this instance, do U.S. reservations to the ICCPR alter this analysis.
The United States has made no reservation to Article 19, which protects freedom of
expression. By contrast, it has ratified Article 20, which prohibits war propaganda and
hate speech, with the proviso that nothing in that article shall "authorize or require
legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict the right of free
speech and association protected by the Constitution of the United States." ICCPR Res-
ervations, supra note 562, no. I(1) (emphasis added). More broadly, the United States
has also attached what amounts at least to a declaration stating that nothing in the
ICCPR requires any action "prohibited' by the Constitution "as interpreted by the United
States." Id. at no. V (emphasis added). None of these restrictions apply, among other
reasons, because application of Article 19 to the Mexico City Policy expands the right
beyond what the United States protects rather than reduces it to something less than
current constitutional protection. See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
604. See supra notes 579-89 and accompanying text.
605. See supra notes 579-89 and accompanying text.
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be bound by the same obligation within its territory or jurisdic-
tion, it follows that it bears responsibility for having undermined
these instruments' central objects through the close and know-
ing discrimination against women abroad that the Mexico City
Policy has effectively caused.6 °6
2. Derived Responsibility Through Coercion
Whereas Article 16 identifies State responsibility in the case
of aid and assistance, Article 18 attributes responsibility in cir-
cumstances of outright coercion. Accordingly, it sets out only
two elements. First, the act at issue "would, but for the coercion,
be an internationally wrongful act of the coerced State."6 °7 Sec-
ond, as before, the outside State must cause the international
wrong "with the knowledge of the circumstances of the act."6 8
By contrast, there is no requirement that the coercing State be
bound by the same obligations as the primary State. The Com-
mentaries explain this omission in part because the injured party
would potentially have no redress since the primary State could
defend itself from responsibility on the ground that the outside
coercion constituted force majeure and so precluded the principal
State from responsibility. 09 Despite one less element, applica-
tion of Article 18 to the Mexico City Policy entails greater diffi-
culties. For the reasons already discussed, the United States had
every reason to have "knowledge of the circumstances of the act"
of placing informational restrictions on its aid, including the
likely effect on individuals within the countries dependent on
606. Chapter IV sets out a third case of derived responsibility that falls between aid
and assistance, see supra notes 579-89 and accompanying text, and coercion, see supra
note 579-89. Under Article 17, an outside State may be responsible for an international
wrong "when it directs and controls another State." TEXT AND COMMENTARIES, supra
note 573, at 64. As with Article 16, derived responsibility further depends on whether
the directing State acts with knowledge of the circumstances of the wrongful act and
whether the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State. Id.
607. TEXT AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 573, at 64.
608. Id.
609. See id. at 1567. This explanation for the omission of the requirement for
Article 18 reinforces an "intermediate" reading of Article 16 to require no more than
that a State have bound itself to an international human rights norm within its jurisdic-
tion. The Article 18 commentary indicates an overriding concern for an injured party
having recourse with some State. The intermediate interpretation of Article 16 bal-
ances this concern, to the extent a wrongful act was caused by an outside State, with the
opposing concern that such a State not be bound by international standards it did not
undertake.
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such funding.6 1 Conversely, whether the aid restrictions at issue
amounted to coercion is another matter. According to the Com-
mentaries, "coercion for the purpose of Article 18 is narrowly
defined," and "has the same essential character as force
majeure."'' They elaborate that, "[n]othing less than conduct
that forces the will of the coerced State will suffice, giving it no
effective choice but to comply with the wishes of the coercing
State." '6 12 To force a State's will, moreover, establishes a de-
manding test: "It is not sufficient that compliance with the obli-
gation is made more difficult or onerous." '613 Nor is it "enough
that the consequences of the coerced act merely make it more
difficult for the coerced State to comply with the obligation."
61 4
Given this narrow definition of coercion, attributing respon-
sibility to the United States would be hard to sustain. As this
Report has shown, U.S. imposition of onerous restrictions to es-
sential health care aid - especially upon which Kenya had be-
come reliant - presented the Kenyan NGOs, who had assumed
a significant portion of reproductive and general care, with the
difficult choice of accepting these limitations and undermining
their core mission or rejecting them at the cost of seeing essen-
tial services dramatically decline.615 However much U.S. policy-
makers sought to pressure Kenyan NGO's to choose funding
over their freedom to operate, this attempt at coercion failed.
As a legal matter, however, the key question relates not to
U.S. attempts to pressure non-governmental providers, but to
pressure the government of Kenya. To the extent it presided
over a diminution in health and information, the Kenyan gov-
ernment violated the relevant human rights obligations that it
had assumed. Under Article 18, the inquiry comes down to
whether Kenya had any choice but to accept this situation. How-
ever difficult, Kenya could have obtained support from other do-
nor nations to make up the shortfall, reallocated admittedly
scarce resources to increase the public health care sector, in-
creased taxes, and further taken these or other steps in anticipa-
tion of the real possibility that the Mexico City Policy would re-
610. TEXT AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 573, at 64.
611. Id. at 156.
612. Id.
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. See supra notes 579-89 and accompanying text.
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cur. In each instance, one would have to show that these or
other options were not available before the United States could
be deemed to have engaged in outright coercion. Certainly as a
practical matter the Kenyan government was left with very few
realistic alternatives once the United States reinstituted the Mex-
ico City restrictions. As a matter of international law, however,
the alternatives would have to be so limited that the United
States effectively gave Kenya no choice but to violate its interna-
tional obligations.
For similar reasons, Article 18 also precludes Kenya from
asserting the defense that it has been coerced. To mount such a
defense, it would have to show that its actions resulted from force
majeure: "[T] he occurrence of an irresistible force or of an un-
foreseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it mate-
rially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obliga-
tion." '6 16 The Commentaries make clear that for the purpose of
derived responsibility, coercion "has the same essential character
as force majeure" for the purpose of a defense.6 17 It follows "that
in most cases .. .the responsibility of the coerced State will be
precluded vis-d-vis the injured third State [or, under human
rights instruments, injured persons]."6" Equating the two con-
cepts, however, reinforces their narrowness. Aside from demon-
strating an irresistible force or unforeseen event, the Draft Arti-
cles further make clear that a State can assert force majeure only if
it did not result in whole or part from the State's own con-
duct,"' or if the State has assumed the risk of the situation oc-
curring. 62 As applied, it would therefore be no less difficult for
Kenya to assert a defense than it would be to maintain U.S. coer-
cion. The return of the Mexico City Policy could not be said to
be unforeseen. Nor could it be said that Kenya's own policies
had nothing to do with the effects of the restrictions once the
616. TEXT AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 573, at 65.
617. Id. at 156-57.
618. Id. at 157. As noted, the Commentaries explain that one reason for not re-
quiring that coercing States be obligated to the same international commitments as the
coerced States is the equivalence of coercion and force majeure. Given that a coerced
State can preclude responsibility for an internationally wrongful act as a matter of force
majeure, to allow the coercing State to preclude responsibility on the ground that it did
not share the same obligations as the coerced State would mean that an injured party
would not have any State to hold accountable for the international wrong suffered. Id.
619. See id. at 65
620. See id.
2005]
110 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
United States reinstituted them. As a practical matter, the Bush
Administration gave countries such as Kenya few alternatives
other than to oversee the violations of the fundamental rights at
issue. But as a legal matter, even such a powerful application of
economic pressure does not suffice to make the United States
accountable for the consequences it has effectively wrought.
3. Need for Clarification and Reform
The Mexico City Policy highlights both the promise and lim-
itations that the Draft Articles present. The culmination of a de-
cades-long international process, they consolidate State responsi-
bility doctrine and extend it well beyond its classical origins. As
such, the Draft Articles merit conversion into a multilateral
treaty on the model of the Vienna Convention. Yet they should
not be deemed the last word on the subject. At the most general
level, neither the Draft Articles nor the Commentaries focus
State responsibility on the special context of multilateral human
rights obligations. Still less are they clear or comprehensive with
regard to affirmative rights in circumstances involving rich and
powerful States effectively exerting pressure on weaker counter-
parts that results in violations of the more vulnerable States
human rights commitments.
The case of Kenya highlights both the strengths and weak-
nesses of the approach of the Draft Articles. Article 16's treat-
ment of aid and assistance provides the basis for an argument
that would hold nations such as the United States accountable
for those violations of Kenya's formal human rights obligations
to the extent these foreseeably resulted from aid restrictions
along the lines of the Mexico City Policy. It would do so, how-
ever, only on an interpretation that held that the actions of the
United States would have been unlawful had they violated paral-
lel obligations that applied within its own borders. By contrast,
Article 18's handling of coercion works to foreclose U.S. respon-
sibility by dropping altogether the requirement that an act be a
violation of its own commitments. In the end, however, it sets so
high a bar in defining coercion that neither the Mexico City Pol-
icy, nor in all likelihood any aid restrictions, however onerous,
would plausibly qualify.
To this extent, a significant disconnect between law and re-
ality persists when powerful countries coerce, assist, or otherwise
[Vol. 29:1
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pressure weaker ones to commit international wrongful acts.
The existing gaps and uncertainties may or may not be advisable
with regard to international rules generally. The impact of the
Mexico City Policy in Kenya, however, demonstrates that the di-
vergence between law and reality needs to be closed when what
is at issue are fundamental human rights.
C. Duty to Cooperate
A final possible source for U.S. accountability for the effects
of the Mexico City Policy arises out of the duty to assist and coop-
erate with developing countries in a manner that respects funda-
mental human rights. As a principle of international law, mu-
tual cooperation predates even sovereignty in reflecting the es-
tablished practice of States. Some authorities have accordingly
asserted that the duty to cooperate is grounded in customary in-
ternational law, and cite evidence of the reiteration of a general
principle of cooperation in numerous international agreements
as evidence of the custom.62 The U.N. Charter includes several
references to cooperation, including Article 1 on the purposes
of the United Nations, in which Members pledge to "achieve in-
ternational cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights." '622 The
Charter recognizes "general principles of cooperation 6 23 and
empowers the General Assembly to promote international coop-
eration in politics and the development of international law6 24 as
well as in "problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humani-
tarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights. '6 25 Finally, the Charter pledges the U.N. Organi-
zation as well as individual members to cooperate in achieving
621. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1242 (1995) (defining in-
ternational law of cooperation) [hereinafter EPIL]. The view that the duty of coopera-
tion is part of customary law is supported by the reiteration of the duty in several inter-
national agreements, including the Charter of the League of Arab States, the Organiza-
tion of American States and the African Unity. Id. at 1244; see also IAN BROWNLIE, BASIC
DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 119 (1981); General Comment Three, supra note 33,
14.
622. U.N. Charter art. 1, 3.
623. Id. art. 11.
624. Id. art. 13, 1.
625. Id. art. 13, 2.
2005]
112 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
the enumerated goals.62 6 International cooperation is com-
monly understood to mean the provision of technical and finan-
cial assistance to developing countries or to countries experienc-
ing a humanitarian crisis. In recent decades, there have been
efforts to define target levels for development aid measured by
percentage of developed countries' GDP, but the substance of a
duty of international cooperation has been largely undefined. 62 7
As noted, the ICESCR also contains language reflecting a duty to
cooperate.628
These treaties and other international instruments provide
evidence of a duty to provide assistance as a matter of interna-
tional custom whether or not they themselves establish the prin-
ciple as binding treaty law. The Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights takes just this position. Framing the duty to
cooperate as a matter of customary international law renders
the principle applicable to all State regardless of whether they
were parties to the ICESCR or other specific instruments. Addi-
tionally, the customary duty brings corollary obligations respect-
ing how assistance is provided, including the obligation to pro-
vide assistance in a manner that promotes the realization of
human rights and respects the principle of sovereign equality.62 9
The Committee has further asserted that respect for and promo-
tion of human rights underpins the obligation to provide assis-
tance. The Limburg Principles, an interpretation of the Cove-
nant by noted scholars and experts, emphasizes that
"[i]nternational cooperation and assistance shall be based on
the sovereign equality of States and be aimed at the realization
of the rights contained in the Covenant."63 Under these inter-
626. The U.N. Organization is discussed in Article 55. See U.N. Charter, art. 55.
Member States are addressed in Article 56. See id. art. 56.
627. EPIL, supra note 621, at 13. There have been efforts to establish a monetary
level of aid. UNCTAD recommends countries dedicate one percent of their GDP to
development aid while a U.N. General Assembly resolution and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, a multilateral organization comprising the
wealthy countries, recommend 0.7% for development aid. Id.
628. See supra notes 579-89 and accompanying text.
629. See BROWNLIE, supra note 621, at 249-50; see also EPIL, supra note 623, at 9;
ECOSOC, CESCR, International Technical Assistance Measures, CESCR General Comment
2, U.N. Doc. E/1990/23 (1990); General Comment Three, supra note 33; General
Comment Fourteen, supra note 34.
630. U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts, Limburg Principles on the Implementation of
the International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, at 33, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1987/17 (Dec. 1987) reprinted in 9 Hum. Rts. Q. 122 (1987).
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pretations, the Mexico City Policy is inconsistent with interna-
tional obligations both to the extent that it fails to respect
human rights and constitutes interference with the recipient
country's national health policies and political process.
Further evidence of an evolving customary duty to cooper-
ate comes from non-binding instruments. At the most general
level, the U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations recognizes co-
operation as a general principle of international law in the pre-
amble, but the operative paragraphs frame the duty to cooperate
"in accordance with the Charter."'63 ' The Declaration obligates
States to cooperate in the promotion of human rights "in accor-
dance with the principles of sovereign equality and non-interven-
tion. '63 2 The pairing of the duty to cooperate and respect for
sovereign equality and non-intervention is reiterated in several
other General Assembly Declarations, all of which were adopted
with large majorities. 633 This tension reflects the dispute during
negotiations during which Western and developing States
clashed over whether the duty to cooperate is a customary or
contractual duty. With regard to heath care specifically, 1978
Alma-Ata Declaration reiterated the concern of the new interna-
tional order that "gross inequality" between States in the founda-
tion of the need for cooperation. 6 4 The Declaration posited
that inequality in access to primary health care as a matter of
"common concern to all countries.163 5 The Declaration calls on
countries to join together to eliminate gross inequality in access
to primary health care.63 6
The U.N.'s various human rights bodies, as well as NGOs,
sought further to define poverty a matter of international con-
cern. These efforts culminated in the assertion of a right to de-
631. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/8028 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
632. Id.
633. See generally Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources,
G.A. Res. 1803, Supp. No. 17, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14,
1962), reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
G.A. Res. 3281, Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 12,
1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251, 260 (1975).
634. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Global Strategy for Health for All by the Year
2000, 71-77 (1981), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/9241800038.
pdf.
635. Id.
636. See id.
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velopment, which asserts an individual and collective right to be
free of poverty and to enjoy the benefits of development and
links this to an international obligation to provide assistance.637
The right to development is theoretically grounded in the funda-
mental right of the self-determination of peoples and is con-
ceived as belonging to both nations and individuals.638 The
General Assembly gave substance to the right in its 1986 Declara-
tion on the Right to Development.6 9 The Declaration reiterates
the principle that international cooperation should be carried
out in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality and
respect for human rights.640 The 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights strongly affirmed the right to development in its
Declaration and Program of Action,6 4' which was adopted by
consensus by representatives of 171 States. 642 The human rights
organs of the U.N. have continued to promote the idea, give it
substance, and to mainstream it with other U.N. agencies re-
sponsible for development work.643 The right to development is
not a binding norm and is not the subject of any treaties. It is
significant, however, because it demonstrates the limitations of
any evidence of consent to an international obligation to provide
economic assistance. Commitments to providing assistance, as
expressed in declarations and at international conferences, re-
main voluntary commitments couched in hortatory language
and do not create binding obligations on donors. The right to
development is significant to the analysis of the effects of the
Mexico City Policy to the extent that it provides evidence of an
international consensus when development assistance is pro-
vided. Development policy must be consistent with human
637. See id.
638. See 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 368 (2000) (discussing self-
determination). ICJ Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui states that "[t]he right to develop-
ment flows from the right to self-determination and is of the same kind." Mohammed
Bedjaoui, The Right to Development, in HENRYJ. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INT'L HUMAN
RiGHTs IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1118 (1996).
639. See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128/Annex, U.N.
GAOR, 41 Sess., 97th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986).
640. See id.
641. See generally Report of the World Conference on Human Rights, U.N., U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993).
642. See id.
643. For more information on the U.N. approach to the right to development, visit
the website for the right to development of the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right.html.
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rights norms and must respect the obligation not to intervene in
a State's internal affairs without its consent.
In recent years, the idea of a transnational duty to cooper-
ate has received renewed and substantial impetus from the
movement culminating in the Millennium Development Goals
("MDGs"). These standards themselves result from the Millen-
nium Declaration, which was adopted by the U.N. General As-
sembly at a special meeting held in 2000 and attended by 147
heads of government.6 4 4 Their purpose is to form a blueprint
agreed to by all the world's countries and all the world's leading
development institutions for mutual, transnational cooperation.
Among the eight goals the MDGs set out, three bear directly on
the conditions recounted in this Report: The third, to promote
gender equality and empower women; the fourth, to reduce
child morality; and the fifth, to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
other diseases.64 As a practical matter, they have already had an
enormous impact on international development planning.646
Their implications for international human rights law are only
now being explored. At least one leading commentator, Philip
Alston, suggests that the MDGs eventually will be viewed as evi-
dence for emerging transnational obligations for development
cooperation in customary international law.64 7 The establish-
ment of such a norm may lie well into the future. The MDGs
and the movement that they articulate may nonetheless offer the
best promise for a firm duty for nations to cooperate in realizing
certain basic economic and social rights beyond their borders.
The United States is one of the largest donors to develop-
ment programs in Kenya, the leading donor to population pro-
grams, and provides extensive funding in other areas as well.6 48
Despite its failures to achieve monetary targets for providing aid,
it is not likely that the United States could be considered to be in
violation of the duty to cooperate contemplated in the U.N.
644. See United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. GAOR,
55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/millen-
nium/declaration/ares552e.htm.
645. See id.
646. See Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human
Rights and Development Debate Seen Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals, 27
HUm. RTS. Q. 755, 757 (2005).
647. See id. at 775-78.
648. See USAID/KENvA, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2004, at 4 (June 14, 2004), available at
http://pdf.dec.org/pdfLdocs/PDACA031.pdf.
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Charter. Scholarly interpretations interpret the customary obli-
gation to respect human rights as limited to those rights that are
considered customary rights and jus cogens, such as systemic ra-
cial discrimination, genocide, or torture. According to this view,
the U.S. actions do not violate the substance of the international
obligation, despite their negative effects, because the assistance
was not provided with the intention of violating a jus cogens
norm.
The version of the duty to cooperate articulated in non-
binding instruments provides a more expansive articulation of
the duty to respect human rights and sovereign equality while
providing development assistance. To the extent that the Mex-
ico City Policy impairs the enjoyment of human rights in Kenya
and undermines Kenya's national policies with regard to repro-
ductive health, it is also inconsistent with the expansive view of
the duty to cooperate. This view, however, has yet to achieve the
requisite level of State practice and opinio juris to have achieved
customary law. The persistent tensions between developed and
developing countries regarding the nature of the duty to cooper-
ate and the establishment of a new international order were
never fully resolved, but in the changed international climate of
the 1990s, the developed country language of contractual and
non-binding duties to provide assistance came to dominate de-
velopment agreements.
CONCLUSION
This Report ranges widely from specific instances of human
deprivation to the theoretic limits of international law.
Throughout its study of Kenya, the Crowley delegation found
that the United States's Mexico City Policy significantly reduced
the availability of reproductive and general health care in popu-
lations that need it the most. This pattern, moreover, was mani-
fest in each of the regions that we visited. This situation simulta-
neously implicates a number of human rights standards, but also
reveals important limitations of the traditional human rights
framework. This Report sets out evidence of cognizable viola-
tions of the right to health care, the right to equal treatment on
the basis of gender, and to the freedom of information. Yet, al-
though these obligations bind Kenya, they do not run to the
United States, the government whose policy in the first instance
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caused the violations at issue. By focusing on the intersection
between Kenyan and U.S. policy, this Report has endeavored to
show both the reach and the limits of international human
rights law in addressing the fundamental issues of health, dis-
crimination, and information that it explores. Finally, amd im-
portantly, the limitations analyzed here are not confined to the
right to health care or even the Mexico City Policy. Interna-
tional human rights law simply has little to say about transna-
tional human rights obligations in general. By identifying these
legal limits while also describing the actual human costs, the
Crowley Program hopes to make more visible the challenges that
the internataional legal community must face when wealthy,
powerful nations export despair to those less fortunate.
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ANNEX I: Crowley Mission Itinerary
Monday, May 17, 2004
TIME INTERVIEW
0900 Jane Onyango, Head of Litigation, FIDA-Kenya
0900 Karoki Elicide, Taxi Driver, Client of MSI-Eastleigh
1100 Pathfinder International
Margaret W. Gatei, Project Manager, PMTCT
Gilbert Magiri, Senior Program Officer
Pamela S.A. Onduso, Associate for Adolescent and
Sexual Health
Georgianna Platt, Program Manager
1500 USAID, Sheryl Strumbus, Director, Office of Democracy
and Governance
Tuesday, May 18, 2004
1000 Dr. Assumpta Muriithu, National Program Officer for
Reproductive Health, World Health Organization
1000 Family Planning Association of Kenya Briefing
Mr. Godwin Z. Mzenge, Executive Director
Dr. Linus Ettyang, Program Manager
1200 Ribeiro Clinic Interview, Staff
Sarah Imbadi, Registered Nurse
Dr. JA. Osur Odour, Supervising Physician
1200 Interviews at Ribeiro Clinic, former FPAK Eastleigh
Community Health Workers
Dorothy Akinyi
Charles Kanyi
Virginia Njue
Grace Adams
1200 Interviews at Ribeiro Clinic, former and present clients
of FPAK Eastleigh
Beatrice
Lorna
Rose Mugure
Esther Mutui
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Veronica Ngina
Elizabeth Njeri
Lucy Omondi
Josephine Wanjiru
1330 Visit to Nairobi Youth Center (escorted by Ruth
Wachira, Program Officer for Service Delivery, FPAK)
Diana Moreka, Nairobi Youth Centre
Peter Nzioki, Nairobi Youth Centre
Field Visits
Team One: Eldoret/Kisii
Wednesday, May 19, 2004 (Eldoret)
0700 Flight from Nairobi to Kisumu
1100 Anglican Church of Kenya-Eldoret HQ
Jackson Sambu, Director Christian Community Services
Florence
Agnes Kosk Dutto, Project Supervisor
Helen Nyego, Project Supervisor
Joan Wege, Project Supervisor
Daniel Korir, Project Supervisor, Kesses
Senyo Gutho
1230 Peter Kagwe, Pathfinder, Area Manager, Eldoret
1300 Dr. Gertrude Akolo, Assistant Program Officer, Service
Delivery Family Planning Association of Kenya, Eldoret
1500 Field Visit to Anglican Church of Kenya Community
Based Distribution Project in Kessess, Presentation/
Songs by 18 Community Health Workers
Thursday, May 20, 2004 (Kisii)
0930 Heryne Ayiemba Dok, formerly of FPAK-Kisii, now of
FPAK-Eldoret
1015 Alice Nyagaka, former FPAK Community Health
Volunteer
1045 FPAK Kisii, former clients
Colsolata Achieng
Marren Achieng
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Dorothy Akelo
Margaret
Angela Owino
Immaculate Waka
Asha Abdallah
1215 Gussi Youth Community Workers
Linet Osebe, Organizer for Osoro Township
Kennedy Nyankundi Nyandoro, Organizer for Mosocho
Ben Giseemba, Organizer for Suneka Division
1300 Zipporah Kuamboka, former FPAK Kisii client
1430 Site Visit to Aries Medical Clinic, location of former
FPAK Kisii Office
1500 Site Visit to Kisii District Hospital, Family Planning
Division
Friday, May 21, 2004 (Kisumu) RB/MH/EK
0930 Christine Ochieng, Program Officer-Litigation, FIDA-
Kisumu Branch
Return to Nairobi
Team Two: Embu
Wednesday, May 19, 2004 (Nairobi/Embu)
0900 Pathfinder, Margaret W Gatei, Project Manager, PMTCT
1000 Pamela S.A. Onduso, Associate for Adolescent and
Sexual Health
1130 David Adriance, Engender Health, Regional Director
1430 Dr. Richard 0. Muga, Director, National Council for
Population and Development, Ministry of Planning and
National Development
Government of Kenya
1900 Dr. Methuselah M. Ocharo, formerly of FPAK Embu
Thursday, May 20, 2004 (Embu)
0700 Dr. Methuselah M. Ocharo, formerly of FPAK Embu
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0800 Egla Njeru, Registered Nurse at private clinic at former
FPAK Embu Site and midwife)
0900 Former FPAK Embu Clients
Catherine Mjura Kinyua
Celina G. Marangu
Roseline Mwenda Mwai
Josephine Wantiku Mwangi
Petwnila Masimiyu Wanyama
1000 Dr. Ngari M. Benson, Medical Officer of Health
1100 B.M. Mugo, EmbuTown Clerk
1115 Dan K. Kiara, Fiscal Planning and Land Policy
Administrator
1125 Former FPAK community health providers
Nancy W. Kamav
Muchoki Kithinji
Hussein Marjan
Mary W Nyagah
Halima S. Shaban
1230 Site visit to proposed location of new FPAK clinic
1400 Sister Florence Karanja, Administrator/Nurse in Charge
Embu General Hospital
1500 FPAK Embu Grassroots & Advocacy Volunteers
SophiaJuena, Secretary Treasurer
Dick Mukono, Assistant Secretary
Friday, May 21, 2004
Travel back to Nairobi
Team Three: Kisumu (Escorted by Mr. Richard Olewe, Marie
Stopes, Regional Manager-Western Kenya)
Wednesday, May 19, 2004
0700 Flight from Nairobi to Kisumu
0830 Marie Stopes International-Kisumu
Michael Oyah, Regional Medical Advisor
Richard Olewe, Regional Director, Western Kenya
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Elizabeth A. Bunei, client
1200 Nyanza General Hospital
Rose Amolo, Maternity Ward
Dr. Kouko
Margaret Odhidambo, Hospital Matron in Charge
Lilian Oketch, Medical Officer in Charge, Support
Center
Veronica Ogonya, Prevention of Mother to Child
Transmission Unit
Diana Rochine, Nurse Officer in Charge, Pediatric Unit
Dr. Wangata
1500 Women in Fishing Industries Project Trust
Charles Otieno, Materials Coordinator
Beth Allardice, Associate Consultant
1700 Plan International
Rasi Masuhi, Program Unit Manager
Thursday, May 20, 2004
0900 Kisumu Medical Education Trust (KMET)
Monica A. Oguttu, Executive Director
Ochieng Ochollah
Jacob Ochieng Ajwang
1100 FPAK Kisumu
Martha Achesi, Nurse in Charge
1230 God's Will Clinic
Sammy Kisaid
1600 Universities of Nairobi, Illinois and Manitoba (UNIM)
Project, Lumumba Health Centre
Dr. Kwango Agot, Project Coordinator
1700 Mildmay International
Grace V. Olang
Wilfred 0. Owour
Friday, May 21, 2004
Center for Disease Control
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Nairobi Interviews
Monday, May 24, 2004
0900 Owuor Olumgah, Ph.D., Research Fellow University of
Nairobi, Institute of African Studies
0930 Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation
Rose Olende-Arungu, Executive Director
1130 Kenya Association for the Promotion of Adolescent
Health (KAPAH)
Mr. Joseph Karueru, Executive Director
1400 University of Nairobi, Faculty of Law
Dr. Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Senior Lecturer, Department
of Private Law
Pauline Nyamweya, Deputy Secretary, Research, Drafting
& Technical Support, Constitution of Kenya Review
Commission
1430 Dr. Peter 0. Odongo, Kenya Medical Association
1500 Mr. Tom Chuma, Family Planning Association of Kenya,
Finance and Administration Officer
1600 Pathfinder, Charles Thube, Country Representative,
Kenya
Tuesday, May 25, 2004
0830 Nyabera Emmanuel, Public Information Officer, UNHCR
0930 Sam Mwamburi Mwale, Economic Advisor
Government of Kenya
Ministry of Planning and National Development
1000 Ms. Elizabeth Oyugi, CARE-Kenya, Sector Advisor for
Civil Society & HIV/AIDS
1100 Research Visit to FIDA-Kenya Resource Center
1300 Dr. Henry van den Hamburg, Coordinator of Health
Programs, Deutsche Gesellschaf fur Technishce
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)
1400 Transparency International-Kenya
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Gladwell Wathoni Otieno, Executive Director
Mwalimu Mati, Deputy Executive Director
1530 Dr. F.M. Kimani
Deputy Director of Medical Services
Government of Kenya, Ministry of Health
Wednesday, May 26, 2004
0830 Pumwani Hospital, Sista Ambetsa, Hospital Matron in
Charge
1030 Video Documentation of Eastleigh Youth Center
1100 Grace Otiemo, Center Manager, Marie Stopes, Eastleigh
1100 Julian Wambui, Former Client, Marie Stopes, Eastleigh
1300 Kenya AIDS NGO Consortium
James Kimani
1300 Site Visit to Mathare Valley (site of former MSI clinic)
Rose Were, Nurse
Grace Achewa, Community Health Volunteer
Henrietta Asitsu, Community Health Volunteer
Mary Kiilu, client
Somali woman, client
Nancy Wanjiku, client
Jane Waniyiku, client
1400 Dr. Soloman, Deputy Director, Reproductive Health
Services
Ministry of Health
Thursday, May 27, 2004
0830 Pumwani Hospital
Dr. Daniel M. Nguku, Medical Officer of Health
David Kiragu, OB/GYN, Hospital Superintendent
0900 Wholistic Caring and Counseling Center
Grace Gitaka, Founder and Executive Director
Amoso (Jane) Wanza, Nurse
Jane Owour, Social Worker
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1000 Dr. Sam Kalibala, International AIDS Vaccine Initiative,
Regional Representative, Nairobi
1300 Professor Wanjiku Kabira, Commissioner
Nancy Baraza, Rapporteur for Bill of Rights Committee
1400 Robert Schrembs, GTZ
1500 Mr. Cyprian Awiti, Program Director, Marie Stopes
Kenya
1600 Dr. Bernand Sinyana, University of Nairobi, Law Faculty
1800 Ann Gathumbi-Masheti, Coalition on Violence Against
Women, Co-Ordinator
Friday, May 28, 2004
0800 Professor Githu Mathai, University of Nairobi
Joined by Jean Kamal, Femnet, former Director of
FIDA-Kenya
0900 Dr. R. Koigi Kamau, Dr. Oyeba
Kenyatta National Hospital, High Risk Clinic
0900 Mr. Mbugua Kang'ethe, AMKENI, Operations Manager,
Finance and Administration
0930 National Council of Churches of Kenya
Ms. Suzie Ibutu, Director of Advocacy
Bwibo Adieri, Director of Social Services Delivery
1000 Mr. Tewodros Melesse, Regional Director, International
Planned Parenthood Federation
1400 Former Clients of Marie Stopes-Mathare Valley
Wilfred Adhiambo
Dorothy Akimyi
Caroline Akoth
Josephine Atori
Oliver Khitieyi
Dorcas Sanya
Virginia Wambui
1430 Tama Bein Aime, Executive Director, Equality Now
1500 Mr. Justice JB. Ojwang, High Court of Kenya
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1630 Nancy Nelima Nafula, Assistant Analyst, Kenya Institute
for Public Policy Research and Analysis
ANNEX II: Additional Interviews
Mehlika Hoodbhoy Preliminary Trip to Nairobi,
Kenya, February 2-6, 2004
Monday, February 2, 2004
Rob Burnet, Program Officer, Ford Foundation
Florence Manguyu, Regional Policy Advisor, International AIDS
Vaccine Initiative
Tuesday, February 3, 2004
Jane Kiragu, Executive Director, FIDA-Kenya
Cyprian Awiti, Program Director, Marie Stopes Kenya
Martha Mutunga, Manager, VSC Projects
Afternoon site visit to MSK Clinic in Eastleigh
Wednesday, February 4, 2004
David Adriance, Regional Director, Engender Health
Dr. Job Obwaka, Project Director, AMKENI
Mbugua Kangethe, Operations Manager, AMKENI
Michael Strong, USAID/Kenya
Thursday, February 5, 2004
Hon. Prof. P. Anyang' Nyong'o, Minister of Planning and National
Development
Dr. Linus Ettyang, FPAK, Program Manager
Dr. Charles Weiyo, FPAK, Program Officer in Charge of Service
Delivery
Tom Chuma, FPAK, Finance and Administration Manager
Mr. Mwalumi Mati, Deputy Executive Director, Transparency
International-Kenya
Ms. Mary Ann Burnis, Trust for Indigenous Health and Culture
Friday, February 6, 2004
Site visit with Marie Stopes Kenya to Machakos-Kyawalia Clinic,
escorted by Martha Mutunga, Manager, VSC Projects
